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When Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, Ltd. ( CNOOC) attempted to 
buy American-owned Unocal Corporation, it unleashed a “perfect storm” in Washington.  
Members of Congress immediately called upon President Bush to invoke his Exon-Florio 
authority to prevent the transaction.  After the president claimed action would be 
premature, Congress quickly coalesced to block the deal.  The Chinese expressed surprise 
at the political backlash and ultimately CNOOC was forced to withdraw its bid. 
The purpose of this study is to explain the fervor that arose over CNOOC’s 
proposed acquisition of Unocal.  The study builds upon the theoretical approach of new 
institutionalism which emerged in response to the shortcomings of theories that 
diminished the importance of political values and collective choice in foreign policy 
making.  Since institutionalism emphasizes the significance of history and assumes the 
infusion of societal values over time, the study applies historical research methodology to 
the case study.  Sources of data include the U.S. Constitution, statute , judicial opinions, 
congressional hearings and reports, White House papers, administrative rules, and 




The study examines how the president and Congress rely upon formal rules for 
making policy, and how these rules reinforce the status quo and createobstacles for 
change.  Over the years, the president has acquired greater foreign pol cy making 
authority which has upset the balance of power between the two decision-maki g bodies.  
Since policy making is incremental, members of Congress have needed to be resourceful 
in devising informal mechanisms for change.  One such mechanism is politicization of an 
event to raise public awareness, elevate an issue to the top of the policy agenda, and build 
coalitions essential to passing legislation. 
The research finds that competition between the president and Congress over 
foreign and national security policy authority is played out in Washington and is reflected 
in policy outcomes.  In the Unocal acquisition case, politicization allowed members of 
Congress to advance their agenda to tighten up the president’s process f r reviewing 
foreign acquisitions and to give Congress greater oversight authority. 
This study is important and timely because China has become a ajor player in 
the global economy and is driving the global search for new and reliable sources of 
energy.  As China extends its reach, competition with the U.S. and other major energy 
importers will increase.  Although competition is considered essential for a healthy 
capitalist economy, other factors influence whether competition will have a positive or 
negative impact on competitors.  One of these factors is the perception of how China’s 
emergence in the global economy will affect U.S. national security.  The future of U.S.-
China relations will depend upon the ability of our political institutions to achieve 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Early in 2005 the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, Ltd. (CNOOC) 
expressed interest in purchasing American-owned Unocal Corporation.  The Chinese 
company’s proposal unleashed a “perfect storm” in the world of Washington politics.1  
Claiming that the foreign acquisition of an American oil corporatin would threaten 
national security, a group of U.S. legislators called on President Bush to invoke his Exon-
Florio authority and prevent the transaction.2  But when the Bush Administration stated 
this action would be premature, Congress quickly coalesced to block the deal.  Th  speed 
with which Congress reached consensus to intervene in the proposed transaction w s 
exceptional.  At the same time, media coverage elevated the event in the public’s eye and 
further politicized the issue of foreign acquisitions of American businesses. 
The Chinese expressed surprise about the reaction in Congress, emphasizing that 
CNOOC had proposed a routine business transaction and the company’s manage ent 
had made every effort to be transparent and comply with American law.  Heated debates 
                                                
1 In 1997, Sebastian Junger adopted the phrase “perfect storm” as the title of his book 
about the 1991 Nor’easter storm.  Here, we use it to describe a perfect situation where a 
rare combination of circumstances occurs to generate a political outcry that esults in 
policy change. 
 
2 The Exon-Florio Amendment to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 was 
initially introduced in Congress to order the executive branch to examine trade with 
countries that had a large trade surplus.  The law has evolved over time and will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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ensued, lasting throughout the summer until the eleventh hour when CNOOC directors 
finally withdrew the bid just before it was to go to the Unocal stockholders for a vote on 
August 10, 2005.  In spite of severe criticism against China, Beijing did not escalate the 
issue beyond strongly admonishing Congress for its tactics.  The CNOOC bid slowly 
faded from the American press but continued to be a point of discussion in Congress as 
key legislators sought greater oversight of foreign mergers and acquisitions under 
statutory authority of the Exon-Florio Amendment and how it was being implemented. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese were particularly perplexed by the national security 
concerns voiced by American legislators.  Ever since the 1980s, the Chinese leadership 
had pursued a foreign policy based on the principles of “independence and peace.”  The 
primary goal had been to accelerate economic growth so as to attain a higher standard of 
living for Chinese citizens and the consensus in China was that economic growth can best 
be realized in a peaceful global environment.  For more than two decades, the U.S. 
government had supported China’s cooperative approach and encouraged China to 
become more engaged in the global economy.  Given the mutually beneficial conomic 
relationships that had developed between the two nations, why would the U.S. Congress 
oppose CNOOC’s bid to purchase a failing U.S. corporation when mergers and 
acquisitions are a basic feature of competition in the capitalist market? 
The purpose of this study is to explain the fervor that arose in Congress over the 
CNOOC bid.  We examine American political institutions from a socio-historical 
perspective which views these institutions as being embedded with values that are 
reflected in the formal rules for policy making that develop over time.  Although formal 
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rules reinforce institutional stability, they often create obstacles and constraints that 
inhibit efficient policy making and restrict institutional actors from accomplishing their 
own policy goals.  As a result, institutional actors often turn to informal mechanisms for 
creating change. 
Sometimes these informal mechanisms are straight forward and transparent, and 
eventually become formalized.  But sometimes these mechanisms are obtuse and difficult 
to comprehend.  For this reason, scholars have relegated informal policy making to the 
“black box” where the process may be obvious or intuitive to institutional actors, but 
appears mysterious to outside observers.  This mystery is especially ominous when the 
outside observers are from a foreign nation and have not been immersed in the American 
culture and values which have shaped the formal rules and have influenced the political 
dynamics that take place within the “black box.” 
The study is an attempt to delve into the obscurity of the “black box” where actors 
filter information and devise alternative mechanisms for circumventing or overcoming 
the formal rules that are inherently resistant to change.  The analysis examines the 
dynamics of formal constraints and informal mechanisms of change, how these dynamics 
may elevate a particular issue to the top of the foreign policy agenda and, by doing so, 
may influence political outcomes which have broader implications for future policy 
making. 
This dissertation considers these institutional characteristics within the context of 
a changing world – a twenty-first century global economy adjusting to China’s global 
expansion and America’s heightened sense of vulnerability and increased emphasis on 
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national security.  This specific case study investigating the political reaction which 
surfaced when Chinese-owned CNOOC attempted to acquire a floundering American-
owned corporation is both important and timely.  China has become a major playe  in the 
global economy and China’s economic growth is driving its global search for new 
sources of energy.  As China extends its reach, competition with the United States and 
other major energy importers will increase. 
Although competition is considered essential for a healthy capitalist economy, 
other factors influence whether competition will have a positive or negative impact on the 
competitors.3  Perhaps most significant, is that China’s emergence in the global economy 
has occurred at a time when there has been increased discussion about “peak oil,” 
increased concern that global supplies of recoverable fossil fuel are decreasing, and 
increased concern about the impact of greenhouse gases generated by th  burning of 
fossil fuels.  If China’s demand for energy continues to increase at its current rate, global 
fuel shortages will be accompanied by increased costs worldwide.  As a result, American 
citizens may no longer be able to enjoy the low-priced energy and steady economic 
growth that they have come to take for granted.4 
                                                
3 Flynt Leverett and Jeffry Bader, “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the 
Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06): 187-201.  Leverett and 
Bader cite Henry Kissinger’s concern that competition over energy is likely to cause 
international conflict.  The authors argue that “prudent” management of the competition 
for Middle Eastern oil will be necessary to avoid friction between China and the U.S.  
See also Caroline Daniel, “Kissinger Warns of Energy Conflict,” Financial Times, June 
2, 2005; and Robert A. Manning, The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas of 
Energy, Security and the Pacific Future (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
 
4 For an introduction to this debate see, for example, Gal Luft and AnneKorin, “The 
Sino-Saudi Connection,” Commentary 117, no. 3 (March 2004): 26-29; and Dan 
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China’s aggressive development policies may also impact the global balance of 
power which, in turn, will influence how nations perceive their need for national security.  
Although the capitalist economy is based on free trade and the United States values free 
trade, the U.S. government also uses trade policies to influence foreign governments and 
promote American ideals.  If China pursues global expansion and negotiat s r de 
agreements which do not impose similar policies or do not aspire to achieve similar 
ideals, it may undermine the preeminence of the United States in the global economy.  
This may lead to a change in the balance of power among nation states and threaten U.S. 
national security. 
Past studies have shown that corporations seeking to extend their operations 
beyond national boundaries face a number of issues they do not face when operating 
within the borders of a single nation-state.  There are risks and co flicts that arise in 
trying to do business in nation-states with different cultures, values, and political systems.  
Historically, there has been a perception that the interests of global corporations are 
identical with the interests of the governments in the home countries of those 
corporations.  This perception has been reinforced by the international relations literature 
dominated by the realism and balance of power theories. 
However, theories that explained foreign policy during the Cold War haveless 
explanatory power today.  After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States claimed 
status as the most preeminent world power; but during the last decade China has emerged 
                                                                                                                                                 
Blumenthal, “China and the Middle East: Providing Arms,” Middle East Quarterly 12, 




as a major player in the global economy.  In addition, the United States has lost 
negotiating power as terrorist groups have expanded their activities.  T rrorism in the 
twenty-first century extends beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and threatens 
national security at the same time that it challenges the tenan s of traditional international 
relations theories.  
New theories are needed to understand the complexity of U.S.-China relations in 
which the two nations espouse contradictory ideologies, yet pursue foreign policies which 
have created mutual dependence on one another for economic growth.  The lines of 
demarcation are becoming blurred as the Chinese Communist Party is brogating some of 
its economic powers to private corporations, while the U.S. Congress is reining in 
capitalist corporations with increased regulatory constraints. 
This study builds upon the theoretical approach of new institutionalism.  The 
theory first emerged in response to the shortcomings of realism nd other strains of 
thought which diminished the importance of political values and collective choice.  While
institutionalism has substantial explanatory powers, recent theory-building efforts have 
focused on distinguishing separate strains within the institutional school of thought.  This 
study challenges bifurcation of the theory by identifying a common theoretical core. 
This approach to institutionalism assumes the significance of an institution’s 
history and the infusion of societal values over time.  These factors affect the institution’s 
structure and role within the polity.  In the United States, policy makers operate under the 
rule of law, which the founders intended to be transparent, and these rules constitute 
institutional constraints which reinforce stability.  The tendency towards institutional 
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stasis benefits society by creating a sense of security wh ch is important in a democratic 
society where individualism prevails and where individuals are expected to take 
responsibility for planning their futures.  These institutional rules and values encourage 
innovation and entrepreneurship, but the system of checks and balances (and the 
constraints it imposes on political actors) affects legislative efficiency and makes it 
difficult for Congress to react quickly and enact laws in a timely manner. 
This approach looks at the endogenous institutional factors that impact decision 
making, but also acknowledges that external factors – such as the role that the U.S. and 
China play in the global economy, increased competition for steady and reliable supplies 
of energy, and predictions concerning peak oil – play a role in decision making.  When 
CNOOC began its quest to purchase Unocal, the company thought it was playing 
according the rules of the American capitalist economy.  Even CNOOC’s foreign 
advisors, who assisted with crafting the proposal, seem to have been caught off guard 
when they did not foresee the reaction in Congress.  The significance of the ongoing 
political tug-of-war between the U.S. president and Congress concerning foreign 
commercial transactions seems to have escaped others as well, including U.S.-China 
analysts and international economists, who also expressed surprise ove the politicization 
of CNOOC’s business proposal. 
This study aims to build an awareness of how the built-in tension between the 
executive and legislative branches causes U.S. legislators to res rt to informal 
mechanisms to accomplish their personal agendas.  It delves into the question of whether 
the proposed CNOOC purchase really constituted a national security threat, or whether 
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there were other motives behind politicization of this particular busines  transaction.  The 
research indicates that the underlying reason for bringing the proposed acquisition to the 
public’s attention was to build support for modifying the Exon-Florio Amendment.  Even 
though Congress had passed the Exon-Florio Amendment decades earlier, presidents 
have intervened in very few business interactions and have prohibited only ahandful of 
deals from being consummated.  For years, legislators had been calling for increased 
oversight over the president’s implementation of the statute.  But they faced institutional 
constraints which weakened their ability to reform the Exon-Florio provisions.  This case 
study shows how individual members of Congress acted strategiclly to politicize 
CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal as a means of overcoming these institutional 
constraints. 
The complexity of this single event and the depth of misunderstanding by the 
Chinese and other foreign observers call for examination of three separate, yet integrated, 
matters affecting U.S.-China policy.  The first concerns China’s unique approach towards 
economic development and integration into the world economy.  The second concerns the 
fragmented approach towards policy making in the United States and its impact on U.S.-
China policy decisions.  The third concerns the impact of September 11, 2001 on the 
lives of American citizens and elevation of national security on the U.S. policy making 
agenda.   
Chapter 2 sets the stage for analyzing the politicization of CNOOC’s bid for 
Unocal by discussing China’s development strategy and the need for continually 
increasing energy supplies to support economic growth.  Chapter 3 lays the foundation 
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for understanding the incessant competition between the U.S. president an  Congress by 
examining the historical process of institutionalization in which formal rules were 
developed and values were embedded in the political system.  Chapter 3 also examines 
how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks empowered the presidency and ultimately 
led the 109th Congress to reach a consensus that congressional oversight over the 
president’s Exon-Florio authority needed to be strengthened.  These two chapters set the 
stage for the case study analysis in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 distinguishes laws that govern domestic mergers and acquisitions from 
those that govern foreign mergers and acquisitions.  It discusses the l gislative history of 
the Exon-Florio Amendment which was enacted to delegate authority to the president to 
prevent foreign mergers and acquisitions when national security was at stake.  Once 
implemented, members of Congress realized the shortcomings of the Exon-Florio 
Amendment, but found it difficult to correct those shortcomings within the formal 
constraints imposed by the institutional structures, rules, and standards.  Analysis of the 
Unocal case shows how members of Congress resorted to informal mechanisms, 
including politicization of this specific event, to accomplish their policy goals. 
Chapter 5 continues the story of the Unocal by examining the outcomes f the
perfect storm that the CNOOC bid unleashed in 2005.  Politicization of the event unified 
Congress in moving forward to modify the Exon-Florio Amendment, but the coup de 
grâce came several months later when Congress learned that the Uni ed Arab Emirates-
owned Dubai Ports World was purchasing London-based Peninsular and Orietal Steam 
Navigation Company which operated ports in the United States.  The chapter argues that 
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the back-to-back foreign acquisitions proposed by CNOOC and Dubai Ports W rld, 
within the context of the need for heightened national security after 9/11 and a growing 
phobia of China’s dominance in the global market provided the impetus for members of 
Congress to use informal mechanisms to reassert their legislative prerogatives and take 
back power from the presidency.  In short, the analysis shows that the CNOOC deal fell 
victim to a domestic power struggle in the United States. 
The rest of this introductory chapter focuses on the development of the theoretical 
approach for this case study.  First we review the realist pproach to the study of 
international relations and how it assumes a national consensus regarding fo eign policy 
decisions.  Then we explain how new institutionalism emerged in response to the realist 
approach as a means of “bringing the state back in” to the discussion of international 
relations and how institutional theory allows for consideration of the role that domestic 
conflict plays in determining foreign policy outcomes.  Finally, wed scribe our 
theoretical approach and methodology in more detail. 
 
I.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
A.  Realism 
 In our quest to answer the Unocal puzzle, we first turn to international relations 
theory as it developed after World War II when nations divided into two major camps –
those which adhered to a capitalist world-view and those which adhered to a communist 
world-view.  The chasm created by this bi-polar world, dominated by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, led international relations scholars to focus foreign policy concerns 
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on the distribution of power, the causes of war, and the conditions necessary for peaceful 
coexistence.5  At the same time, there was a movement towards bringing more credibility 
to the field of study by emphasizing the importance of developing a scientific approach.6  
Since then, international relations scholars have held to the tenet that intellectual progress 
depends on rigorous theory and systematic empirical testing; that is, better theory and 
better methods of theory testing are necessary for the field to be relevant to policy makers 
and those concerned with foreign policy issues.  The presumption is that policy makers 
would make better decisions if they could identify the causal forces that drive 
international relations and foreign policy.7 
It is within this context that realism emerged as the favored approach to the study 
of international relations.8  Realists assume the structure of the international system i  
defined by the formal arrangement and position of states within that system.  The primary 
                                                
5 Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957); 
Hans Morganthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (N w 
York: Free Press, 1967); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: 
Columbia University, 1979); and Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, Understanding 
International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
 
6 See for example, David J. Singer, “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight without Evidence,” 
in Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Klaus 
Knorr (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1969). 
 
7 Jeffry A. Friedan and David A. Lake, “International Relations as a Social Science: 
Rigor and Relevance,” ANNALS of the American Association of Political and Social 
Science 600 (July 2005):137. 
 
8 Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security St dies: A Report of 
a Conference on the State of the Field,” International Security 12 (Spring1988): 8.  Two 
primary schools of realist thought were elaborated by Hans Morgenthau (political) and 




attribute of the system is that it lacks central authority.  Anarchy “provides both the 
motivating rationale for state behavior as well as the ontological essence that drives 
international policies – the search for security in a hostile, violence prone, self-help 
international system.”9  In this environment, self-preservation is of primary importance.10  
Because self-preservation is subject to each state’s position within the system, and is 
dependent upon the distribution of power, states must constantly compete for power.11 
During the Cold War, realism provided a means for understanding the on-going 
power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union (and other communist 
states) and proposed that balance of power is a necessary condition for peace.  Upon the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the dominant power and some 
scholars began to suggest that realism had lost its explanatory power.12  But Waltz 
defended the realist approach by emphasizing that unipolarity is the “least durable of 
                                                
9 Darryl S.L. Jarvis, “Multinational Enterprises, International Relations and International 
Business: Reconstituting Intellectual Boundaries for the New Millennium,” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 59 (June 2005): 205.  
 
10 Paul R. Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds., International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 55-57. 
 
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International 
Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990): 21-38; and Hans Morganthau, Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (N w York: Free Press, 1967). 
 
12 Stefano Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in Internatio l Relations,” 
European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 533-568; 
Margarita H. Petrova, “The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground between 
Rationalist and Ideational Approaches in International Relations?” European Journal of 
International Relations 9, no. 110 (March 2003): 115-163; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 
“The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New 




international configurations” – just as “nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics 
abhors unbalanced power” – and so the power struggle will continue.13  Therefore, when 
China initiated its “open door” policy and began the journey towards rapid economic 
development, realists began to view this policy as a strategy for global expansion and an 
effort to tip the balance of power in China’s favor. 
Although realism is compelling for its parsimony and its ability to explain the 
dynamics of states vying for power within an international system, its adherents have 
recognized that the international system is simply one factor “shaping and shoving” 
foreign policy.14  There is also a need to open the “black box” of domestic politics and 
look at the various domestic systems and institutions that contribute to th  formation of 
states’ foreign policies.15  This is especially the case in trying to understand why the U.S. 
Congress reacted so vehemently to CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal, and to 
                                                
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 
(Summer 2000): 28; and Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist 
Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21 no. 4 
(Spring 1997): 88.  
  
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University, 1979), 
70-72; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Reply 
to My Critics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University, 1986), 322-46.  
 
15 G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction: 
Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,” International 
Organization 42 (Winter 1988): 5; Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel N. Nexon, “Paradigm 
Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics,” European Journal of International 
Relations 11 (March 2005): 24; Sheldon W. Simon, “Is there a U.S. Strategy for East 
Asia?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 21 
(December 1999): 325-343; and Peter A. Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The 
International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 




understand how Congress was able to achieve a consensus to block the acquisition with 
speed which is uncharacteristic of the fragmented system of American policy making. 
B.  New Institutionalism 
To understand the role that domestic political institutions play in facilitating or 
inhibiting financial transactions in a global economy we turn to the analytical approach of 
new institutionalism.  New institutionalism delves into the “black box” f domestic 
politics by looking at institutions as mechanisms for channeling and constraining 
individual behavior and shaping policy outcomes.  Because new institutionalism p aces 
the “black box” within the context of the larger world, this approach llows us to 
integrate our analysis of U.S. domestic politics with the twenty-first century global 
environment characterized by China’s expanded approach to economic development and 
America’s new emphasis on homeland security. 
The theoretical approach of “new institutionalism” first emerged in response to 
the shortcomings of realism and other strains of thought which diminished the importance 
of political values and collective choice.  March and Olsen observed that the ideas behind 
this new approach 
deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an 
interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political 
institutions; they deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and 
efficient histories in favor of relatively complex processes and historical 
inefficiency; they deemphasize metaphors of choice and allocative 
outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality of meaning 
and symbolic action.16 
                                                
16 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational 





Although “far from coherent or consistent,” new institutionalism claims a “more 
autonomous role for political institutions” without denying the importance of social 
context of politics, the economy, or the motives of individual actors.17 
As interest in this approach increased, attempts at theory building were so 
extensive and so diverse that it became unclear as to what exactly new institutionalism 
was, how it could be distinguished from other approaches, and how it could be 
measured.18  Hall and Taylor proposed that some of the ambiguities could be dismissed 
by recognizing that institutionalism is not one unified body of thoug t.  Instead, they 
suggested the three schools of thought emerged to “elucidate the role that institutions 
play in the determination of social and political outcomes.”19  While it would be beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to fully elucidate these approaches, a brief summary of the 
three bodies of thought is relevant to the development of our theoretical framework. 
The first approach, historical institutionalism, seeks to improve upon political 
theories which focus on micro-analysis by “bringing the state back” into the discussion.20  
Although influenced by the structural-functionalist view that the polity is a system of 
interacting parts historical institutionalism does not accept the idea that individuals are 
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the driving force.21  Instead, historical institutionalism builds upon theories that assign 
importance to formal political institutions by examining them during their formative 
periods.22  The premise is that history is important because institutions create a system of 
collective values as they are being formed and these values are emb dded in the 
structures of the institutions and thereby affect the policy-making process.23  One needs 
an understanding of institutional legacies in order to fully understand subseq ent policy 
outcomes.24 
Over time, historical institutionalism evolved into a complex framework centered 
on the impact of formal administrative and political institutions on policymaking.  
According to Skocpol, this approach “views the polity as the primary locus of action, yet 
understands political activities, whether carried out by politicians or by social groups, as 
conditioned by the institutional configurations of governments and political party 
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systems.”25  Rather than focusing exclusively on state autonomy, Skocpol suggests that 
institutionalism should focus on four factors: 
(1) the establishment and transformation of state and party organizatio …; 
(2) the effects of political institutions and procedures on the identities, 
goals, and capacities of social groups…; (3) the “fit” – or lack thereof – 
between goals and capacities of various politically active groups, and the 
historically changing points of access and leverage allowed by a nation’s 
political institutions; and (4) the way in which previously established 
social policies affect subsequent politics.26 
 
By contrast, the second approach of rational choice institutionalism was largely 
inspired by the application of conventional rational choice assumptions to the study of 
congressional behavior.  Assuming that individuals tend to make decisions based on 
maximizing utility, legislators have multiple preferences, and politica  issues are 
multidimensional, rational choice theorists have tended to conclude that it would be quite 
difficult to achieve the majority votes needed to pass legislation in Congress.27  But, as 
Hall and Taylor point out, empirical research shows the opposite; there is a strong 
tendency towards stability in congressional decision making.28 
To resolve this paradox, rational choice institutionalism focuses on “the
importance of institutions as mechanisms for channeling and constraining individual 
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behavior.”29  Individual actors are still expected to maximize their personal utilities, but 
they are constrained by institutional structure, rules and procedures.30  Or, as Ostrom 
suggests, rational actors are “fallible learners” who will engage in a “continuous trial-
and-error process until a rule system is evolved that participants con ider yields 
substantial net benefits.”31  Either way, institutions tend to be characterized by the 
majority of actors, rather than any one individual. 
Rational choice theorists suggest individuals define their goals and preferences 
independent of, but subject to the constraints of, institutions.  Proponents of thi approach 
emphasize that it allows political actors to have multiple goals.32  For example, individual 
legislators may be motivated by a desire to be re-elected, the need to secure campaign 
contributions, aspirations for power or position within the legislature, and ideological 
commitment to specific policy outcomes at the same time that they are subject to 
constraints imposed by legislative coalitions and committee membership and their 
political party.33  Rational choice institutionalism is attractive because it helps us 
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understand how political actors respond to the incentives and constraints introduced by 
their institutions at the same time that it permits us to see how individuals have an int rest 
in shaping institutions to meet their personal goals. 
Scott asserts that the third approach of sociological institutionalism disagrees with 
the rational choice perspective and suggests that the institutional forms and procedures of 
modern organizations are the result of cultural values and practices.34  Sociological 
institutionalism defines institutions broadly to include “symbol systems, cognitive scripts, 
and moral templates” that guide human actions.35  This approach also focuses on the 
interactive relationship between institutions and individual actions.  Although actors may 
be purposive or rational, institutions influence their behavior by providing scripts to 
follow, and actors influence institutions by asserting their preferences.36 
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In comparing these approaches, scholars have emphasized both similarities and 
differences.  For example, Thelen focuses on distinguishing rational choice 
institutionalism from historical institutionalism.  She suggests that rational choice 
theorists, working at the mid-range of theory building, often attempt to develop grand 
theories with more general theoretical claims; whereas, theorists who adopt historical 
institutionalism often focus on a limited range of cases that are unified in space and/or 
time.37  Thelen identifies another difference in the approaches to hypothesis building.  
While rational choice theorists derive their research questions frm situations in which 
observed behavior seems to deviate from theoretical expectations, historical 
institutionalism theorists often begin with questions that emerge from observed vents.38  
Although both approaches are interested in identifying and understanding 
regularities in politics over time, Thelen concludes the main distinction is that the rational 
choice approach emphasizes coordinating functions and equilibrium order whil  the 
historical approach emphasizes historical process.  Rational choice theorists see 
institutions as holding together a particular pattern of politics while historical 
institutionalism theorists tend to reverse causality to suggest that institutions “emerge 
from and are sustained by features of the broader political and social context.”39 
The exercise of distinguishing among different approaches to new institutionalism 
has value in trying to isolate the theory’s essential elements, bu  the risks associated with 
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this exercise are dilution of the theoretical richness and loss of it  explanatory powers.  
For example, although the rational choice approach may lend insight into individual 
decision making within the institutional context, the impact of individual decision making 
on political outcomes may not be understood without understanding the institutional 
structure and functions.  Similarly, the study of an institution’s historical evolution may 
provide insight into institutional constraints, but it may not be able to xplain why 
individual actors within an institution prefer certain choices over others or why some 
actors may have greater ability to influence colleague’s choices than oters. 
Rather than distinguishing among the three approaches to new institutionalism, 
this study is based on the assumption that there are common elements in the institutional 
research to suggest a unified theory.  It suggests that the theoretical core includes the 
significance of an institution’s history and infusion of societal v ues that affect the 
institution’s role within the polity.  Within this context, the focus is on the “black box” 
where formal rules govern yet informal mechanisms shape and filter political interests in 
order to produce policy outcomes.40  The general framework for looking into the “black 
box” of domestic politics is described below. 
 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  An Integrated Theoretical Approach to U.S. – China Foreign Policy 
Institutionalism refers to an approach to the study of political institutions which 
includes a set of ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional 
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characteristics and political actors.  It assumes that institutions are shaped by history and 
infused with shared values that influence their structures, rules, and st ards.  These 
endogenous characteristics create stability and predictability needed for long term 
planning.  At the same time that these formal structures, rules, and standards facilitate the 
actions of political actors, they also create constraints.  As aresult, political actors will 
tend to adapt, but one way that they adapt is to rely upon informal mechanism for 
creating policy change. 
This dissertation develops an integrated theory by adopting core elements of the 
historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches to new institutionalism that were 
discussed in the literature review above.  The following premises con titute the core 
elements of the theoretical framework: 
1. The premise that history is important because institutions create a system 
of collective values during their formative stage, and these values are embedded in 
institutional structures that affect the policy making process. 
2. The premise that institutional actors tend to base decisions on maximizing 
utility, but political issues are complex and multidimensional, and institutional actors 
must constantly weigh multiple preferences. 
3. The premise that democratic institutions are characterized by formal 
constraints that provide institutional stability, but allow for informal mechanisms that 
permit individual actors to assert their own preferences in the decision making process. 
4. The premise that the success of an individual legislator in Congress 
overcoming institutional constraints that impact foreign policy making depends upon 
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manipulation of a variety of factors, including: (a) public awareness, (b) constituent and 
party support, (c) coalition building, (d) presidential support, and (e) timing. 
This approach to institutionalism suggests that policy change is incremental and 
gives weight to the significance of previously enacted laws.  In explaining how policy 
change takes place, the dissertation considers the content of existing law and legislative 
proposals as well as the reasons why individual actors conceived of or chose to support 
various policy alternatives.  By grasping the motivation behind the actors’ policy choices, 
it will be possible to gain a better understanding of the strategies that the actors develop 
to persuade others to support their policy alternatives.  One of the best ways to get at the 
heart of policy initiatives is to analyze the actors’ discourse.41 
The dissertation’s theoretical approach assumes that when corporations enter into 
the global capitalist market, they organize their economic activities so as to maximize 
profits.  This assumption holds true regardless of whether the corporation is private 
enterprise or a jointly-owned public/private entity.  A corollary of this assumption is that 
corporations are motivated to manage risk in the global capitalist market and that they 
have a variety of strategies at their disposal.  Some of the risks are political and social 
instability, bureaucratic complications, local interference with natio l laws, high fees 
and administrative charges, undeveloped infrastructure, and supply problems.  Risk 
management strategies include encouraging the country of origin to establish stable 
diplomatic relations with the host country, encouraging the host country to improve the 
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legal environment for foreign investment in local enterprises, relying upon the protections 
provided by international law, crafting creative financial arrangements for doing business 
within the host country, and integrating foreign capital, labor, and otherresources into the 
enterprises operations within the host country.42 
The approach also assumes that foreign policy decisions do not take place within 
a vacuum; they are influenced by the international environment as well as the domestic 
environment.  One of the most outstanding characteristics of the international 
environment in 2005 was China’s emergence as a major economic power.  After a decade 
of explosive growth, there was no indication that China’s economy would break pace 
with its impressive track record.  In fact, China’s foray into the capitalist world economy 
had become so successful in stimulating the domestic economy that it became part of a 
comprehensive strategy for developing geopolitical alliances that w s virtually 
inconceivable when communist China and capitalist America first entered into diplomatic 
talks under the Nixon Administration. 
Another feature dominating the global environment in 2005 was the U.S. war on 
terror which followed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.  
For the first time in recent memory American citizens had been subjected to a sense of 
vulnerability and fears of subsequent attacks on their homeland.  As a result, national 
security took on a new meaning in the American psyche and came to play a new and 
more prominent role in both domestic and foreign policy making. 
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This global environment has set the stage for our inquiry into why Congress 
politicized CNOOC’s business proposal to acquire the underperforming Unocal 
Corporation.  The research questions that we address in the study are as follows: 
1. What are the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislative 
branches in overseeing foreign mergers, acquisition, or takeovers? 
2. What laws may the president or Congress invoke in order to block a 
particular foreign merger, acquisition, or takeover? 
3. Are there different laws and procedures for blocking a foreign merger, 
acquisition or takeover for economic reasons as opposed to national security concerns? 
4. If one branch of government perceives either an economic or a national 
security threat and the other branch does not, must the branch perceiving the threat 
obtain consent or support from the other branch in order to prevent th  merger, 
acquisition or takeover? 
5. Are there certain situations in which one branch or the other may act 
independently? 
6. What mechanisms did Congress employ to block CNOOC’s proposed 
acquisition of Unocal? 
7. What role did individual legislators play in the attempt to block the deal 
and what were their individual beliefs as to why the deal needed to be blocked? 
8. Since Congress is comprised of independent actors, and the policy making 
process is fragmented, how can Congress influence executive acon when current laws 
do not require action and a threat is deemed imminent? 
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B.  Methodology 
This study uses historical research methodology which focuses on analysis of 
original documents.  Since the study is concerned with identifying the constraints that 
political institutions create and the opportunities for implementing policy change the 
researcher sought sources of data that would provide specific content of the policy 
proposals that the actors promoted.  This data was found in the following types of 
documents: (1) legal sources such as the Constitution, statutes, and judicial opinions; (2) 
official government documents such as congressional reports, white houspapers, and 
administrative rules; and (3) presidential and legislative testimonials found in published 
biographies.  The study supplements these original sources with secondary sources 
including media sources such as newspapers, magazines, radio/television transcripts, and 
public opinion polls; peer-reviewed journals; and think tank publications. 
Initially, the research design included a survey instrument that was sent to all 
members of the 109th Congress.  The survey included both multiple choice and open-
ended questions designed to be broad in nature to provide interviewees latitude in 
prioritizing and bringing out issues of greatest importance to them.  Although some 
legislators responded, there was an overwhelming reluctance to participate in a written 
survey, or to respond to follow-up telephone calls or email inquiries from anyone other 
than members of their own congressional districts. 
The survey was attempted during an election year and the responses support the 
author’s hypothesis that legislators’ individual actions are driven primarily by the desire 
for re-election.  This motive leads legislators to focus their indiv dual policy agendas on 
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issues perceived to be of priority to their constituents.  Since the surv y response was not 
statistically significant, the study relies upon the sources of data described above.  Any 
comments received from legislators will be treated as anecdotal and will be reinforced by 
documentary evidence. 
While direct access to the president and executive staff would have been ideal, it 
was not possible given the president’s leadership style and the confidential treatment of 
foreign business transactions within the White House.  Foreign policy and international 
relations scholars have long encountered similar difficulties in acquiring detailed 
information about the decision making process.  The information is hard to find and often 
incomplete.  In recent years, there has been an information explosion with increased 
access to information over the World Wide Web, but care must be taken o sure 
authenticity of the information.  At the same time, the media has become much more 
involved in interviewing individuals involved in the decision-making process and in 
analyzing their decisions.  There has also been an increase in autobiographies in which 
decision makers feel a need to document their own actions and perceptions of the 
process.43  These secondary sources added to interpretation of the political environment, 
but our analysis primarily relies on official White House documents, press releases, and 
statements to the media. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 This chapter suggests that CNOOC unleashed a “perfect storm” in 2005 when it 
proposed to purchase American-owned Unocal Corporation.  Although CNOOC claimed 
the bid was simply a business transaction, members of Congress claimed it was athre t to 
national security and immediately called upon President Bush to invoke his Exon-Florio 
authority to prevent the transaction.  On the surface, it appeared to the Chinese that 
Congress politicized the CNOOC bid to prevent China from developing its economy.  
This study questions why Congress felt compelled to intervene in this particular business 
proposition. 
 Traditional international relations theories which assume foreign policy is based 
upon a struggle for power cannot explain how domestic politics influence a nation’s 
foreign policy decisions.  For this, the study turns to the approach f new institutionalism 
which focuses on an examination of what happens within the “black box” of domestic 
policy making.  The study suggests that an understanding of institutional constraints and 
the mechanisms that institutional actors employ to overcome these con traints may lend 
insight into foreign policy making and help explain why some foreign policy issues are 
politicized while others are not. 
The study adopts a socio-historical approach to new institutionalism which 
requires the laying of a foundation for the analysis by placing the event of CNOOC’s bid 
for Unocal within the context of that particular point in history.  Chapter 2 describes 
China’s rapid and continuous economic growth, the energy resources needed to maintain 
this growth, and the disparity between demand and domestic supplies.  Th  facts indicate 
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that China has no alternative but to look outside its borders for access to nergy supplies 
that will continue fueling economic development. 
The socio-historical approach also assumes institutions are infused with values 
and that these values influence the institution’s structures, rules, and st ndards, and 
ultimately the leaders’ decision making processes.  Chapter 3 examines the historical 
processes which have shaped American political institutions.  It discusses how these 
institutions have been infused with values that transcend the values of any ne individual 
within the institutions, and how these values are essential to the survival and expansion of 
the capitalist economy. 
In crafting the American Constitution, the Founding Fathers established an 
institutional structure which provided political stability.  The Constitution also defined 
separate powers for the executive and legislative branches, but incorporated a system of 
“checks and balances” which prevents either one of the institutions frm becoming too 
powerful.  As a result, policy making in the United States is fragmented and inefficient 
and often times difficult to predict.  When CNOOC contemplated its bid for Unocal, the 
corporation focused on the business opportunity but failed to foresee that the bid would 
become entangled in an institutional struggle between Congress and the president over 
foreign policy powers. 
Chapter 4 discusses the details of the Unocal case.  It begins with the laws that 
govern mergers and acquisitions in the United States and focuses specifically on the 
Exon-Florio Amendment.  An examination of the 2005 congressional hearings indicates 
that the Exon-Florio Amendment, and Congress’s concern about how it had been 
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interpreted and implemented by the presidency, was at the heart of the Unocal acquisition 
controversy.  The analysis in this chapter shows how informal mechanisms and strategies 
serve as a means of overcoming the institutional inefficiencies of the American political 
system. 
Sometimes these mechanisms operate within the “black box” of policy making in 
Congress and, in spite of laws requiring transparency, may be hidden from public 
scrutiny.  Even though we may never be able to discover all the details of deals that are 
negotiated in private, we may acquire more insight into the policy utcomes through case 
studies that analyze the informal methods that key decision makers us  to accomplish 
their policy goals. 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions as to why and how some members of Congress used 
informal mechanisms available to them to politicize the CNOOC bid for Unocal.  
Extending the analysis beyond the House of Representative’s enactment of Resolution 
344 (which focused on preventing CNOOC from acquiring Unocal and received so much 
press) provides for greater understanding as to why politicization of CNOOC’s proposal 
was instrumental to achieving long-sought statutory changes in the Exon-Florio 
provisions.  In 2006, as Congress was debating an amendment to Exon-Florio to provide 
greater oversight of presidential authority over foreign acquisition , United Arab 
Emirates-owned Dubai Ports World attempted to control Peninsular and Orient Steam 
Navigation, a British company that operated terminals at several American ports.  This 
case study shows how politicization of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal helped Congress defeat 
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the Dubai Ports World acquisition and set the stage for future legislative oversight of 











THE UNOCAL PUZZLE 
 
 
I.  CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
A.  Entering the Global Economy 
Self-reliance had been a major strategic priority for nearly three decades under 
Mao’s leadership.  Then in the late 1970s after Deng Xiaoping cameto power, China’s 
leadership began to look outward for economic growth.44  Exhausted by the disruptions 
and uncertainties of perpetual political campaigns, the Chinese people mbraced the idea 
of stabilizing their economy and raising their standard of living to levels enjoyed by the 
world’s more developed countries.  At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in 
December 1978, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a “fundamental change in its 
domestic as well as its foreign policy priorities.”45  These changes required an openness 
that had not been seen for decades as exemplified by the State Statistical Bureau’s 1979 
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publication and widespread distribution of national economic data which was a first step 
towards greater transparency in the Chinese economy.46 
The Party confirmed its backing of economic liberalization at the 1980 National 
People’s Congress by appointing Zhao Zhiyang as prime minister and Hu Yaobang as 
secretary-general of the Party.  Zhao Zhiyang called for abandoning “once and for all” 
the idea of self-reliance and urged the nation to enter the world markets.47  Secretary-
general Hu Yaobang proclaimed China’s foreign policy should be based on the principles 
of “independence and peace,” that is, independence to pursue relationships that would 
promote China’s economic goals and a peaceful environment that would not threaten 
China’s national security.48 
The leadership endorsed gradual transformation from a centrally planned 
economy toward a more market-based economy as they pursued policies that would 
accelerate economic growth and lead to higher standards of living.49  Although state-
owned industries continued to dominate key sectors, the government began to privatize 
small and medium sized state-owned enterprises and allow the emergenc  of a non-state 
sector led by private entrepreneurs.  The private sector continued to grow, and by 2001, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the non-state ector accounted for 
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three-fourths of industrial output, approximately half of gross domestic product, and 60 
percent of nonagricultural employment.50 
Since recovering a seat in the United Nations,51 China has established economic, 
political, and cultural relations with capitalist nations world-wide and has become 
increasingly integrated into the global economy.  But membership in nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), such as the IMF, the World Bank (WB), and its aff liate, the 
International Development Association (IDA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum, has been accompanied by very strict conditions.52  
These conditions, in turn, have led to liberalization of trade and investment which 
accompanies capitalist management practices, borrowing technological innovations, and 
engaging in joint ventures with foreign business partners.53  In spite of occasional 
menacing rhetoric, China’s leadership has focused on diplomacy rather than costly 
military activities to accomplish economic development goals.54 
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China’s economy began to take off almost immediately after adopting the “open-
door” policy which sought foreign investment as a means of stimulating the economy.55  
From 1980 to 2005, China reports that its GDP grew at an average rate of 9.6 percent 
(adjusted) per year, reaching 1,823 trillion yuan (2.23 trillion U.S. dollars).56  The IMF 
estimates that GDP based on purchasing-power-parity per capitaGDP grew from $419 in 
1980 to $6,193 in 2005.57  The United Nations (UN) estimates that per capita income has 
grown from less than $400 in the 1980s, to an estimated $1,500 - $3,000 in 1993.58  Rural 
per capita income alone has grown by a factor of more than four in the last thirty years, 
reaching $1,700 in 2007.59 
Foreign trade and investment increased significantly after the Chinese 
government established Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  In 1950, the total value of 
China’s imports and exports was about $1.1 billion, less than one percent of total world 
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trade.  Although world trade experienced a six-fold increase from 1950 to 1978, China’s 
total share of that world trade stagnated due to disruptions caused by Mao zedong’s 
political campaigns. 
In the eight years after China introduced the open door policy, the stat  approved 
8,332 foreign-funded enterprises and committed $19.14 billion to foreign investment.60  
From 1978 to 2003 the country’s trade increased at an average annual rate of fifteen 
percent, and its share of total world trade increased from less than one percent to more 
than five percent, while its national ranking in world trade (merchandise) jumped from 
thirty-second place in 1978 to third place in 2004.61 
By 2004, the government had begun encouraging foreign investment by allowing 
foreigners to establish investment corporations in China.  The only qualifications were 
“fine credit and economic strength” (which consisted of meeting stipula ed financial 
requirements, such as the total sum of $400 million property the year before applying to 
invest in China), more than ten foreign invested enterprises, and invested sum of 
registered capital actually paid of more than $10 million in China.62  During 2004, trade 
and investment deals were made with Thailand, Malaysia and eight other Southeast Asian 
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countries and by 2005 China had opened free-trade talks with South Korea, Pakistan, 
Australia and Iceland. 
In 2004, China surpassed the United States as Japan’s largest trading p rtner.  But 
historical animosities over Japan’s occupation of China during World War II kept the 
relationship from blossoming.  In addition, the two Asian countries were competing over 
access to Siberian oil and China lost the larger prize.  Then tensions began to escalate 
when China began oil exploration in the South China Sea where Japan had claims of 
sovereignty.63  This heightened the concern in Beijing regarding military protection for 
China’s access to oil. 
In addition to Asia, the Chinese government has also established a foothold in the 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America.  In 2000, the China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum was formed to promote trade and investment in forty-fou  African 
countries.64  Since then, several high level delegations have visited the continent a d 
Beijing has negotiated partnerships with governments in the Angola, Nigeria, Chad, 
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Congo, Libya, Niger, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Chinese trad  with Africa 
more than tripled from 2000 to nearly $30 billion in 2004.65 
In 2004, while visiting Brazil with a number of business leaders, President Hu 
announced $20 billion in new investments for oil and gas exploration and related 
projects.  This global outreach became a source of concern in Washington as some White 
House advisors and legislators in Congress feared a weakening of U.S. influence in these 
regions.66  Aside from the competition for trade, observers began to worry that Beijing 
was striking deals with governments that do not adhere to international laws, support 
human rights agendas, or promote democratic ideas.  Although Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Minister Zhou Wenzhong has stated that Beijing tries to “separate politics from 
business,”67 the boundaries are not clear, especially when foreign regimes hav  different 
interests and adhere to different values. 
B.  Producing Energy for Economic Growth 
1.  Economic Growth Spurs Energy Demands 
Throughout its history, China had been primarily an energy exporter.  But the 
structural changes initiated by Deng Xiaoping and carried forward by today’s leaders 
have led to unprecedented industrial growth and technological progress accompanied by 
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explosive economic development.  These changes, along with the demands of a surging 
population, have led to significant increases in energy consumption and rapid shifts in oil 
trade patterns.  In 1990, China exported nearly five times as much cr de oil as it 
imported.   But China became an energy importer for the first time in its history in 1993 
as crude oil imports grew to twice the size of exports. 
The surge in economic growth and demand for energy is shown in Tables 1 to 3 
below. 
Table 1 – GDP Based on Purchasing-Power-Parity Per Capita from 1980 to 2005 
 
YEAR GDP YEAR GDP  YEAR GDP 
1980 $   419 1990 $ 1,329 2000 $ 3,852 
1981 $   476 1991 $ 1,483 2001 $ 4,211 
1982 $   543 1992 $ 1,713 2002 $ 4,606 
1983 $   617 1993 $ 1,967 2003 $ 5,087 
1984 $   728 1994 $ 2,236 2004 $ 5,641 
1985 $   840 1995 $ 2,495 2005 $ 6,196 
1986 $   920 1996 $ 2,758 2006  
1987 $ 1,037 1997 $ 3,020 2007  
1988 $ 1,175 1998 $ 3,517 2008  
1989 $1,251 1999 $   2009  
            Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2005 
 
      Table 2 – Chinese Data on Energy Production and Consumption 
     
Energy Production  (104 tce) 103,216 (=100) 
 
Coal  74,533  (72.2) 
Crude Oil 22,916  (22.2) 
Natural Gas   3,351  (  3.2) 
Hydropower   2,416  (  2.3) 
  
Energy Consumption (104 tce) 124,033 (=100) 
Coal   88,481  (71.3) 
Crude Oil  30,188  (24.3) 
Natural Gas    2,863  (  2.3) 
Hydropower    2,501  (  2.0)  
              Source:  China Energy Statistical Annual (1996-1999) 
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Table 3 – Total Primary Energy Production and Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) 
 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
       
Production 18.1 24.3 29.4 35.1 35.3 63.2 
Consumption 17.5 22.0 27.0 34.9 35.5 67.1 
 
Source: EIA, International Energy Annual, Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 3a, Table 
3b (Forecast values) 
 
Table 3 shows that China’s total primary energy consumption rose by twenty-six 
percent from 17.5 to 67.1 quadrillion Btu in the twenty-five years from 1980 to 2005.  
Although China uses less energy per capita than more developed countries, its energy use 
is very inefficient.  In 2006, the International Energy Administration (IEA) estimated that 
China’s energy consumption per GDP was five times that of the U.S. and twelve times 
that of Japan.68  Industrial processes are outdated and require large amounts of fuel 
compared to modern processes that have been adopted in more industrialized n tions.  
Even though a study by China’s Energy Research Institute suggests that China has 
potential to cut energy use by thirty to fifty percent by adopting international industrial 
standards, the size of China’s population and the sustained high pace of economic 
growth, will continue to push energy demand even higher. 69 
As the gap between domestic supply and demand in energy sectors continues to 
widen, it will have an increasingly significant impact on the natio ’s economic security.  
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The forecasts are staggering.  In 2000, the IEA predicted China would “surpass Japan as 
the second largest world oil consumer within the next decade and reach a consumption 
level of 10.5 million barrels per day by 2020.70  In 2004, the IEA predicted that eighty 
percent of China’s oil demand in 2030 would have to be met by imports.71 
2.  Regional Variances 
One of the problems associated with China’s rapid growth policy has been 
widening of the gap in the level of economic development between urban and rural areas 
and across geographic regions.  Not only has the leadership been fac d with finding ways 
to equalize regional variances in standards of living, it has also needed to find ways to 
balance energy resource supplies and demands between western and eastern China.  
While western China is rich in all kinds of energy resources, seventy percent of the 
country’s hydropower resources lie in the south-west.  Fossil-fuel resou ces (coal, crude 
oil and natural gas) and long-term reserves, located mostly in the orthwest, account for 
approximately two-thirds of the country’s whole supply.72  The twelve western provinces 
contain eighty percent of the country’s total renewable resources, but the eleven eastern 
coastal provinces are the largest energy consumers.  Consistent with the location of 
population centers and the distribution of energy resources, the main energy flows are 
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from west to east and from north to south.  The main methods for distribution have been 
transportation of coal by rail and ship and transmission of electric power through energy 
grids.  
China’s use of its energy supplies from 1949 to the early twenty-first century is 
summarized as follows: 
(a)  Coal - Historically, China has depended heavily on coal as its primary source 
of energy and China has been the world’s largest coal producer.73  The U.S. Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Agency (DOE/EIA) reported that China accounted for 
twenty-eight percent of world coal production in 2004.74  It is estimated that China holds 
126.2 billion short tons of recoverable coal, the third largest in the world behind the U.S. 
and Russia.75   
In spite of these reserves, in 1993, China’s coal consumption exceeded domstic 
coal production and annual coal production peaked at 1.4 billion tons a few years later.76  
By 2004, China was consuming 2.1 billion short tons of coal, representing one-third of 
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the world total, and a 46 percent increase over 2002.77  Clearly, China could no longer 
depend upon coal to sustain high levels of economic growth. 
(b)  Oil - Compared to coal, China’s oil reserves are comparatively limited, with 
85 percent of oil production on shore.  At the beginning of 2006, DOE/EIA estimated 
proven oil reserves at 18.3 billion barrels.78  China’s largest producing field has been 
Daqing which accounted for more than 900,000 billion barrels per day, or one-quart r of 
China’s total crude production in 2005.79  However, Daqing is a mature field and, by the 
new millennium, production levels had to be reduced to extend the life of th  field.80  The 
second largest producing field is Shengli which produced over 500,000 billion barrels per 
day in 2006.  Another 190,000 billion barrels per day is produced from CNOOC’s 
offshore fields in Bohai Bay and South China Sea.81 
Since the Bohai Bay region is estimated to hold more than 1.5 million barrels of 
recoverable oil reserves, it has attracted the attention of major oil corporations.  To 
encourage exploration and development in the region, CNOOC initiated production 
sharing contracts with international companies, such as ConocoPhillips, Kerr-McGee, 
Apache, Chevron, and Royal Dutch Shell.  “ConocoPhillips holds the largest acreage 
with total discovered reserves estimated at 732 million barrels.  ConocoPhillips has a 
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forty-nine percent stake in the Bozhong 11/05 block and has produced 30,000 billion 
barrels per day of crude oil from its Peng Lai 19-3 field since 2002.”82  In 2006, the 
DOE/EIA reported that it was expected to produce 140,000 billion barrels per day.83 
According to the IEA, China consumed 6.6 million barrels per day of oil and 
imported 3.0 million barrels per day in 2005.84  Assuming the current rate of growth, the 
EIA estimated that consumption in China would increase in 2006 by close to half million 
barrels per day, or 7.4 million barrels per day of oil, which the EIA projected to represent 
thirty-eight percent of the world total increase in demand.85  Other projections by Chinese 
and international energy experts estimated that China’s oil demand in 2020 would range 
from 10 to 13.6 million barrels per day, but China’s oil production would only range 
from 2.7 to 4 million barrels per day.86  Based upon these predictions, imports of 6 to 11 
million barrels per day would be needed to satisfy domestic demand.  In weighing the 
growth in demand against domestic supplies of oil, the Chinese lead rship could not 
ignore the potential for natural gas to supplement oil. 
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 (c) Natural Gas - Traditionally, natural gas has been a minor fuel in China.  It has 
been secondary to coal, oil and hydro power with the largest known reserves in the 
western and north-central regions.  The first year the Communists were in power, natural 
gas output in China was only 7 million cubic meters the first year, but it had risen to more 
than four times the 1949 level by 2000 with approximately 28 billion cubic meters of 
output.87 
In the 1990s, proven reserves were estimated at 1.5 Tcm.88  Although 
more recent estimates by the Oil and Gas Journal place proven reserves at 
53.3 Tcm, which is considerably greater than earlier estimates, natural gas 
still accounted for only 3 percent of energy consumption by 2004.89 
 
Since most of the earlier discoveries had been found near oil fields, natural gas 
was used mostly for oil production which resulted in a highly fragmented transmission 
and distribution network.  Without a national natural gas pipeline grid, the domestic 
market had been limited to local producing regions.  As the economy continued to grow 
throughout the 1990s, lack of an adequate infrastructure to transport natural g s to high 
energy consuming markets in the east and south east became a major obstacle.  However, 
with foreign financial and technical assistance, gas pipelines increased to 9,112 
kilometers in length with transporting capacity of approximately 10.5 billion cubic meters 
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in 1996.90  By the beginning of 2006, plans were in place “to establish a moreintegrated 
and complete oil pipeline network to better satisfy growing demand.”91 
Along with aggressive development of indigenous natural gas, greater expansion 
of the infrastructure for delivery to consumers, and increased importation of liquefied 
natural gas in the last decade, the government began looking into alternative energy as a 
means of meeting its energy demands. 
(d)  Alternative Energy Sources - In spite of the developments that had taken place by 
2004, the leadership recognized additional diversification would be needed to keep pace 
with projected increases in energy demand.  The DOE/EIA projects that consumption of 
every primary energy source will increase over the twenty-one year forecast horizon, 
with the exception of nuclear.92  However, developing alternative energy sources, such as 
hydropower, nuclear power, and renewable energy, requires significant investment and 
technological development which does not take place over night. 
Chinese leaders have encouraged enterprises to seek foreign supplies in an effort 
to support continued economic growth in the short-term and to secure supplie for the 
long-term.  Although there has not been a significant focus on energy conservation as a 
means of coping with domestic shortages, Premier Wen Jiabao did suggest in 2005 that 
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energy conservation would be needed “to reconcile rapid economic growth with limited 
energy resources.”93 
C.  Restructuring the Energy Industry to Support Economic Growth  
China’s transformation from nearly complete reliance on coal to other sources of 
energy began with economic reforms in the early 1980s.  The leadership recognized a 
need to “rejuvenate” the oil and gas industry which had been lagging under the Ministry 
of Petroleum Industry.94  The reforms took place in two stages.  The first stage involved 
transition from inefficient management under the command economy system.  The 
transition was initiated by contracting with the Ministry of Petroleum Industry for annual 
production targets and allowing producers to sell excess oil in domestic markets.  This 
provided incentive for further exploration and development and investment funds for 
technological improvements. 
The second stage involved separating regulatory and commercial functions 
(which had been centralized in the Ministry of Petroleum Industry) by abolishing the 
Ministry and creating three national corporations to focus on exploration, production, and 
marketing.  Sinopec was created for refining and petrochemical production, primarily in 
the south and east and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was created to 
operate principally in the north and west.  A third corporation, China National Offshore 
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Oil Corporation was created to control exploration, development, and production of oil 
and gas in China’s territorial waters.95  Further restructuring within these corporations 
took place throughout the 1990s with the goal of creating vertically integrated oil and gas 
companies that would be globally competitive. 
After 1993, when China first began to rely on imported oil, the fear that shortages 
could threaten growth of the domestic economy and political stability elevated the need 
for a comprehensive energy policy.  In May 1997, former Premier Li Peng wrote a policy 
paper encouraging greater involvement in the exploration and development of 
international oil and gas resources, and endorsing diversification of imp rt sources and 
transportation routes.96  In support of this policy position, the leadership encouraged 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Sinopec, and CNPC to establish relationships 
in other countries, to engage in production sharing contracts, and to negotiate j int 
ventures that would enhance China’s energy supplies.  The government expand d 
diplomatic relations with other countries which allowed the corporations to initiate deals 
in Angola, Burma, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Yemen, 
among others.97 
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To facilitate foreign investment, the national corporations began to spin off or 
eliminate unprofitable ancillary activities; they placed their most profitable, high quality 
assets into subsidiaries; and they carried initial public offerings on the Hong Kong and 
New York exchanges.98  China National Offshore Oil Corporation created and transferred 
all its valuable commercial assets to its subsidiary, CNOOC Ltd. (CNOOC), which listed 
on global markets in February 2001.  The initial public offering was only for 27.5 percent 
and only offered minority shares.  Nearly seventy percent of CNOOC’s share capital 
remained with its parent company.99 
Although China’s entry into the global market was incremental, CNOOC 
successfully generated interest from foreign operators anxious to get a foothold in China.  
To this end, Kerr McGee, ChevronTexaco, Apache, EDC, Devon, Burlington, Phillips, 
Husky, ConocoPhillips, and Devon Energy became involved in offshore areas.100  
CNOOC’s foreign partners in Bohai Bay, its largest production area, include 
ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, and Devon Energy.  Foreign investors have assisted 
CNOOC with developing liquefied natural gas operations and China’s l quid natural gas 
(LNG) infrastructure in Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. Other foreign 
operators are involved with CNOOC in the South China Sea, Beibu Gulf and East China 
Sea. 
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In spite of successes, implementation of joint agreements withforeign 
corporations has not been a smooth process.  For instance, CNOOC and Sinopecentered 
into a series of agreements with two multinational corporations, Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
and Unocal, to set up what promised to become China’s largest offshore natural gas 
project.  The project was applauded as a significant step towards stisfying China’s 
energy needs by producing gas from the Xihu trough, 250 miles southeast of Shanghai, 
and transporting it by pipeline to the eastern coast.  Not only would the pipeline provide 
low-pollution natural gas to Shanghai, it would help meet the energy needs of other 
industrial centers along the way.101  But just one year later, Royal Dutch/Shell and 
Unocal announced they would be pulling out of the multibillion-dollar project for 
commercial reasons,102 leaving China’s second and third largest domestic oil companies 
the only players.103  This was the second large project that Shell abandoned in 2004, 
having also pulled out of the west-east natural gas transportation project.104 
Despite setbacks, China’s national energy corporations did not relinquish efforts 
to engage foreign corporations in exploration and development pursuits.  In 2005, CNPC, 
the country’s largest player in terms of production and reserves, produced 1.3 trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas in 2005 and Sinopec produced a total of 222 billion cubic 
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feet.105  Meanwhile, CNOOC, which was in the forefront of natural gas development, 
introduced plans to construct LNG import facilities in Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang 
provinces.106 
By 2005, CNPC had acquired interests in overseas exploration and production 
which included investments in Sudan, Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Syria.  CNPC also 
announced its intent to invest $18 billion in foreign oil and gas assets by 2020.  In 2005, 
Sinopec was also pursuing overseas opportunities.  Sinopec had already signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Iranian government to acquire a fifty-one 
percent stake in the Yadavaran oil field; it was considering a $70 billion deal in which 
China would import liquefied natural gas from Iran; and it had acquired a forty percent 
stake in Synenco Energy’s oil sands project in Canada.107  Meanwhile, in addition to 
bidding to acquire Unocal, CNOOC purchased Repsol-YPF’s oil interests in Indonesia, 
making CNOOC the largest operator in the Indonesian offshore oil sector.108  In spite of 
this breath of commercial activity, by mid-year, the contribution of China’s three national 
energy corporations to oil imports was less than 300,000 billion barrels per day or 8.5 
percent of total oil imports at that time.109  
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D.  Acquiring Foreign Energy Supplies to Support Economic Growth 
Ever since 1993, China’s leaders have become more and more concerned that 
energy shortages could threaten growth of the domestic economy and political instability.  
This concern has been the impetus behind a strategy emphasizing diversification of oil 
and gas imports and transport routes, and pursuit of oil deals with Russia and Central 
Asian countries.  The need for secure transportation routes has served to strengthen 
China’s position towards reunification with Taiwan.  Since the United States has pledged 
its support of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, the fear that U.S. control over 
shipping in East China might inhibit Chinese trade is ever present in the leaders’ mind .
In pursuing foreign oil and gas supplies, the Chinese sought lessons from other 
nations’ experiences.  Learning from Japan’s mistakes, the Chinese mod led their entry 
into the global energy system upon the American example.  When Japan’s eco omy took 
off in the 1960s and 1970s, the government focused on exploration and financed dozens
of small players.  The Japanese companies were unable to compete with larger, wealthier, 
and more experienced corporations.  They pursued small projects instead, but these 
pursuits led to an inordinate number of dry wells.  It is estimated that the Japanese spent 
$50 billion for oil-exploration, yet nearly three decades later only 5.7 percent of Japan’s 
oil imports come from Japanese-owned fields.110  By contrast, the Chinese government is 
financing large corporations which can be competitive in the world energy market.  Th se 
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corporations are following the strategies of major international corporations by targeting 
proven reserves and working wells. 
At first, the Chinese national corporations sought import relationsh ps with 
smaller Middle Eastern states, such as Oman and Yemen, because they produced a light, 
“sweet” crude oil that was compatible with China’s existing refineries.111  The Chinese 
national corporations also established trade relationships with other small nations such as 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.  
By the second part of the 1990s, the Chinese corporations turned their focus to the 
primary producing areas in the Persian Gulf – Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  In 1997, after 
the UN lifted sanctions on Iraq, Chinese national energy companies joined with China 
North Industries Corporation to enter into a 22-year production-sharing greement with 
Saddam Hussein to develop Iraq’s second largest oil field.  But the Chinese had not 
predicted the U.S. war with Iraq and the uncertainty that would follow.112  As such, 
according to energy expert Tong Lixia, the Iraq war was the “turning point” in China’s 
energy strategy.  It was the point at which Chinese “companies ad the government 
realized that China could not rely on one or two oil production areas.”113 
The lesson in geopolitics that came out of the Iraq War did not go unheeded.  
According to Shen Dingli, Fudan University international relations expert, China’s 
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leadership has become more concerned about a future in which there might not be enough 
oil to meet worldwide demand and this concern has led to the perception that the United 
States is a major competitor.114  To remain competitive, China has initiated investments 
and trade arrangements with foreign energy firms in primary producing areas beyond the 
Middle East, particularly in North Africa and the Caspian Sea Basin.  This “going out” 
(zou chu qu) policy encouraged the three national oil companies to seek supplies by 
purchasing equity shares in foreign markets, exploring and drilling n other countries, 
building refineries, and building pipelines to connect China with Siberia and Central 
Asia.115 
Some analysts suggest the Chinese and their energy corporations are u de taking 
the same strategies as the United States and the major energy corporations.  For example, 
a National Petroleum Council study, conducted at the request of Secretary of Energy 
Spencer Abraham, recommended a strategy for improving supply diversity, ncouraging 
conservation and efficiency, improving demand flexibility and efficien y, sustaining and 
enhancing natural gas infrastructure, and promoting the efficiency of natural gas 
markets.116  Along these lines, the Chinese attempted to minimize their vulnerability to 
foreign supply interruptions and trade embargos by diversifying import suppliers, 
cultivating diplomatic relations with resource rich countries, establishing a physical 
presence in producing regions, negotiating investment and trade deals, acquiring equity 
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stakes in foreign exploration and production assets, developing alternate t ansportation 
routes, and developing its own large-scale oil tanker fleet.117 
Another mechanism the Chinese have adopted for minimizing vulnerability is 
constructing an American-style strategic oil reserve along the Zhejiang province coast.  
Beginning in 2005, the first phase included fifty-two tanks with capacity for 25 million 
gallons of gasoline.  The stated goal was to create a reserve large enough to support the 
economy and allow the military to function for three months without imported oil.118  In 
short, the basic energy security strategies the Chinese are pursuing include “maximum 
development of domestic resources, creation of strategic reserves, se king foreign 
technology and investment, establishing reliable and secure oil trading channels, and 
making strategic investments in upstream production facilities abroad.”119 
 
II.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although China and the United States have followed separate and distinct 
development models, the two countries have emerged as the world’s large t nd strongest 
economies in the twenty-first century.  While some may see this as an anomaly, it is 
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clearly the result of an increasingly global economy and China’s conscious efforts to 
become integrated into that economy. 
China’s steady economic growth over the past thirty years has been dependent 
upon a steady supply of energy.  But unlike the United States, which has always relied 
upon private entrepreneurs to meet its energy requirements, China has relied upon three 
state-owned companies, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), rather than independent corporations, to engage in energy 
transactions.  While subject to government controls, these corporations re par t of the 
two-stage reorganization program discussed in this chapter and may be view d as 
instruments for transitioning from a command economy to a more market-based 
economy. 
When China’s energy demand required its energy corporations to extend their 
global reach and develop business deals in other countries, the corporatins also began to 
diversify the energy imports into China.120  The Chinese government provides these 
corporations low-cost loans to assist their outreach efforts, and Chinese diplomats often 
facilitate negotiation of exploration and drilling rights in foreign countries.121  Similarly, 
while the U.S. government may not be directly involved in negotiating business deals, it 
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certainly plays a role in the success of those deals by establishing diplomatic relations 
and trade agreements with energy surplus countries. 
China began establishing relationships with energy surplus countries early a 
decade before it came to depend on foreign supplies.  For example, in the mid-1980s, 
China and Saudi Arabia initiated their relationship through military commerce; 
established full diplomatic ties in 1990; and in 1999, President Jiang Zemin announced a 
strategic oil partnership in which Saudi Arabia quickly became China’ number one 
foreign supplier of crude oil.122  Similarly, China established a trade relationship with 
Iran by supplying ballistic-missile components, air-, land-, and sea-based cruise missiles, 
and by 2004 Iran had become China’s second largest supplier of oil.123 
These trading relationships point to a second distinction between the rationale that 
leaders in the U.S. and China give for engaging in the global energy system.  Historically, 
the U.S. government has restricted American firms by imposing trade policies which 
reflect political or ideological goals, such as human rights agendas, the pursuit of 
democracy, nuclear disarmament, or the war against terrorism.  Butthe Chinese 
government refrains from imposing similar policy limitations on their national energy 
corporations.  Instead, the Chinese national corporations capitalize on relationships with 
oil-rich states by distancing themselves from domestic human rights ssues, by providing 
foreign aid, by focusing on economic outputs rather than political inputs, and by 
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engaging in trade in armaments and dual-use technologies.  As a result, China has been 
able to cultivate trade relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan 
which have been characterized by the U.S. government as “an increasg threat to U.S. 
security interests.”124 
Chinese national corporations do not operate according to the same rules as the 
major international oil companies.  For example, Bader and Downs have observed, that 
the national corporations “are not constrained by the Foreign Corrupt Pactices Act, by 
OECD guidelines on export credit competition and tied loans, or by segregation from 
other businesses that can be added to a package to make it more attractive, such as non-
energy construction and engineering projects.”125  This suggests that the U.S. and its 
allies might have more leverage in preventing China from entering into business deals 
which undermine efforts by the international community to influence how c untries 
spend their oil revenues if they would invite China more often to the decision making 
table.126  More recently, as Erica Downs, China Energy Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution, has indicated, the Chinese government has used its seat on the United 
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National Security Council “to deflect international diplomatic pressure on a country in 
which a Chinese oil company has substantial investments.” 127 
A more recent feature of the Chinese model is the push to acquire oil and gas 
fields.  Even before the Iraq War and the CNOOC bid for Unocal, there were signs of 
China’s increasing interest in acquiring foreign assets.  By 2005, the volume of 
transactions involving a Chinese buyer and an international target ros  to nearly $23 
billion.128  Erica Downs suggests that this strategy is based on the assumption by some 
“that oil obtained through foreign investment is more secure and less expensive than that 
purchased on the international market.”129  If China’s national oil companies acquire 
equity oil then the companies could send their foreign equity production to China in the 
event that China has sufficient funds, but is unable to purchase enough oil on the world 
market.  But American energy experts contend there is no real adv ntage to owning oil 
fields.  While the Chinese may broker a deal to purchase supplies from energy rich 
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countries, the deals may be of little consequence if they are not able to obtain secure lines 
of supply.130 
Chinese leaders share many of the same concerns as their American counterparts 
when it comes to energy dependency.  But the Chinese have an additional concern about 
relying on supplies from politically volatile areas.  They worry about relying on energy 
supplies from regions where the United States is the preeminent power, and how they 
would sustain economic growth and political stability if the United States were to cut 
access to those supplies.131  As the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent 
upon maritime trade passing through the waters adjacent to the South China Sea, and 
patrolled by the U.S. Navy, the Chinese feel much more vulnerable.132  Nearly eighty 
percent of China’s oil imports are shipped through the Strait of Malacc .  Gordon Feller 
reported in the Pipeline and Gas Journal that approximately 2.45 million barrels per day 
of oil moved through the Strait to China in 2004.133 
Greater dependency and vulnerability, combined with the desire for peaceful 
expansion, provides a strong incentive for diplomacy as a means of maintaining positive 
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foreign policy relations with the United States.  At the same ti , the need for energy 
security provides an incentive to look for reserves in areas closer t  home, areas within 
China’s range of military influence where its leaders might have greater bargaining 
power and control over outside influences.  The Chinese leadership has made a concerted 
effort to build regional relationships which have been based on “a sophisticated blend of 
trade, confidence building measures, and even development assistance.”134  But Beijing 
has also encouraged global expansion into Africa, South America, and Central Asia as a 
means of providing alternative sources of energy to its energy mix. 
While some members of the U.S. Congress are encouraged by China’s 
increasingly prominent role in the global economy, others are morelee y of an increased 
global influence that might replace that of the United States.  Concerns about China have 
been expressed in congressional hearings and debates ever since the Nixon 
Administration when the U.S and China renewed diplomatic relations.  Although U.S.-
China relations are complex, members of Congress tend to gravitate toward one extreme 
or another based upon their personal values and ideologies.  However, when CNOOC 
indicated its interest in acquiring an American-owned oil corporation, members of 
Congress coalesced to oppose the transaction in an unusually unified manner.  This 
phenomenon can be explained by the institutional approach to foreign policy analysis. 
This chapter described China’s need to import energy and provided the rationale 
behind CNOOC’s bid to purchase Unocal.  The study now turns to a discussion of the 
American political system, the political structures which have be n institutionalized, the 
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rules and norms which have led to incessant competition between the executive and 
legislative branches.  According to the integrated approach to institutionalism, 
institutional structures, rules, and values impose constraints on actrs within policy 
making institutions that make policy change difficult at best.  The process is fragmented 
and slow.  As a consequence, institutional actors will often turn to i formal mechanisms 
to accomplish policy goals. 
Chapter 3 sheds light on how the American Constitution operates to reinf rc  
democratic principles and ensure that no one branch of government becomes t o 
powerful, but also provides for a modicum of creativity in which individuals may serve 
as instruments of change.  Analysis of evolution of the institutions of the presidency and 
the legislature lends insight into the state of the conflict betwe n the two branches in 
2005 when George W. Bush and the 109th Congress were responding to the issues of 
peak energy, growing competition from China in the global economy, and vul erability 
to terrorist attacks.  It is the understanding of this inter-institutional conflict that provides 













This chapter examines the formation of institutional structures, the historical 
processes which have shaped the American presidency and Congress, and the infusion of 
values into these institutions.  It also considers how certain values have come to 
transcend those of any single individual, and how these values support the basic tenants 
of American democracy and the market economy.  Once these characteristically 
American institutions and values were in place, they began to shape futur political 
discourse and policy formation. 
The foundation of the American political system and its institutions is the 
Constitution.  In crafting the Constitution, the Founding Fathers debated what kind of 
system would provide stability while reinforcing democratic principles.  The final 
solutions was a division of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
and a system of “checks and balances” which defined separate powers f r ach branch 
including the power to question how each of the other branches exercises its authority. 
In practice, this American system of governance is dynamic nd policy making is 
in a constant state of flux characterized by a continuous struggle for power between 
Congress and the executive branch.  Although powers are defined, there is always room 
for interpretation of these powers and the president and Congress are often tempted to 
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push their limits.  As one branch asserts its influence over a policy issue, the other reacts 
to restrain that influence.135  While this system allows for policy change, change is 
incremental and may lead to temporary imbalances in power.  The system of “checks and 
balances” provides a mechanism for the system to resolve political imb ances and move 
back towards a state of equilibrium. 
We begin this chapter with an overview of the American Constitution and a 
discussion of how it defined the authorities of each branch of government.  Co gress was 
designed as a pluralistic institution intended to “represent the people and enact policies in 
response to the popular will through a complex deliberative process.”136  The executive 
branch was designed to function under the guidance of a single individual elected to 
protect the nation’s stability and security by implementing laws nd responding quickly 
to crises.  The federal court system was designed to interpre  laws and protect 
constitutional rights and liberties.  The founders hoped this structure would provide for a 
long-lasting and effective system of governance. 
After discussing the foundation upon which the system is based, we mov  to a 
discussion of the processes by which the executive and legislative branches became 
institutionalized; how institutionalization of these two branches ensured that fundamental 
values underlying the American democratic system would transcend any changes in 
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executive or legislative leadership; and how institutionalization created constraints on 
individual actors but left the door open for them to devise informal mechanisms of 
change. 
This overview is significant in that this study’s analytic approach is based on a 
socio-historical perspective which assumes institutions are shaped by history and infused 
with values.  While values are important in the formation of institutional structures, rules 
and standards and tend to persist over time, the conditions that existed during the 
formative years may change.  The integrated approach to new institut onalism suggests 
that institutions which are capable of adapting to change are more likely to survive in an 
evolutionary environment.  However, the more the structures and rules ar  
institutionalized, the more difficult it is to change course.  Therefore, institutional actors 
responsible for policy making often adopt informal mechanisms for change.  These 
mechanisms may become institutionalized or they may merely be tolerated as acceptable.  
Familiarity with the historical background in which the American political institutions 
were created, and the values underlying these institutional structures, will lead to better 
understanding of why certain issues and events (such as CNOOC’s proposed acquisition 
of Unocal) are politicized in an effort to accomplish long-term policy goals.  Since there 
is no express provision in the Constitution concerning regulation of foreign investment in 
the United States, we must look to other federal powers mentioned in the Constitution to 
understand politicization of foreign investment policies and regulations. 
The genius of the American Constitution is that it gave shape to the government 
and defined the boundaries and limits of the government at the same time that it provided 
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for fundamental rights which would be protected from temporary changes and political 
influence.137  It fulfilled the need for a “kind of social compact – a basic agreement 
among citizens, and between citizens and state, setting out mutual rights and duties, in 
permanent form.”138 
The Constitution created a republican form of government in which the people are 
the ultimate power, but they transfer that power to representatives elected to govern on 
their behalf.  While the Founding Fathers conceived of a dominant national g vernment 
which would limit the powers of the individual states, concerns over creating a system in 
which power might be too centralized led them to include discretionary language in the 
Constitution which divided powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.139  
Each of these branches was granted separate powers, but they were also required to share 
powers. 
The Constitution vests executive powers in the president and provides for 
executive checks on the legislature which include emergency calling into session of one 
or both houses of Congress; forced adjournment when both houses cannot agree on 
adjournment; presidential veto of legislation; and serving as commander in chief of the 
military.  Although the president has the power to oversee matters concerning foreign 
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nations, the Founding Fathers gave Congress policy making and budgetary powers to 
ensure that the president would not be able to assert absolute control ove the 
government.140  Legislative checks on the executive include the power to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare of the United States; the powerto d clare war; 
House impeachment power; Senate trial of impeachments; Senate approv l of 
departmental and U.S. Supreme Court appointments; Senate approval of treaties and 
ambassadors; and legislative override of presidential vetoes.141  Two of the constitutional 
bases for legislation concerning foreign investment are the power t  r gulate interstate 
and foreign commerce142 and the power to provide for national defense.143 
By institutionalizing the system of “checks and balances,” the founders created a 
tension between the executive and legislative branches that is reflected in the policy 
making process.  While attempting to resolve important and controversial is ues the 
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president and Congress compete for autonomy and decision making authority.144  
Although this struggle is constant, it is tempered by the institutionalization of values that 
are biased towards reaching a state of equilibrium.  The tendency towards equilibrium in 
domestic governance often prevails over efficient, or optimal, policy formulation.145  
Nonetheless, greater understanding of the institutional dynamics and how they have 
evolved over time will lend insight into how or why the president or Cngress may 
choose to politicize particular issues while formulating policies.146 
The struggle for control over foreign policy had clearly emerged by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, but the first major congressional challenge to the president’s 
foreign policy prerogative did not occur until the years between World War I and World 
War II.147  But after WWII, Congress rarely seemed to oppose the president’  foreign 
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policy decisions.148  Scholars have suggested that congressional deference was due in part 
to executive leadership in winning the war and in part to recognition that the president 
had advantages such as greater access to intelligence, the ability to function outside 
public scrutiny, and the ability to take decisive action, especially in times of crisis.149 
The semblance of acquiescence began to change after the 91st Congress when 
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a loyal ally 
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of President Johnson, began to challenge the president’s foreign policy initiatives.150  In 
particular, Fulbright objected to the president’s handling of military intervention in Santo 
Domingo which he claimed was a violation of a “treaty which had been solemnly ratified 
with the consent of the Senate.”151 
Although Senator Fulbright recognized presidential authority for making 
decisions and taking actions in emergency situations, he concluded that a series of crises 
over the past twenty-five years had led to an “unhinging of traditional constitutional 
relationships” in which the Senate’s constitutional powers of advice and consent had 
“atrophied into . . . a duty to give prompt consent with a minimum of advice.”152  In 
Fulbright’s view, the Senate’s responsibility was 
to review the conduct of foreign policy by the President and his advisers, 
to render advice whether it is solicited or not, and to grant or withhold its 
consent to major acts of foreign policy.  In addition the Congress ha  a 
traditional responsibility, in keeping with the spirit if not the precis  words 
of the Constitution, to serve as a forum of diverse opinions and as a 
channel of communication between the American people and their 
government.  The discharge of these functions is not merely a prerogative 
of the Congress; it is a constitutional obligation, for the neglect of which 
the Congress can and should be called to public account.153 
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At first, Senator Fulbright’s concerns did not seem to be felt to the same extent in 
the House.  For example, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported 
a resolution proposed by the president in support of his foreign policy efforts, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee adopted an alternative resolution requiring “affirmative 
action by Congress” to commit armed forces abroad.154  After Johnson announced he 
would not run for re-election, the Senate withheld the resolution from the floor, but 
Fulbright responded to the power that President Johnson had amassed by forming an ad 
hoc Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad chaired by 
Senator Stuart Symington.  The subcommittee’s stated purpose was to review 
international military commitments and the relationship of those commitments to U.S. 
foreign policy.155  Its underlying purpose was to facilitate Fulbright in asserting his own 
foreign policy initiatives. 
The cleavage between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Presi ent 
Johnson set the foreign policy tone for the next decade and beyond.  After the Vietnam 
War and the Watergate scandal led to a loss of confidence in executive leadership there 
were additional challenges to executive powers.156  Beginning in 1973 with the War 
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Powers Act,157 the legislature became more assertive in restricting the executive power to 
make foreign policy by mandating prior consultation with Congress.158  The following 
year, Congress went a step further and imposed human rights issuesinto U.S.-Soviet 
policy with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (“Jackson-Vanik”) to the Trade Act.159 
Although Jackson-Vanik denied the president wholesale authority to grant Most 
Favored Nation (“MFN”) status to any “non-market economy” (such as the Soviet Union 
and China) that prevented free emigration, it did permit the president to allow MFN 
treatment on an annual basis subject to legislative veto by a majority of Congress.  After 
a 1983 Supreme Court decision made the legislative veto unconstitutional, Congress 
amended Jackson-Vanik to allow legislative rejection of the president’s annual extension 
of MFN through a joint resolution of disapproval.160  Unlike the previous amendment, the 
joint resolution was subject to presidential veto and required two-thirds vote of both the 
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House and the Senate to overrule a presidential decision to extend MFN status.  As a 
consequence, each year as presidents would consider extension of MFN to China,
Congress would engage in debates as to whether that status should be extend d or not.  
These debates were replete with innuendos concerning communism and China’s foreign 
and domestic policies. 
Throughout the 1980s Congress struggled with determining where to draw the 
line between its foreign policy making authority and the president’s.  Japanese 
technology was gaining a stronger foothold in the American market and some legislators 
were concerned about the possibility that Japanese corporations might acquire industries 
deemed essential to U.S. commerce and national security.  Senator Exon (D-NE) and 
Representative Florio (D-NJ) sponsored an amendment to the Defense Production Act of 
1950 to authorize executive review of all foreign investments that might undermine 
national security.  The Exon-Florio Amendment passed in 1988 with the expectation that 
the president would intervene and block foreign acquisitions of American corporations 
that threatened national security. 
Ever since its enactment, Congress has reviewed the impact that the Exon-Florio 
Amendment has had on foreign acquisitions.  Ironically, by drafting legislation with the 
intent of protecting national security without compromising free trade nd proprietary 
rights of private businesses, Congress had created a situation in which they had excluded 
themselves from legislative oversight.  The secrecy necessitat d by executive review of 
confidential business transactions led some legislators to suspect that presidents were 
being too lenient in interpreting and implementing their authority under Exon-Florio. 
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Concerns about implementation of Exon-Florio continued to exist even after 
President George W. Bush reorganized his administration to protect the homeland from 
national security threats.  This study analyzes the tension between Congress and the 
White House over foreign policy and the difficulty that both branches face in balancing 
free trade values with the national security imperatives.  The analysis leads to the 
conclusion that congressional challenges to presidential authority, as demonstrated by the 
politicization of CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal, may become mor pervasive 
with regards to U.S.-China policy.161 
 
II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLICY MAKING  
 
Institutionalization is defined as a process by which an organization “acquires 
value and stability” by attaining high levels of autonomy, adaptability, complexity and 
coherence.162  In discussing the evolution of the American political system, this
dissertation shows how institutional characteristics have created opportunities as well as 
constraints for the president to assert foreign policy making powers.  Similarly, it shows 
how institutionalization has created opportunities and constraints for Congress to assert 
its legislative muscle in the foreign policy arena.  Even though there is a constant tension 
between the two institutions, accompanied by varying levels of support for the president 
                                                
161 Richard Bush, “The Roles of Congress in Shaping Washington’s China Policy,” 8. 
 
162 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 12.  In this study, we adopt the four characteristi s of 
institutionalization proposed by Huntington and further defined by Lyn Ragsdale and 
John Theis, “The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92,” American 




among individual legislators, Congress has successfully enacted major legislation to 
guide the president in balancing economic goals with national security goals.163  Analysis 
of the tension between the two institutions will help explain Congress’ efforts to 
politicize CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal in 2005. 
A. Institutionalization of Presidential Powers 
 1.  Characteristics of the Institutionalized Presidency 
(a)  Autonomy - During much of its history, the office of the president consisted 
only of the president and some low-level staff, administrative functio s were limited to 
national defense, and the presidency demonstrated few institutional qualities.164  Some 
scholars have traced the institutionalization of the presidency to 1921 when Congress 
enacted the Budget and Accounting Act.165  Previously, Congress had been wholly 
responsible for the structure and program responsibilities of the executive branch, 
including preparing the national budget.  But the Budget and Accounting Act transferred 
this congressional power to the presidency by requiring that the president draft the budget 
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with the assistance of the newly established Bureau of the Budget (BOB), which was 
housed in the Treasury.166 
The Economy Act of 1933 gave the president limited authority to reorganize the 
executive branch.  Then, in 1939, Congress further strengthened the president’s 
managerial responsibilities by statutorily authorizing the president to issue executive 
orders proposing reorganization within the executive branch that would reduce 
expenditures and increase efficiency.  A president’s reorganization order was to become 
effective after sixty days unless either the House or Senate adopted a resolution of 
disapproval.  President Roosevelt used this statutory authority to propose a 
Reorganization Plan to Congress, and some scholars trace the institutionalization of the 
presidency to the reorganization that followed. 167  After obtaining congressional consent, 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248 to create the Executive Office o  the President 
(EOP) and the White House Office (WHO) within the EOP.  Executive Order 8248 also 
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transferred the Bureau of the Budget, later to become the Office o  Management and 
Budget (OMB), from the Treasury Department to the EOP.168 
In establishing the Executive Office, Roosevelt made some significa t changes in 
presidential staffing.  He added six presidential assistants to his staff and differentiated 
between secretaries who had substantive responsibilities and administrative assistants 
who fulfilled other responsibilities and gathered information at the president’s request.  
By moving the Bureau of the Budget into the Executive Office, Roosevelt helped 
strengthen presidential control over fiscal planning.  Over time, the Executive Office of 
the President has expanded to include a number of advisory and policy-making agencies 
and task forces.  Modern presidents exercise additional powers with their ability to 
determine which powers shall be granted to the vice president, which ind viduals shall be 
given cabinet-level status, and which of those individuals shall carry mo e influence over 
the president’s decision making process.  The status the president grants to each of his 
advisors in the EOP is an indicator of the president’s policy preferences. 
Although budget allocations have varied from one Congress to the next, over he 
years, the executive budget has grown incrementally along with the staffing.  For 
example, before the reorganization in 1939, there were thirty-five employees serving in 
the BOB, but in less than ten years the staff had increased to more than 600, and over the 
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same time period the bureau’s budget had increased from less than $200,000 to nearly $3 
million.169  Today, the exact size of the president’s staff is not exactly clear.  According 
to Burke, this is because presidents borrow staff from other agencies and departments, 
and because presidents have “incentives to limit the officially report d size of the staff” 
to avoid “an outcry by Congress and the public.”170 
Over time, the expansion of the EOP required more than additional staff, it 
required greater managerial expertise.171  Presidents tended to emphasize managerial 
expertise until the Nixon Administration when “the impetus for staff institutionalization 
shifted significantly toward reducing political uncertainty.”172  As Nixon encouraged 
tight control over administrative agencies, the White House staff grew more influential.  
Today, the White House Office is even larger, staff functions have become increasingly 
specialized with more levels of hierarchy, and presidents have much ore autonomy than 
in the past.173 
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Another measure of executive autonomy is the extent to which the presidency 
provides leadership and offers policy directives independent of other branches of the 
government.  It has been noted that the president’s dual roles of leader and administrative 
clerk are often in conflict.174  But the leadership role is instrumental to managing foreign 
policy and diplomatic crises. 
Although the Founding Fathers had envisioned Congress as the lawmaking body, 
executive influence over law-making has expanded over time.  President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt established precedence for the president’s new policy-making role when he 
declared to the nation, “It is the duty of the President to propose and it is the privilege of 
Congress to dispose.”175  Since Roosevelt’s presidency, this concept has been 
institutionalized to the extent that the public now expects the president to formulate a 
legislative package, and the president expects his party to support his legislative package 
within Congress.  But, even with this expanded power, presidents continue to have 
difficulty getting their proposals through Congress, especially when the presidency and 
Congress are controlled by different political parties. 
Presidents attempt to increase their influence over Congress by relying upon a 
patronage system consisting of personal favors such as inviting individual legislatures to 
meetings in the White House or making campaign visits to their home districts.  
Presidents also attempt to influence policy through executive orders.  Authority to issue 
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executive orders is derived from the “take care” clause in the Constitution whereby the 
president has the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”176  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the “take care” clause to authorize the president to take 
such actions as necessary to carry out laws passed by Congress or to enforce existing 
laws and the Constitution.177 
After Roosevelt carried out the first Reorganization Plan, Congress reviewed the 
president’s statutory authority to issue executive orders under the Reorganization Act.  
Congressional review was based on a provision in the act that allowed Congress to 
disapprove a plan.  Then, in 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated congressional rel a ce 
upon a concurrent resolution to disapprove a proposed plan in INS v. Chadha.178  In 
response to the Supreme Court decision, Congress enacted the Reorganization Act 
Amendments of 1984.  The amendments allowed the president to make changes to his 
plan any time during the sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress in which 
it was submitted.  But the act also provided that both houses must adopt a joint resolution 
for approval within ninety days of continuous session.  This amendment only continued 
until the end of 1984 when it automatically expired.179  No president since Reagan has 
sought this reorganization authority. 
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In the absence of reorganization plan authority, the president may propose 
executive branch reorganization through the normal legislative process.  But this process 
is often slow, lacks a time frame, and does not mandate a vote.  The president can attempt 
minor reorganization, such as creating temporary entities, through directives such as 
executive orders, but this approach is inadequate for major organizational changes. 
Although executive orders are often administrative in nature, they have become 
increasingly “policy-specific” over time.180  But there are several constraints upon 
presidents who wish to accomplish policy goals through executive orders.  First, the 
executive order lacks permanency.  It has become increasingly common for presidents to 
revoke executive orders signed by previous administrations by issuing new executive 
orders that accomplish their own policy agendas.  A second constraint is the power of 
Congress to pass laws which modify or overturn executive orders.  This constraint has 
not been a significant deterrent to presidents as they know that a slow and tedious 
lawmaking process may prevent legislative action.  A third constrai t is the judicial 
power to declare an executive order unconstitutional.  However, such rulings are rare 
since the courts are reluctant to interfere with the executive’s authority over his staff.  In 
short, the Constitution provides these types of checks and balances to limit executive 
powers; but the fact that they are rarely used in practice has contributed to increased use 
of executive orders and the expansion of presidential autonomy. 
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Another mechanism contributing to the institutionalization of the presidency 
stems directly from the Constitution.  Article 1, section 7 stipulates how bills are 
presented to the president and how the president may veto or modify bills presented to 
him.  If the president approves the bill, “he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with 
his Objections to the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.”  If two-thirds of each 
house supports the president’s recommendations, the bill will become law. 
This signing statement consists of commentary that the president writes to 
accompany a bill when he signs it into law.  Over the years it has evolved into a 
“multipurpose device” with a number of different uses.  It can be used to influence 
political actors or to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of the bill 
pursuant to the president’s Article 2 “take care” and “oath of office” powers.  Or it can be 
used simply as a rhetorical tool to alert the public as to the president’s position 
concerning certain aspects of the bill.181 
Signing statements have long been used by presidents to assert their au ority 
after Congress passes major legislation that threatens presidential power and autonomy in 
the policy making process.  Kelley and Marshall trace the first use of the signing 
statement to President James Monroe, but their research suggests that the signing 
statement first attained “strategic importance” with the Reagan presidency and two 
significant Supreme Court decisions in which the Court relied in part on President 
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Reagan’s signing statements to reach their decisions.182  The signing statement is a 
“formidable” tool because it provides the president with a “last-move advantage” after a 
long sequence of political bargaining.183 
(b)  Adaptability – Adaptability is based on an awareness of internal and external 
environments and refers to the ability to take action to achieve a balance betwen the two.  
The adaptive function is a means by which an institution may modify its internal 
structures to meet the requirements of a constantly changing external environment.184 
This second feature of the institutionalized presidency refers to “the flexibility presidents 
have to create, modify, and eliminate units and the resilience of key units no matter who 
is president.”185  Like autonomy, adaptability increases the potential for the presidency to 
act independently of other branches of government.  For example, when presidents take 
office, their first task is to set up a system for managing the White House activities and 
staff.  It is not unusual for presidents to add some units that support high presidential 
priorities and abolish others that do not, but for the most part, presidents have tended to 
follow a fairly consistent model.  This model includes a chief of sta f who assumes 
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responsibility for organizing the White House and a cabinet consisting of the vice 
president and heads of administrative agencies.  Because of the complexity of the 
institutional structure and the wide variety of policy issues which the president must 
address, the role of the chief of staff has become increasingly important to modern 
presidents.186  During the George W. Bush presidency, the vice president’s involvement 
in executive decision making was elevated to a new level as will be discussed later. 
(c)  Complexity – Ragsdale and Theis suggest that the last two features of 
institutionalism – complexity and coherence – are indicative of the president’s ability to 
make internal changes in response to external forces.  Complexity r flects “increased 
division of labor and specialization” which enhances institutional stability y making it 
more difficult to dissolve administrative units.187  Measures of complexity include the 
total administrative units within the organization and the amount of staf ing.  As 
institutional complexity increases there will be “more discussion points, vetoes, 
jurisdictional conflicts, and decisions” which may contribute to an individual president’s 
knowledge-base, but may also diminish the efficiency of his decision making powers. 188 
There is no question regarding the degree of complexity in the executive branch.  
In 2005, there were over 2.7 million federal employees in the executiv  branch and the 
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president was responsible for appointing a small minority of these employees.  As a 
consequence, presidents have valued the role that political appointees play in advancing 
policy agendas.  While expanding policy making authority, the presidency has also 
sought to expand its control over White House and administrative agency staff.  Political 
appointees grew from 1,229 in the Clinton Administration to 2,000 in the Bush 
Administration – over thirty-three percent.189  The highest level appointees, such as 
cabinet secretaries, are subject to Senate confirmation, and these appointees are 
responsible for appointing their assistants. 
“Virtually all administrations over the past half century have embraced some 
version of a three-tiered layer cake for interagency policy making.”190  The top tier 
consists of the cabinet secretaries who are subject to Senate confirmation.  These 
appointees are responsible for appointing their assistants, the intermediate tier deputies 
who are second or third in charge of the departments and agencies.  Th  bottom tier 
consists of assistant secretaries and below.  These lower tier employees often retain 
employment from one president to the next and tend to identify more cl s ly with the 
mission of their agencies than the president’s policy agenda.  The diversity of the 
administrative work force may create pressure points for individual presidents who seek 
to impose policy agendas on the administrative agencies, but it helps buid the fourth 
essential characteristic of institutionalization – coherence. 
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(d)  Coherence – Coherence reflects the ability of an organization to manage its 
workload and includes “universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic 
rather than discretionary methods for conducting internal business.”191   Over time, job 
criteria are developed and the workload begins to follow predictable patterns; daily tasks 
become more automatic and stability increases.192  As coherence in personnel increases it 
tends to transcend changes in presidents and changes in party leadership which ultimately 
strengthen the office of the presidency.193  At the same time, increased coherence may 
make it more difficult for the president to impose his individual preferences in the policy 
making process. 
One of the most obvious measures of coherence may be found in the civil s rvice 
system in which administrative staff is protected from being dismissed once a new 
president or a president from a different political party takes office.  The magnitude and 
extent of the administrative bureaucracy’s influence acts not only t  ensure stability, but 
also reinforces the tendency towards institutional stasis. 
In short, an individual president’s influence over the policy agenda is subject to 
the institutional constraints that have been formalized by the Constitution, statutes, and 
case law.  The constraints that the president faces vary from one administration to 
another.  In the domestic arena, the president is challenged by theconstraints imposed by 
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Congress and the judiciary.  But, in the foreign policy arena, the president is also 
challenged by external constraints imposed by other nation-states and demanded by the 
need to protect national security.  How well the president is able to manage or overcome 
these institutional constraints depends upon informal mechanisms, such as his leadership 
skills, the organizational structure that he establishes within the W ite House and 
Executive Office, and how that structure facilitates the president’s understanding of the 
political dynamics and allows him to utilize his special decision making skills. 
 2.  The President’s Formal and Informal Powers 
Institutional theory suggests that American presidents are bestow d with both 
formal and informal powers upon taking office.  We have stated previously how the 
president’s formal powers arise from constitutional authority, statutes, and case law.  
Although the Constitution grants the president specific powers, it provides little guidance 
on how the president should structure an administration to implement these powers.194  
For example, article 2, section 1(2), empowers the president to nominate and appoint, “by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, “and all other Officers of the Unit d States” whose 
appointments are not otherwise provided by the Constitution or established by law.  The 
Constitution also provides that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone.”  How the president 
executes his powers of appointment has been shaped by historical precedent, l gislative 
                                                
194 Glen O. Robinson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Harold H. Bruff, The Administrative Process, 




acts, and decisions of the Supreme Court.195  In the absence of specific legislation, the 
president has considerable autonomy and flexibility in the authority he delegates to his 
political appointees and how he interacts with them. 
Since informal powers are not specifically delineated by law, they arise from the 
historical setting and the political climate existing at theime the president is elected.   
Informal powers continue to evolve throughout the president’s term of office.  Each 
president’s informal powers are shaped by his personality, world view, and leadership 
style; the “political capital” that he accumulates prior to taking office; and the set of skills 
he possesses for managing the endless number of institutional conflicts and constraints 
that he faces during his administration. 
There are many definitions of “world view.”  This study draws its definition from 
cognitive philosophy which provides that a person’s world view originates from his 
unique experiences in society, emanates from his socio-economic position, and reflects 
his religious background, education, ethics, and basic beliefs.  This world view becomes 
part of the president’s personality and is manifested in his leadership style. 
“Political capital” is often bestowed upon the president by virtue of winning the 
election.  This power is a function of the president’s electoral margin, party support in 
Congress, public approval, and patronage appointments.196  When a president wins by a 
landslide, or even a comfortable majority vote, he tends to assume he has been granted a 
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popular mandate to implement his political agenda.197  When the president wins in a close 
election his political capital is diminished. 
The president’s informal powers arise out of the organizational structures and 
decision making processes he adopts and the political appointments he makes.  The 
structural components are subject to the president’s management skills and influence his 
ability to collect, analyze, and evaluate the options available for accomplishing political 
goals.198  But the compartmentalization of formal organization structures crates barriers 
to the decision making process.  Informal structures are not found on organization charts, 
but create links across the formal lines of authority and communications and are a way of 
breaking down structural barriers.199 
B.  George W. Bush’s Presidency 
 1.  Historical Setting and Political Climate 
 Historically it is during political campaigns that presidential candidates begin to 
disclose their world views, define their political agendas, accumulate political capital, and 
set the tone of their leadership styles.  The focus in the 2000 presidential campaign was 
on values and domestic policy, not foreign policy.  George W. Bush used vigorous 
language in his campaign speeches, yet carefully avoided engaging in any lengthy 
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discourse regarding specific foreign policy issues.  No longer faced with Cold War 
conflicts fabricated by two contending superpowers, Bush suggested tha future threats 
would come from “rogue nations and terrorists.”   He cited a need to prepare for future 
challenges by creating military forces which would be “more agile, harder to find, easier 
to move, readily deployable, and lethal in action.”200 
In regards to foreign trade, Bush extolled the same benefits that Clinton did – an 
open global economy in which American enterprise and values would prevail.201  But 
Bush attempted to distinguish himself from Clinton in his occasional rema ks concerning 
China. Bush described China as a “strategic competitor” as opposed t  Clinton’s 
characterization of China as a “strategic partner.”202  Beyond these generalizations, 
substantive foreign policy discussions were virtually absent from the campaign.203 
With foreign policy in the background, George W. Bush was able to focus on 
domestic policy and the GOP’s goal of restoring the party to power.  The Republican 
establishment recognized Bush as a winner – a candidate who was loyal to conservative 
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values, but was not divisive.  While the Bush name was well respected, George W. Bush 
himself had the advantage of not being burdened by Washington politics.204  This was a 
welcome relief to the party as well as to the American public whi h had been outraged by 
Clinton’s actions which signaled disrespect for the office. 
Although the 2000 election brought victory to the Republican Party, it was
tarnished by controversy over the Florida ballots.  After losing the popular vote in a 
disputed election and waiting thirty-six days for the Supreme Court t  make its narrow 5-
4 decision regarding the Electoral College vote, President Bush was left with very little 
political capital to build upon.  President Bush faced another disadvantage because his 
Republican Party only held a majority in Congress by a slight margin.  The Senate was 
evenly divided with Vice President Cheney breaking the tie and the House was split 221-
212. 
The lack of political capital and experience in Washington had potential for 
inhibiting President Bush’s ability to govern.  After the Supreme Court’s decision, Bush 
had less than fifty days to hire his staff.  To make matters worse, the number of positions 
requiring Senate confirmation had increased in recent years which meant it could have 
taken much longer to fill key appointments.  Yet, Bush was up to the challenge and did 
not assume office with the restraint that one might have expected from his narrow and 
disputed victory. 
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George W. Bush’s leadership style and commitment to strengthen the ranks of the 
Republican Party allowed him to solidify his base of support and overcome these 
disadvantages.  He made structural changes within the EOP that reflected his own goals 
and approach to governing, he elevated the status of the Vice President, and he moved 
quickly to fill Senate confirmed positions.205  In spite of these obstacles he filled political 
appointments on an average of 8.3 months from nomination to confirmation, which was 
not much longer than the average of his immediate predecessors, Bill Clinton and George 
H.W. Bush.206 
In short, President George W. Bush inherited institutional constrai ts typical to 
other presidencies, including prior budget commitments and foreign treaty obligations, as 
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well as constraints unique to his own presidency.  All of these constraint  limited his time 
and ability to collect and analyze information, and also restricted the options for 
implementing his presidential agenda.  Nonetheless, President Bush followed the 
precedent established by previous presidents when he focused on the power of informal 
mechanisms to overcome institutional constraints.  This study argues that it is the formal 
constraints created by the American Constitution, statutes, and case law that has 
contributed to the need for actors within the executive and legislative branches to rely 
upon informal mechanisms to accomplish policy goals. 
2.  Developing a Leadership Style 
Since our laws grant the president broad discretion in how he organizes the White 
House, he is able to set up structures that reinforce his own world view and values, and 
these are manifested in his leadership style.  George W. Bush’s world view was shaped 
by his Harvard Business School experiences, his tenure as a corporate executive, and 
observations of his father’s successes and failures as President of the United States.  
Bush’s world view, in turn, helped shape the focus of his campaign for the presidency 
and his presidential leadership style.  According to Daalder and Lindsay, Bush identified 
three essential challenges for the president:  (1) the challenge of leadership which is to 
“outline a clear vision and agenda,” (2) the challenge of building a strong team of 
effective people to implement the president’s agenda, and (3) the chall nge of sticking to 
an opinion even when the polls show the public moving in the opposite direction.207 
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Daalder and Lindsay suggest that what made Bush unique among presidents was 
his “logic about how America should act in the world.” 208  Bush believed that the key to 
securing America’s interests in the world was primacy in a hegemonic world order.  This 
view was based on five propositions that are consistent with realist theory:  (1) the world 
is a dangerous place, (2) the key players in world affairs are self-interested nation states, 
(3) the key to survival is power, (4) multilateral institutions and agreements are not 
necessarily conducive to achieving American interests, and (5) the United States is a 
unique power with a focus on personal freedoms and open markets.209 
Bush’s strategy for working with Congress was similar to thatwhich he pursued 
as governor in Texas where he developed proposals that appealed to both Democrats and 
Independents.  Upon taking federal office, he deviated little from the agenda that he had 
described on the campaign trail.  His agenda was a narrow one intended to limit 
competition among issues for public attention and congressional support.  His tax cuts 
appealed to the Republican base that elected him and his education reforms were a way to
reach across party lines to win over moderates.  But one of the more difficult issues on 
the presidential agenda was that of energy security, which meant creating energy 
independence and economic security.210 
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There was increased pressure on both Congress and the presidency to elevate 
energy policy on their political agendas after California’s energy crisis had brought about 
blackouts.  Upon taking office, President Bush acknowledged the energy crisis as the 
most important task of his presidency.  Shortly afterwards he created a task force of 
senior government representatives, called the National Energy Policy Development 
Group (NEPDG), with Vice President Cheney as chair to develop a ng-range plan to 
meet American’s energy requirements. 
The NEPDG released a report on May 17, 2001 which called for drilling in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) at the same time that it blocked an increase in 
fuel efficiency standards.  The report created strong opposition within the environmental 
community and Democratic representatives in Congress. Although it was controversial, 
the proposed drilling in ANWR allowed the Bush Administration to claim commitment to 
a policy of independence from the Middle East.  Actually, as Michael Klare points out, 
the report did not offer a real plan for decreasing dependence on imported oil.211  Instead, 
it supported the priority of increasing and protecting the flow of petroleum from foreign 
sources to U.S. markets.212 
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Support from Tom DeLay and other House leaders, was instrumental to forming a 
coalition with Democrats from oil and gas states and other interest groups, such as the 
Teamsters, to move the energy policy through Congress.  The president won a 240-189 
victory in the House, but the Senate was more challenging, especially after the 
unexpected defection of life-long Republican Senator Jeffords to the Democratic Party.  
Losing the majority in the Senate meant losing the advantages that come with majority 
status, including control over the timing and substance of the legislative agenda. As a 
consequence, Bush’s team of advisors assumed a key role in moving his energy agenda 
forward  – especially after 9/11 when the focus turned to national security. 
Finally, Bush persevered with his commitment to stick to an opinion once it had  
been formed. Reflecting on his accomplishments, George W. Bush stated th  he would 
“like to be remembered as a person who first and foremost, did not sell his soul in order 
to accommodate the political process.”  He proudly proclaimed, “I came to Washington 
with a set of values, and I’m leaving with the same set of values, and I darn sure wasn’t 
going to sacrifice those values; that I was a president that had to make tough choices and 
was willing to make them.”213  Bush believed that leaders should not succumb to public 
opinion, but should adhere to what they believe is the best course of acti n.  He 
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demonstrated this belief in his commitment to the war on terror and military action in 
Iraq.  It was also an attitude reflected in diplomacy and U.S. China foreign policy. 
3.  Creating a Organizational Structure and Decision Making Scheme 
 (a)  Political Appointments – Political appointments are at the heart of the 
executive organizational structure and the president’s decision making scheme.  The 
tradition of the president’s cabinet may be traced back to the beginnin  of the presidency 
itself.  Based on article 2, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, one of the principal purposes 
of the cabinet is to advise the president on any subject he may require relating to the 
duties of their respective offices.214  Traditionally, the president’s cabinet has consisted of 
the vice president and secretaries of the executive departments. 
President Bush took great strides to appoint key individuals within his cabinet (as 
well as the White House and administrative bureaucracy) who shared is world view and 
ideology.  He also focused on honoring political obligations and achieving diversity. 
Consistent with his business management background, Bush appointed a cabinet that 
symbolized corporate America.215  The key appointees and their influence over Bush’s 
foreign policy decisions are discussed below. 
First, and foremost, was Vice President Cheney who began a career in public 
service when he joined the Nixon Administration in 1969 and then later served on 
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Congress representing the State of Wyoming.  But Cheney also had a distinguished career 
in business and he was CEO of Halliburton Corporation when he joined Bush’s campaign 
ticket.  Although business experience was prevalent in Bush’s political appointments, 
Kenneth Walsh notes that when Bush asked the head of his vice presidential s arch team, 
Dick Cheney, “to actually become his running mate, it was clear that he valued Cheney’s 
Washington experience above all.”216  He told Cheney that he would need his advice in 
good times and bad, but Cheney’s advice was actually most valued during times of crisi . 
President Bush came to rely on his vice president more than any other advisor and 
confidant.  He immediately gave Cheney responsibility for developing the national 
energy policy and welcomed him to attend any executive meeting of his choice.217 
Unlike previous administrations, Bush made Cheney chair of the president’  
Budget Review Board which rules on appeals of OMB decisions regardin  proposed 
funding for executive branch departments.  Bush also named two of Cheney’s top aides – 
Lewis Libby and Mary Matalin – assistants to the president.218  This was quite unusual, 
but served to bring the White House and vice presidential staff closer together. 
Bush also gave Cheney an office in the White House in addition to the ne 
traditionally reserved for the vice president in the Senate.  In Cheey’s words, his close 
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relationship with the president created a “seamless operation” in which he and everyone 
else was there “to serve the president.”219  In an interview with Cokey Roberts, Vice 
President Cheney gave insight into the administration’s perspective concerning the 
historical struggle for power between the presidency and Congress.  Cheney explained 
that the president’s powers had been so compromised by Watergate that it diminished the 
“ability of the president of the United States to do his job.”220 
Cheney’s commitment to taking back presidential powers was demonstrated on a 
number of occasions.  One particularly notable case concerned Vice President Cheney’s 
role as chairman of the NEPDG, which was charged with developing a national energy 
policy.  In April 2001, Representative John Dingell (D-MI), ranking memb r of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Henry Waxman (D-CA), ranking 
member of the House Committee on Government Reform, wrote to the GAO Comptroller 
General Walker to request investigation of the conduct and composition of the NEPDG. 
Initially the GAO requested information concerning the composition of the task 
force, the persons with whom Cheney, in his capacity as chair of NEGDC, and the task 
force met, the meeting notes and minutes, and the costs incurred in developing policy 
recommendations. The congressional members claimed they wanted this information to 
aid with considering proposed legislation, assessing the need and merit of legislative 
changes and conducting oversight of executive branch administration of existing law.  
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Even though Title 31, section 712 broadly authorizes the GAO to investigat all matters 
relating to the use of public funds, Cheney refused.221  Even after the GAO voluntarily 
narrowed its request by eliminating the minutes and notes and informati n presented to 
the task force, Cheney still refused to comply.  The vice president was resolute in his 
belief that the presidency had been weakened by “unwise compromises” that were made 
over the previous thirty to thirty-five years and he refused to releas  any substantive 
information.222  It was his position that the GAO lawsuit was an intrusion into “the inner 
sanctum of executive-branch deliberations” which threatened to undermine the 
constitutional powers of the executive branch.223 
Although the issue was not resolved, the GAO postponed its pursuit of the 
requested information out of deference to the administration’s need to respond to the 
events of September 11th.  Then, early in 2002, after several senators joined the previous 
request by the House of Representatives, the comptroller general wrote a letter to the 
chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Committees stating that the 
GAO had exhausted all statutorily required processes for resolving access requests out of 
court.  Cheney’s refusal was an affront to the GAO which is a nonpartisan group that is 
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widely respected in Washington.  Although the GAO was sensitive to the vice president’s 
“need to protect executive deliberations,” it was concerned that Ceney had denied 
access to information that the GAO had “a statutory right to obtain.”224  The GAO 
proceeded to file suit against Vice President Cheney in Walker v. Cheney reasoning that 
“if the Vice President’s arguments were to prevail, any administration seeking to insulate 
its activities from oversight and public scrutiny could do so by assigning those activities 
to the Vice President or a body under the White House’s direct control.”225 
Walker v. Cheney was a landmark case because the GAO had never before filed 
suit against the executive branch for failing to cooperate with an inquiry.226  It was also 
distinguished by the fact that the suit was brought by a member of the Republican Party 
to raise important constitutional questions involving the actions of a Republican vice 
president exercising executive privilege independent of the president.  But the case did 
not prevent Cheney from continuing with his efforts to bolster executive privilege and 
elevate his vice presidential authorities to new heights.  The mor  Cheney pushed, the 
more he gained influence over the president’s leadership style – which be ame 
increasingly inflexible, insular, and aggressive.  As we will see later, the more the 
president relied on Cheney, the less the president relied on his other advisors for input 
into the decision making process. 
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Besides Cheney, other appointees brought valuable corporate experience to the 
Bush Cabinet, including Samuel W. Bodman and Donald Rumsfield.  Bodman joined the 
Bush Administration in the Department of Commerce after a career in venture capital, 
serving as chairman, CEO, and director of a number of publicly owned corporations.  
Then he served a year as deputy secretary of Treasury before bing sworn in as the 
eleventh secretary of Energy on February 1, 2005.  Rumsfield had a distinguished career 
in the military and politics, as well as the corporate world.  He served seven years in 
Congress, followed by nearly a decade of political appointments, before serving as chief 
executive officer, president and chairman of G.D. Searle & Company, chairman of 
General Instrument Corporation, and chairman of the board for Gilead Sciences, Inc.  As 
secretary of Defense, Rumsfield was characterized as a conservativ  hawk; he was an 
advocate for a strong defense policy with a particular emphasis on missile defense 
systems. 227 
Consistent with campaign promises and the need to strengthen political capital, 
Bush strategically diversified his cabinet.  He appointed two African-Americans (General 
Colin Powell at the State Department and Roderick Page at the Department of 
Education), two East Asians, one Hispanic, and three women to highly visible 
positions.228  But even these appointments were a reflection of corporate America.  For 
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example, Carlos Gutierrez joined Kellogg as a sales representativ , but rose to executive 
office, and was named to chairman of the board before he was nominated as secretary of 
Commerce in February 2005. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell had a distinguished military c eer, having served 
as a captain in Viet Nam before his promotion to full general under former President 
George H.W. Bush’s administration and service as chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
during the Gulf War.  Powell was perceived as a moderate with regards to military 
matters.  For instance, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Powell stated that the key to dealing with the Chinese was to expose them “to 
the powerful forces of a free enterprise system in democracy, so they can see that this is 
the proper direction in which to move.”229  This moderate approach and the respect that 
Powell had earned from both Democrats and Republicans led to the Senate’s u nimous 
approval of his appointment. 
As a moderate, Powell also preferred a policy of containment regardin  Iraq, but 
this made him the “odd man” among Bush’s other hawkish advisors.  Even though 
Powell succumbed to Bush’s strategy for overthrowing Saddam Hussein aft r 9/11, 
political infighting among the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the 
Vice President’s Office led to his resignation on November 15, 2004.230 
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President Bush relied on a number of other appointments to high ranking 
positions to compensate for his lack of experience in Washington.  The National Journal 
reports that forty-three percent of Bush appointees had worked in his father’s 
administration, eighty-six percent had worked for the government previously, and twenty 
percent had worked for Washington lobbying firms.231  One of these experienced and 
trusted appointments was National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice who later 
replaced Colin Powell as secretary of state in 2005. 
Interestingly, there is no provision in law establishing an assist nt to the president 
for national security affairs, but the position of national security advisor has roots in the 
National Security Council (NSC) established by President Harry Truman in 1947 with 
four statutory members – the president, vice-president, secretary of state, and secretary of 
defense.  At first, the assistants that managed the NSC simply reported to the president.  
Then President Dwight Eisenhower created the position of special assistant for national 
security to assist with long term planning.  President Kennedy, who wanted to be more 
directly involved with foreign policy, modified the position into one that managed the 
president’s policy affairs and worked to integrate the national security bureaucracy with 
the president’s foreign policy agenda.  Daalder notes that the “position gained 
prominence after President John F. Kennedy’s election . . . and has become central to 
presidential conduct of foreign policy.”232  National security advisors must balance their 
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allegiance to the president with their commitment to manage a policy process that 
engages various senior officials and their agencies. 
Historically, the national security advisor has influenced the president’s foreign 
policy initiatives and decisions concerning overseas business transactio .  Analysts have 
explained this phenomenon by noting the national security advisor’s proximity to the 
Oval Office and the frequency with which he or she interacts with the president.233  As 
foreign policy became more complex, presidents came to rely on their national security 
advisors to work with various departments to integrate diverse policy dimensions, 
including defense and diplomacy, finance and trade, the environment and homeland 
security, and science and technology.   By the time George W. Bush took office there was 
a “general consensus” as to the appropriate role of the national security advisor.234 
The position requires someone who can balance the need to make decisions with 
sensitivity to the roles of the other secretaries and advisors.  A key ingredient to the 
national security advisor’s success is maintaining the trust of the president and the other 
senior advisors, all of which must have confidence that he or she will convey their views 
and advice to the president. 
Condoleeza Rice joined George W. Bush’s Administration as assistnt to the 
president for national security after a career in academia, and several stints of service in 
the previous Bush Administration, including service on the National Security Council.  
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Prior to joining the current administration, she gained experience as a member of several 
boards and commissions, including the board of directors for the Chevron Corporation.  
She was an expert on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and as  “realist,” 
believed that the U.S. must maintain a position of military streng h in its relations with 
communist countries.235  She also believed that the administration should focus on 
strengthening relations with Japan and other East Asian allies while downplaying 
relations with China.236 
Ultimately, the national security advisor is responsible for helping the president 
make the best decisions as expeditiously as possible.  Some analysts argue that Rice 
followed the president’s orders without examining alternative actions or examining the 
consequences.237  But given Bush’s managerial style, it is unlikely that he would have 
been receptive to any attempts to engage him in analysis.  He view d himself as “the 
Decider” whose primary responsibility was making tough decisions in difficult times. 
A distinguishing characteristic of Bush’s presidency was that he did not appoint 
China experts to his cabinet or to key foreign policy advisory position .  Believing the 
Clinton Administration had over emphasized China’s importance, Bush did not rush into 
developing his own China policy.  It was only after a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance 
aircraft and a Chinese jet fighter collided in the South China Sea in April 2001 that Bush 
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was forced to turn his attention to China.  Even though U.S.-China relations were tense, 
Bush pledged to do “whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan,238 which included military 
measures as well as downgrading China’s stature in foreign policy by working through 
State Department and Defense Department channels.239 
Although China experts did not define Bush’s cabinet, two senior policymakers 
had significant experience in Asia – Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz.  Armitage served three tours of duty in 
Vietnam and was in Saigon with it fell to the North Vietnamese.  During the Reagan 
Administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs and also assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.  
Like Rumsfield, Armitage saw the relationship with Japan as fundamental to U.S. 
national security supported a missile defense policy.  Wolfowitz had served as 
ambassador to Indonesia and assistant secretary of state for East Asia and pacific affairs.  
He, too, advocated for stronger ties with Japan, at the expense of ties with China, and a 
policy of increased missile defense. 
Another political appointment relevant to the development of foreign policy under 
the Bush Administration was U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick.  Zoellick 
gave a preview of the Bush Administration’s trade agenda when he testified before the 
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House Ways and Means Committee.  Emphasizing that “[t]rade policy is the bridge 
between the President’s international and domestic agendas,” Zoellick pushed for trade 
liberalization and the free exchange of goods and services to boost domestic economic 
growth.  Assuring the Committee he would consult with them often, he asked Congress to 
give him “the strong hand of presidential trade promotion authority.”240 
(b)  Bush’s Hierarchical Approach to Decision Making 
 The president’s decision making scheme consists of how recommendations are 
made to the president – whether he is presented with one perspective of each policy issue 
or whether he was alerted to disagreements across policy issues; wh ther he looks at just 
one dimension or multiple dimensions of the information presented; whether he r ceives 
single or multiple recommendations for action; and how he communicates policy issues 
and decisions to the public.241  Ultimately, the president’s decision making scheme has an 
impact on whether he is able to build coalitions, coalesce congressional support, and win 
public endorsement.  But just as the separation of powers has created issues of control 
and responsibility among the various branches of government, it has also created 
conflicts within each branch as the cabinet members, advisors, and executive staff, often 
have overlapping responsibilities. 
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Initially, President Bush took a restrained approach to his executiv  
responsibilities which seemed to reflect his limited background in public policy.  
Although the organizational structure that existed when he took office mirrored the 
structure of presidents before him, he drew upon his business school education and the 
successes he had as Governor of the State of Texas, to form a structure and managerial 
style that relied upon a hierarchical approach to decision making. 242  For example, in 
organizing the White House staff, President Bush appointed Andrew Card as his chief of 
staff, but did not make Card the only senior advisor who reported directly to him.  He 
also appointed Karl Rove as his political strategist and Karen Hughes as his public 
relations advisor.  Karl Rove was put in charge of the newly created Office of Strategic 
Initiative (OSI) which was designed to “think ahead and devise long term political 
strategies.”243 
According to Hult, forming the triad of Andrew Card, Karl Rove, and Karen 
Hughes was “consistent with reports of [the president’s] desire for multiple sources of 
information” and was also a mechanism for maintaining control and keeping any one of 
his advisors from becoming too powerful.244  But after Karen Hughes left the president’s 
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staff early in 2002 Karl Rove’s influence over the president increased substantially.245  
Evidence of Rove’s influence is abundant, but one example is the impact he had 
regarding the president’s political appointments which extended from the executive 
branch to the federal judiciary.  The evaluation criterion for politica  appointments 
included partisan as well as ideological standards.  This criterion came to play when the 
White House Personnel Office sought advice concerning nominees.  The Personnel 
Office would not just consult the staff in the Office of Political Affairs, as had been done 
in previous administrations, but would go to Senior Advisor Karl Rove as well.246 
President Bush often chose to achieve policy goals through his cabinet (to which 
he had delegated some “untraditional” functions),247 political appointees, and 
bureaucratic channels rather than through Congress or the party apparatus.248  For 
example, when Bush came to office, he admitted that he was weak in foreign relations 
experience and assembled a team of experts to counterbalance that w akness.  This group 
of eight Republican experts, nicknamed the “Vulcans,” was led by National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz, dean of Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies.  Both Rice and Wolfowitz had served under the elder 
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Bush – Rice as the president’s advisor on Soviet affairs and Wolfowitz as undersecretary 
for defense policy.  Other Vulcans who served in the previous Bush Administration, and 
their previous titles, included:  Robert Blackwill, White House advisor on European and 
Soviet affairs; Stephen J. Hadley, assistant secretary of defense for international security 
policy; Robert Zoellick, undersecretary of state for economic affairs and White House 
deputy chief of staff.  Vulcans who served under President Reagan, and their titles, 
included Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for inte national security 
affairs; Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy; Dov 
Zakheim, deputy undersecretary of defense for planning and resources.   
These appointments were significant because they indicated Bush’s “own foreign 
policy predispositions.” 249  In contrast to Republican “sovereignists” who served in 
Congress in the mid-1990s and favored isolationism, the Vulcans supported engagement 
and free trade.  It was this preference for letting the free market reign that caused some 
legislators in Congress to question whether the Bush Administration was taking the 
Exon-Florio Amendment seriously, or whether the presidency was more inclined to let 
corporate profits prevail over all other national interests. 
In laying the foundation for understanding Bush’s decision making scheme, we 
have examined his leadership style, his key political appointments, and how he interacted 
with his advisors and cabinet members.  Now we turn to the strategies he used to build 
coalitions, congressional support, and public endorsement. 
 
                                                





 4.  Building Coalitions and Congressional Support  
Under institutional theory one might expect a strong tendency towards 
cooperation when the president and the majority in Congress represent the same party.  
This is because members of the same party are more likely to adhere to similar ideologies 
and political views.  There is also strength that can be garnered from party cohesiveness 
when it comes to a candidate’s ability to finance political campaigns and secure electoral 
votes.  Once a candidate is elected, the public tends to judge the elected official based 
upon his or her ability to fulfill campaign promises.  Given the division of power in the 
American system, individual politicians are more likely to be successful if they can build 
a coalition of support, and the party is fundamental to building coalitions. 
By contrast, when members of Congress and the president are from opposing 
parties they tend to adhere to different ideologies and view one another as a threat to 
attaining personal and political goals.  In spite of the expectation of cooperation along 
party lines, there are occasions in which the president and legislators from the same party 
may disagree.  This may be because legislators want to be re-el ct d and are motivated 
by a desire to serve their constituents, but not all of their constituen s support all of the 
president’s policies.  Or, as in the Unocal Case, it may be becaus  individual legislators 
become concerned about the president diminishing the importance of respecting 
congressional oversight. 
While it is in the president’s best interest to cooperate with members of his party 
in Congress, the diversity of interests represented in Congress means that it is not always 
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possible.  The president must constantly lobby legislators and form coalitions of support.  
But the coalitions of support will vary depending upon the issue, the particul  
circumstances surrounding that issue, and the cohesiveness of the party as a whole.  
Sometimes the president will need to reach across the aisle and cultivate support from the 
opposite party, but this type of coalition building becomes much more difficult when one 
or both chambers of Congress are controlled by the opposition party. 
In his campaign, Bush had run as a “compassionate conservative,” suggestin  that 
he would work to overcome the strong partisanship that had characterized the 1990s, as 
well as the Texas statehouse when he was governor.  But President Bush quickly learned 
that the political game in Washington was much more challenging than Texas politics. 
Even though Bush had begun to reach out to individual Democrats before he was 
declared the winner in the Florida election, he still failed to convince Democrats and 
Republicans to work together to push legislation through Congress. 
Given the circumstances, President Bush enjoyed exceptional legislative success 
in the early years of his administration.  Some attribute this p enomenon to Bush’s 
ideological and partisan compatibility with Republicans in Congress and the majorities 
that his party held in the House for the first six years and the Senate for the first four 
years.250  Some attribute it to the strategy of focusing on just a few issues and playing to 
interests held by both Democrats and Republicans, such as education reforms and lower 
taxes.  And some attribute it to 9/11 and the unique situation in which Americans rallied 
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around the president and the firm stance he took in preventing America from being the 
target of future terrorist acts. 
Certainly, President Bush had the advantage of a Republican-controlled C ngress 
when he took office, but the lack of political capital made him dependent upon his the 
cabinet, the White House staff, and administrative agencies for promoting his political 
agenda.  Fortunately, he had the advantage of the Republican majority in the House of 
Representatives, and even though it was by a narrow margin, the House is biased towards 
the majority and a cohesive majority has substantial power.  This meant Bush was well-
positioned to take advantage of the procedural and organization tools in the hands of the 
Speaker of the House. 
By contrast, the Senate operates by more permissive rules and the 50-50 split 
between the parties in the Senate presented a challenge to the presid nt.  The divided 
Senate “forced Republicans to enter into a power sharing agreement with Democrats 
specifying equal numbers of members on every committee” even though Republicans 
would chair committees.251  Tension between President Bush and his party in Congress 
began to emerge shortly after Senator Jeffords’ defection from the Republican Party on 
May 24, 2001.252  Noting that many Republicans in Congress had never served with a 
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president of their own party and none had served in the majority with a Republican 
president, Sinclair suggests that “congressional Republicans were accustomed to setting 
their own course.”  They may have had unrealistic expectations from the president, but 
they were disappointed when President Bush asked them to “make tough votes that 
conflicted with their ideology.”  After losing the majority, Republican senators became 
much more outspoken when they did not agree with the president, that is, until September 
11, 2001.253 
Throughout his administration, whenever President Bush found that he could not 
win Congress over, he turned to his veto power to object to specific provisions of a bill 
without vetoing the entire bill.  Although the Constitution grants this power to the 
president, it does not provide any formal rules mandating how the president may or may 
not use the signing statement to accomplish his own goals.  According to a study by 
David Birdsell, the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations used signing 
statements to argue “on behalf of a president’s right not to enfrce ‘constitutionally 
unsound’ provisions and all three presidents made much more frequent use of signing 
statements than their predecessors.”254  But Birdsell suggests that President George W. 
Bush went far beyond previous presidents in expanding his executive prerogative beyond 
congressional will. 
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What made President Bush’s approach unique was not just the number of signing
statements accompanying the bills he signed, but the character of the statements.  Rather 
than following the precedent of framing statements in the first person, Birdsell points out 
that President Bush framed his statements in the third person.  He asserted the 
constitutional authority “of the President” rather than his own authority as it related to the 
particular bill.  His signing statements also lacked specificity regarding his objections, 
which made it virtually impossible for Congress to respond.  Finally, the language he 
used was “formulaic and broad, asserting power without a detailed rationale for the 
power.”255 
A successful president does not just limit himself to winning over Congress he 
also works to win over the public.  Public opinion is instrumental in bolstering the 
president’s position vis à vis Congress because legislators votes are influenced by vocal 
interest groups and supportive constituents.  This means that presidents must be astute in 
managing their communications with the public.  How President Bush handled 
communications is discussed below. 
 5.  President Bush’s Communications Network and Public Endorsement 
 The White House communications network is complex and multifaceted, and 
focused on briefings, press releases, and advance copies of speeche as tools for 
managing the media.  The modern communications network may be attributed to 
President Wilson who expanded relations with the press, centralized control in the White 
                                                





House, reinstituted the tradition of orally delivering the State of the Union address to 
Congress, and initiated national campaigns.  White House ties to the media expanded 
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt after he gave the press secretary gr ater authority 
to coordinate the media and its contacts with the administration and to discipline 
executive departmental staff to project a public message designed by the president.256  
The role of the media has continued to grow ever since. 
 In today’s world, the communications operations are needed to promote the 
president’s brand of leadership and advocate for the policies, laws, and programs that he 
wants to accomplish.  Communications are a serious matter and are handled by the 
Offices of Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting, and Global Communications.  
By Bush’s second term, communications staff exceeded 300, ranging from senior 
officials down to personnel who record presidential speeches, press conferences, and 
briefings, and transcribe the sessions.257  One reason behind the growth of the 
communications staff is that modern technology has increased the channels of 
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communication and the president can no longer make “off the record” remarks to a 
unique audience.258  Everything is open to public scrutiny. 
President Bush’s communications and advocacy were shaped by a White Hous
structure organized around the management principles that he followed in private 
business and as governor of Texas.  Martha Kumar suggests that his management style 
was based on Peter Drucker’s principles which call for setting goals, developing plans for 
getting to the desired goal, assigning operational responsibilities, and allowing staff to 
implement the plans.259  By appointing loyalists to the White House staff and top 
administrative positions, he was able to accomplish the mandate that the dministration 
“talk about what we want to talk about, not what the press want to talk about” 260  The 
communications system was also influenced by Chief of Staff Andrew Card’s 
“compartmentalized” operating system based on a “need to know”, and Karl Rove’s 
attempts to integrate policy, politics and publicity.261 
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James Wilkinson has described President Bush’s goal as a communicator as 
wanting “to make news on his own terms.”262  Because Bush wanted to avoid 
communications mistakes that might make him more vulnerable, he rarely allowed staff, 
who might not be sophisticated in dealing with the press, to appear in the ews or the 
briefing room to provide background policy information.  While this was a change from 
previous administrations in which policy specialists and cabinet secretaries often 
explained policy initiatives, the approach was relaxed a bit by Bush’s second term when 
his ratings began to fall.  As Martha Joynt Kumar has observed, Card’s system was 
efficient in avoiding overlap of duties, but often resulted in situations where the staff was 
“caught by surprise on some major issues.”263  This may have been the case when the 
CNOOC bid for Unocal became an explosive issue in the American press.  When 
confronted by the media, the administration’s spokespersons gave vague responses, 
dodging any official response, other than a statement that executive review of the 
proposed acquisition was premature. 
Like other modern presidents, President Bush tracked public opinion, although is 
administration sought to convey the impression that it was not as “obsessed” as the 
previous Clinton Administration.264  Edwards suggests that public relations are 
fundamental to the modern presidency and there are three premises about the relationship 
between public opinion and presidential leadership: (1) public support is a “crucial 
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political resource” for the president because it makes it diffcult for Congress to deny the 
demands of a president with popular support, (2) the president earns public support 
through his performance and by actively taking his case to the people, (3) the president 
can persuade and mobilize the public through a “permanent campaign.”265  Typically, 
there is a honeymoon period in which presidents have a high degree of public support.  
Americans tend to want the president to succeed, and even if they did not support the 
president during the campaign, they are likely to give him some time to get acclimated. 
From the very beginning of his term, President George W. Bush took his case to 
the people with a public relations campaign that surpassed that of any new president.  But 
this was not a surprising tactic given that he took office after losing the popular vote by 
less than one percent.  The election had become even more controversial as it hinged on 
the outcome of controversies which emerged concerning the voting mechanics in the 
State of Florida where his brother was governor.  After thirty-six days, the Supreme 
Court declared Bush the winner and he took office with an air of confidence that belied 
his thin victory. 
Although Bush went to the public to promote his proposals, he did so in a 
controlled environment.  With little national speaking experience, he reli d heavily on 
prepared scripts.  But even the most eloquently written speeches – such a  the 2001 
inaugural address – lost some of their dramatic impact from poor delivery.  The press 
began to question his absence from the public view just three months into his 
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presidency266 and, later on, others noted that prior to the night of the September 11, 2001 
tragedy he had not addressed the nation once from the Oval Office.267 
Bush worked diligently to achieve the promises he had made to the Republicans 
who had played a key role in bringing him to office.  While it is common for presidents 
to campaign for the party’s congressional candidates in the mid-term elections, Fortier 
and Ornstein describe President Bush’s effort as “unprecedented.” 
He made a record ninety campaign appearances, including campaign stops 
for twenty-three congressional candidates, sixteen Senate hopefuls, and 
candidates in a number of hotly contested gubernatorial races.  Along the 
way he attended nearly seventy-five fund-raisers and raised a rcord of 
more than $144 million.  His campaign trips had him on the road nearly 
nonstop in the weeks leading up to the November 5 election, including a 
whirlwind tour of fifteen states in the last five days before the election.”268 
 
In spite of an ambitious travel schedule, he also sent proposals to Congress to support his 
campaign issues of income tax cuts, education reform, and overhauling the military.  
Then, even when Congress changed key elements of his proposed policies, he 
emphasized his success in getting the legislation through Congress rather than bringing 
attention to how Congress had modified his proposals.269 
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 This discussion of George W. Bush’s presidency illustrates how a president may 
take advantage of informal mechanisms to upset the institutional balance of power so as 
to dominate foreign policy decision making.  Although taking office as a Washington 
outsider with little experience and even less political capital, President Bush built upon 
on his political connections to assemble an impressive team of advisors with expansive 
corporate experience.  The president and his advisors were inclined to supp rt free trade 
policies with minimal oversight and regulation.   
After 9/11, Bush took a strong and decisive position against global terrorism 
which gave him the political capital needed to push his policy agendas through Congress.  
At the same time, members of Congress were also concerned about protecting national 
security.  When CNOOC made its offer to buy Unocal in 2005, it created  perfect storm 
in Washington and Congress demanded that the president take immediate action.  This 
next section will discuss the institutionalization of legislative powers and the tensions 
between Congress and the presidency that encourages individual members to resort to 
informal mechanisms to achieve their policy goals. 
C.  Institutionalization of Legislative Powers 
1. Characteristics of the Institutionalized Legislature 
(a) Autonomy – By the end of World War II, Congress’s policy making role 
had diminished to such an extent that some congressmen were beginning to question the 
institution’s survival.270 With the burgeoning growth of the federal economy and 
increasing budget deficits, Congress delegated more and more legislative authority to 
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administrative agencies, but often failed to provide meaningful oversight.  In 1946, 
Congress responded to its loss of power by initiating several reforms, including the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA), and the 
Employment Act.271  Each of these acts demonstrated Congress’s ability to adapt to  
more complex society.  The Administrative Procedure Act was design d as a means of 
relying on administrative agencies to perform legislative functio s.272  At the same time 
that Congress alleviated its work load when it delegated rule-making procedures to the 
agencies, it improved transparency by requiring that agencies hold public hearings and 
obtain citizen input in the rule-making process.  
The LRA was particularly significant because it radically rest uctured the 
organization of Congress.  It provided rules of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and recognized the constitutional right of either chamber to change its 
own rules. It reduced the number of standing committees, gave parallel jurisdiction to the 
House and Senate committees, and designed the overall committee structure to coincide 
with the structure of the federal administration.273  For the first time, the LRA defined 
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and assigned to standing committees an implicit responsibility for “legislative 
oversight.”274  This improved supervision of administrative agencies contributed to the 
institutionalization of Congress. 
(b) Adaptability – In our discussion of the presidency, we defined adaptability 
as awareness of internal and external environments the ability to take action to achieve a 
balance between the two. While both the president and Congress are const ained by the 
Constitution and statutory law, Congress faces additional challenges.  It is a democratic 
body whose interests and positions are defined by the states and the constituents they 
represent.  As such, this study assumes that the legislature is more restricted in its ability 
to adapt to changes in the external environment.  It is much more difficult to achieve a 
consensus when members of Congress are accountable to their states rather than one 
ultimate authority.  History has taught legislators that they must form coalitions and 
support groups to accomplish their policy goals.  For this reason, they have taken 
advantage of their powers under the Constitution to develop their own committees, with 
rules and operating procedures to guide the committee’s work.   
Throughout the evolution of standing committee structure, two principles have 
remained constant:  (1) the principle that the majority controls the committees, and (2) 
the principle that the minority is entitled to an equitable voice in proportion to its 
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representation in the house of Congress as a whole.275  The ability of Congress to adapt to 
internal and external conditions is demonstrated by the changes i  the seniority system 
which accompanied changes in the standing committees.  Initially, committee 
chairmanship was awarded to those delegates with the greatest length of service in 
Congress.  However, as the number of issues increased and as the is ues become more 
complex, Congress recognized the need for more equitable committee assignments and 
the dispersal of power beyond just a few legislators.  Seniority still plays a role, but it is 
now seniority on the committee, rather than in Congress as a whole, t at positions a 
member for leadership. 
A committee’s power is also preserved by the convention in which members of 
the standing committee are assigned as conferees when a bill is considered by both 
chambers.  This practice was institutionalized in the House during the 109th Congress by 
Rule I, clause 11 which specifies the members of the House appointed to conference 
committees “shall to the fullest extent feasible, include the princi al proponents of the 
major provisions of the bill or resolution passed or adopted by the House.”276  But the 
House can adapt to the particular circumstances in which a bill is passed.  If a bill is 
modified on the floor, the Speaker can appoint conferees who supported the floor position 
rather than the committee position.  Although this study focuses on the House, the Senate 
showed a similar ability to adapt with the changes in its own rules. 
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(c) Complexity – Complexity involves an increased division of labor and 
specialization. In the earlier section on the presidency we discussed the Legislative 
Reorganization Act.  The LRA provided greater coherence to both the presidency and 
Congress by delineating organizational structures and responsibilities; t also contributed 
to institutional independence and flexibility.  But the LRA had some un xpected 
outcomes for Congress.  First, by authorizing the standing committees o hire 
professional staff, the LRA led to explosive growth in the number of congressional staff 
and enlarged support services for research and policy analysis.  Not only did the number 
of individual legislative aides increase277 but, in 1970, the Congressional Research 
Service replaced the outdated Legislative Reference Service as Congress’s primary 
source for research and policy analysis.278  Since then, a variety of improvements to the 
General Accounting Office has increased its capacity to evaluate administrative 
performance; and the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 has also contributed to 
legislative oversight.279  Today, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional 
Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office o  Technology 
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Assessment all include foreign specialists.  With its own staff, Congress was no longer 
dependent upon the executive branch for information resources. 
A second unexpected outcome of the 1946 LRA was the uncontrolled growth of 
subcommittees.  The consolidation of committees resulted in larger jurisdictions, which 
led to the need for more and more subcommittees to divide the work load.  The 
proliferation of subcommittees led to the creation of more chair positions, which resulted 
in the distribution of influence among more members of Congress.  Concern over 
increasing subcommittee autonomy led to revision of the Legislative Reorganization Act 
in 1970.  Specifically, section 110 reinforces the principle that Senate committees control 
the funds of their subcommittees280 and section 129(a) reinforces the rule that 
subcommittees are part of House committees and subject to its authority and direction.281 
Congress has a number of mechanisms for influencing administrative agencies 
without having to amend authorizing statutes.  In addition to the regularity of decision 
making promoted by the APA, the Senate has the constitutional power of “advice and 
consent” to the President’s nominations of agency heads.  Although some believe this 
power has devolved into nothing more than a formality, others believe it is still a 
powerful tool in shaping public opinion.282  Congress also has the power of 
                                                
280 See U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, Final 
Report. 89th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rep. 1414 (1966): 13-14. 
 
281 Walter Kravitz, “The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,” 377.  See House of 
Representatives Committee on Rules, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 91st Cong., 
2nd sess., H. Rep. 91-1215 (1979): 8. 
 
282 J.M. Graham, and V.H. Kramer, Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The 
Federal Commerce Committee and the Federal Trade Commission (1949-1971), report 
128 
 
appropriations, which may be even more influential today.  Annual budget hearings in 
both houses provide an opportunity for Congress to review agencies’ performance, to 
hear and express opinions, and to further influence agency actions by approving or 
denying specific expenditures.283  With the evolution of statutory laws Congress 
contributed to the institutionalization of a “legislative-centered” federal administration 
where agencies assist with legislative functions, where Congress plays a role in 
overseeing agency work, and where Congress may intervene in ag ncy decision making 
“through casework and other forms of constituency service.”284 
(d) Coherence – As stated previously, coherence reflects the ability of an 
institution to manage its workload based upon universal criteria. Each individual 
legislator has benefited from increased staff support, but Congress as a whole manages its 
workload through its organizational structure and rules. 
While the presidency has benefited from the coherence provided by the civil 
service system, Congress has benefited from the coherence provided by the system of 
incumbency and social networks.  Few incumbents are defeated and, as a result, some 
members of the House of Representatives have served for more than thirty years. 
Members with greater length of service are more likely to have cultivated relationships 
and built supportive networks among other legislators, within the federal agencies, and 
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with experts who populate think tanks and advisory boards and commissions that 
influence policy making in Washington.  Senior legislators are also more knowledgeable 
of the rules and procedures and how to manipulate them to accomplish policy goals.  For 
example, since Congress operates on the basis of standing committees, those with the 
most seniority in the majority party chair the most important committees.285  This 
committee structure creates a formidable challenge to president and will be discussed in 
the next section. 
2. The Legislature’s Formal and Informal Powers 
Institutional theory suggests that Congress is bestowed with formal and informal 
powers.  Just as the Constitution grants the president specific powers, article 1, section 1 
provides that all legislative powers shall be vested in Congress.  A  the fundamental 
source of lawmaking, Congress plays a primary role in controlling a d overseeing 
administrative agencies.  Article I, section 8 (18) of the Constitution provides that 
Congress has the power to 
. . . make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof. 
 
These laws include statutes that create agencies and define their substantive and 
procedural limits, as well as statutes that define foreign policy criteria and restrictions. 
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(a) Constitution and Congressional Rules 
The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of it  
proceedings and must keep and publish a journal of its proceedings.286  Legislators are 
required to follow these rules when introducing legislation.  But the rules have become 
extensive and are often cumbersome.  Because the rules have slowed do n the policy 
making process or created inefficiencies, over time Congress has devised a system of 
informal mechanisms that legislators may utilize to accomplish their goals. 
These informal mechanisms for policy making take place throughout te formal 
process.  Although there are specific formal procedures for introducing bills and violation 
of the procedures can kill a bill, the formal procedures do not necessarily give insight into 
why legislators introduce certain bills.  Nor do the formal procedur s help us understand 
the political strategy that an individual legislator chooses to adopt.  However, 
institutionalism suggests that the informal mechanisms underlying Congressional actions 
may provide insight into legislative outcomes. 
Why legislators introduce bills depends upon a variety of factors.  They may 
introduce legislation in response to pressure by interest groups; they may want to 
publicize issues that they are personally concerned about; they may want to convey a 
message to the president or an executive agency; or they may simplwant to go on the 
record as doing something about an issue for the benefit of their constitue ts and to gain 
constituent support.  This study suggests that examination of public records and 
statements to the media regarding the particular legislation w ll give insight into why 
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individual legislators introduced the legislation.  The theoretical approach also suggests 
that insight may be gained from examining precedent established in the legislative 
history.  Some of the questions raised by the institutional approach are as follows:  Does 
the legislator have a history regarding the particular issue?  What positions has he taken 
in the past?  Has he been able to generate support for the issue in the past, or has he faced 
opposition? 
Legislators adopt informal tools at each stage of the legislative process.  During 
the first stage of introducing legislation, the experienced legislator may consider the 
following factors:  (1) how to title the bill so that it has the broadest appeal to the public 
or attracts the media’s attention; (2) whether to include co-sponsors and how to determin  
who has the greatest potential to influence others over the issue; (3) whether to introduce 
the bill early in the legislative session so as to compensate for Senate filibuster, or late in 
the session to take advantage of public pressure for Congress to act quickly before recess; 
(4) whether to introduce companion bills concurrently in the other chamber; and (5) how 
to draft the language of the bill so that it falls within thejurisdiction of a committee that 
might be more sympathetic to the issue and more capable of pushing the bill rough the 
legislative process.287 
Although both chambers are guided by rules of procedure, the rules in the House 
are much more formal because of its size.  In addition, the House has developed different 
procedures for handling minor legislation and uncontroversial issues compared to major 
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bills or more controversial issues. There are four legislative cal ndars for scheduling 
legislative actions in the House.  These are as follows: 
(1) Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of th  Union 
which handles actions concerned with raising, authorizing, or spending funds; 
(2)  Private Calendar which handles actions concerned with matters of concern 
to individual persons or entities; 
(3) Discharge Calendar which handles bills that have been removed from 
committees through special procedures; and 
(4) Corrections Calendar which is concerned with unnecessary or 
cumbersome rules and regulations.  This last calendar was removed fr m the House 
rulebook at the beginning of the 109th Congress.288 
One tool that the Speaker uses to control the agenda is the suspension of the rules.  
Prior to the 109th Congress, the suspension procedure was in effect on Mondays, 
Tuesdays, and the last six days of the session.  At the beginning of the 109th Congress, 
Rules Chairman David Dreier (R-CA) added Wednesdays to the suspension calendar.289  
There are three rules that govern suspension procedures: (1) debateis limited to forty 
minutes and is divided between proponents and opponents, (2) amendments to a bill may 
be included if the amendments are included in the motion to suspend the rules, and (3) 
the only vote on the measure is a vote to suspend the rules and pass the bill.  A quorum 
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must be present for the vote and it must pass by a two-thirds vote.  Typically, the Speaker 
will not schedule bills under the suspension rule unless he or she isconf dent of the two-
thirds vote.  But, if the bill fails to pass under the suspension rule, it may be considered 
again under the regular House procedures.290 
The suspension procedure helps expedite legislation that appeals to a maj rity of 
the House.  Committee chairs tend to support the suspension rules becau e they protect a 
bill from amendments on the floor and points of order.  Majority party leaders like to use 
the suspension procedure to move their legislative agenda forward, but minority party 
leaders may oppose the suspension rule procedure on bills which they believe require 
more lengthy debate or wish to amend.291  In recent years, suspension procedures have 
been used more often.  Oleszek suggests that this is because it “giv s lawmakers who are 
frustrated by their inability to modify major bills a chance to offer additional suspension 
measures that serve their constituents, make policy, and enhance their influ nce in the 
chamber.”292 
House rules allow five standing committees direct access to the floor for certain 
bills.  They initiate legislation measures as follows:  Appropriations Committee may 
report general appropriations bills; Budget Committee may report budget resolutions; 
House Administration Committee may report matters relating to enrolled bills, House 
expenditures and committee funding; Rules Committee determines rules and the order of 
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business; and Standards of Official Conduct Committee may recommend action 
regarding conduct of a member or employee of the House. 
Other standing committees do not have the same privilege and act only on 
legislation referred to them.  Most legislation does not go directly from the committee to 
a calendar and to the House floor.  A bill must have privilege, that is, precedence over the 
regular order of business.293  Major bills get to the floor through the Rules Committee. 
The First Congress appointed an eleven-member body in April 1789 to draf  its 
procedures.  For nearly a century afterwards, each Congress would appoint a panel to 
prepare its rules.  The Rules Committee became a permanent committee in 1880 and soon 
developed the practices followed today, such as reporting rules agreed to by the majority 
that control the time allowed for debate and the extent to which bills could be amended 
from the floor.  Traditionally, the Rules Committee is an agent of the leadership and 
functions to implement the majority party’s agenda.  The Speaker has the power of 
appointment and the disproportionate partisan ratio guarantees majority control. 
The power of the Rules Committee is in its scheduling responsibilities.  As bills 
are reported out of committee, they are entered in chronological order n the Union or 
House Calendar.  Major legislation is granted precedence for consideration on the floor 
through a special order obtained from the Rules Committee.  The chair of the committee 
reporting the bill submits a written request for the special order to the chair of the Rules 
Committee.  The Rules Committee holds a hearing in which witnesses are limited to 
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lawmakers who debate the proposal.  This has been described as a “dre s rehearsal” in 
which the committee serves as the first audience for the legislation outside of the 
committee or subcommittee reporting it.294  After the hearing, the Rules members write 
their rule and vote on it.  Then the rule is considered on the House floor as privileged 
matter which means no more than one hour of debate and no amendments before a vote. 
Rules serve several purposes: (1) the order of precedence on the Calendars, (2) the 
length of general debate, (3) dispensing with the first reading of the bill and amendments 
that are preprinted in the Congressional Record, (4) limiting the number of amendments, 
and (5) moving the bill to an immediate vote.  The Rules Committee has the power to 
block or delay legislation from reaching the floor.  The committee serves as an informal 
mediator of disputes among House members and over legislation with overlapping 
jurisdiction. 
The Rules Committee grants three basic kinds of rules: open, closed, and 
modified.  The distinction pertains to the amendment process.  Under an open rule, 
amendments may be offered from the floor as long as they comply with House rules and 
precedents, such as the writing requirement.  During the Bush Administration there was a 
decline in the number of open rules.  Rules Committee member JamesP. McGovern (D-
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MA) observed that only one non-appropriations bill out of 190 was considered under an 
open rule in the 109th Congress.295 
Closed rules prohibit floor amendments except those offered by the reporting 
committees.  In recent years there has been an increase in the numb r of closed rules that 
require a bill be considered in the House and not the Committee as a Whole under 
procedures that limit debate to one hour and restrict or prohibit amendments.296  Some 
critics, like Representative McGovern (D-MA), believe closed rules hamper legislative 
process and violate democratic values; while supporters such as Representative Capito 
(R-WV) say they are needed for complex measures subject to intense lobbying.297 
Modified rules may be open or closed.  A modified open rule may indicate all 
parts of a bill are open to amendment except a few sections.  A modified closed rule may 
state that an entire bill is closed to amendment except for certain sections.  During the 
109th Congress Republicans began to characterize modified closed rules as “structured” 
rules, thereby suggesting that they were not restrictive, but fair and systematic.298 
In addition to these three forms, the House rules allow for waivers, or temporarily 
setting aside certain procedures or points of order.  The primary purpose is to waive 
points of order against consideration of legislation that is privileged but has violated 
                                                
295 Representative Jim McGovern of Massachusetts speaking against the House resl tion 
Adopting House Rules for the109th Congress, on December 7, 2006, H. Res. 5 , 109th 
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House rules.  It is typically used at the end of the session when legislators want to wrap 
up business quickly. 
(b) Legislative Seniority System 
 Although modern legislators are much more individualistic than in the past, they 
are conscious of their position in the legislative hierarchy.  This is reflect d in a variety of 
situations, ranging from their committee assignments to voting patterns and electoral 
vulnerability.299 
Committees can be divided into different types – policy committees are those that 
attract members who want to make good public policy; power committees ar  those that 
expand the member’s legislative jurisdiction.  For example, the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee is a powerful committee because it combines strong legislative 
jurisdiction with effective oversight responsibilities. 
To overcome opposition to policy initiatives presidents have developed strategies 
to push legislation through Congress.  One such strategy involves appointment of liaison 
staff to establish and maintain relations with Congress.  These staff members target key 
legislators in both houses, keep the president informed of “power clusters,” keep 
congressional members informed of presidential initiatives, and recommend tactics to the 
president for developing support of his initiatives.”300 
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Although the committee structure is essential to how Congress functions, the 
internal power system is not totally dependent upon the committees.  The power of 
Congressional leadership positions, such as the Speaker of the House and majority and 
minority leaders in both houses, often trump the powers of the committee chairs.  As a 
consequence, power in Congress is fragmented and derived from a variety of sources, 
such as leadership status, personal relationships, and the “power of the purse,” all of 
which may be utilized to act as a check on the president’s authority over foreign and 
national security policies. 
(c) Delegation of Powers and Legislative Oversight 
In the early years, as Congress began enacting legislation to delegate powers to 
administrative agencies, it also began conferring some decision maki g discretion on the 
administrators of those agencies.301  Perhaps unexpectedly, while creating broad 
administrative powers, Congress also provided the presidency with increased autonomy 
and budgetary control.  This transfer of powers was gradual at first.302  Following the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
301 Initially, the Supreme Court denied the permissibility of delegation, Field v. Cark, 143 
U.S. 649 (1892), but as pressure grew for doctrinal change, delegation was permitted 
where the legislature sets standards to limit the scope of agency discretion, Buttfield v. 
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904). 
 
302 See Herbert Hoover, Presidential Publication No. 112 - Special Message to the 
Congress Proposing a Study of the Reorganization of Prohibition Enforcement 
Responsibilities, June 6, 1929, documented at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? 
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50, Special Message to the Congress on the Reorganization of the Executive Branch, 
February 17, 1932 and June 30, 1932, documented at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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Pub. Paper 423, Special Message to the Congress on the Reorganization of the Executive 
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Great Depression, President Hoover sought authority to reorganize the executive and 
administrative agencies, but was cautious about overstepping his constitutional powers.303  
Assured by such prudence, Congress granted the president authority to consolidate the 
agencies and “to segregate regulatory agencies and functions from th se of an 
administrative and executive character.”304  To increase efficiency, Congress also 
authorized the president to make changes by Executive Order but restricted this executive 
authority by stipulating that Executive Orders could not abolish the statutory functions of 
agencies.  To ensure executive compliance with this restriction Congress required that the 
president transmit Executive Orders to Congress while in session and provided that the 
orders would not become effective for 60 days unless Congress approved them earlier.305 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued the quest to update the administrative 
machinery so as to give the chief executive greater managerial control.  He appointed a 
Committee on Administrative Management to examine inefficiencies and to make 
recommendations for change.  President Roosevelt passed the committee’s “five-point” 
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304 Reorganization Act of 1932, U.S. Code, part 2, § 401(d). 
 
305 President Herbert H. Hoover, “Special Message to Congress on Reorganization of the 
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program on to Congress for legislative action.  The recommendations included expanding 
the White House staff to help the president keep in touch with administrative affairs and 
to obtain the knowledge required for decision making.306 
After adopting the Reorganization Act of 1939, Congress applied the legislative 
veto to resolve delegation problems related to national security and foreign affairs issues.  
Congress continued to include the legislative veto in statutes delegating legislative power, 
and presidents continued to accept the legislative veto as the price to pay for obtaining 
exceptional authority, but the constitutionality of the veto was uncertain.307 
D.  109th Congress 
 1.  Historical Setting and Political Climate 
Historically, Congress has focused primarily on domestic matters.  But as 
influence within the executive branch has continued to move away from the State 
Department toward the White House and functional departments with international 
responsibilities, congressional access to foreign policy decision making has been 
increasing.  This change is the result of increased complexity of foreign policy issues and 
greater crossing of domestic and international considerations on many non-security 
issues.  By 2005, congressional members were more likely to take the initiative to join 
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with like-minded colleagues in asserting independent positions on foreign policy matters, 
whereas earlier in our nation’s history they might have simply accepted guidance from 
the White House or other executive departments.308 
Although Congress asserts its policy making muscle from time to time, the 
president still has an advantage in the national security arena b c use intelligence, 
operational instruments, and the power bases are still located in his office.  Even though 
Congress has increased its staff and has greater research capabilities, the departments of 
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the National Security Council, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of Staff continue to dominate national security 
policy.309 
2. Legislative Decision-Making 
There is a significant body of research with a diversity of opini n as to who 
influences U.S. foreign policy and the policy preferences of public offials.  The most 
prevalent external influences may be categorized into three groups: rganized interest 
groups, knowledge-based experts, and voters or public opinion.310  Business corporations 
and associations are particularly influential because of their eff cts on the economy, their 
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powerful lobbying efforts, and the link between lobbying and campaign contributions.311  
Knowledge-based experts have become more and more important to legislators as our 
society has become more complicated.  The range and variety of issues in which 
legislators much be conversant has expanded exponentially, while the number of 
legislators representing the population has grown incrementally.  Even with the growth of 
support staff, it is impossible for any one legislator to be fully informed on every issue 
considered in Congress.  Although it is commonly accepted that legislators must be 
responsive to public opinion, it is more likely that members of the House of 
Representatives will be more sensitive to public opinion because of th frequency of their 
elections in small, decentralized districts, whereas Senators are more insulated from 
public opinion because of their longer terms.312  But these differences may have 
diminished in an information society dominated by C-Span and the internet.  Legislators 
will tend to weigh the merits of a proposed policy against their assessment of its 
acceptability.313  But it is generally agreed that there is a hierarchy of values when 
legislators consider foreign policy, with domestic political factors taking precedent over 
foreign policy decisions.314 
                                                
311 Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
 
312 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” 
109. 
 
313 Barbara Farnham, “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-
Making,” Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004): 443-445. 
 
314 Barbara Farnham, “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-
Making,” 443-445; see also George, A. “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in 
143 
 
 The preceding discussion of legislative institutionalization identfi s informal 
mechanisms that the 109th Congress had at its disposal to shift the balance of foreign 
policy making power back in its direction.  For instance, increases in l gislative staff and 
support services have bolstered Congress’ research and policy analysis c pabilities and 
its capacity to evaluate administrative performance.  Changes i  subcommittee structures 
have redistributed control over legislative priorities and disbursed th  ability to amass 
votes among more members.  The power of appropriations has resulted in greater 
administrative accountability to Congress.  And, while the procedural rules may create 
constraints, more experienced members of Congress have learned how to manipulate 
rules to move bills through the process.  The following chapters will discuss in more 
detail how the 109th Congress took advantage of these types of informal tools to politicize 
the CNOOC bid for Unocal. 
Before moving to the analysis of official records showing that politicization of 
CNOOC’s business proposal was a mechanism for asserting congressional power, the 
next section will discuss the post 9/11 sense of vulnerability that created a sense of 
urgency for reexamining executive review of foreign mergers and cquisitions for 




                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Change in the International System, ed. O.R. Holsti, R. 




III.  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES TRIGGERED BY SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
A.  Changes in the Relationship Between the President and Congress 
Early in his presidency, Bush had followed a minimalist approach to foreign 
policy which was intended to contrast with Clinton’s interventionist approach.  Upon 
entering the White House, Bush knew he would have to balance the foreign policy 
interests of both the conservatives and neoconservatives that had supported his 
election.315  One way of achieving this balance was with his political appointme s.  For 
example, one appointee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, believed in the 
use of force to promote American ideals in foreign nations, while another appointee, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, believed in a cautious approach which stressed the 
importance of cultivating allies. 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, President Bush acknowledged that neither 
China nor Russia presented a global threat and this allowed him to turn his attention to 
other areas of the world.  By way of example, he received President Vicente Fox as the 
first visiting foreign head of state.  Not only did this stress the role that Bush saw Mexico 
                                                
315 During the Cold War conservatives and neoconservatives put a premium on national 
security and saw the Soviet threat, not China, as calling for a global strategy.  After the 
Cold War ended differences between the two factions emerged.  Conservatives 
concentrated on interests in areas that had material significance to the U.S. and sought to 
withdraw from peripheral commitments.  For example, during the Reagan Administration 
conservatives feared potential threats to stable Western access to oil and emphasized the 
importance of diplomatic relations with Arab oil-exporting states.  (Since China was just 
beginning to open up to the West and was not yet an energy exporter, it was not 
considered a threat.)  Meanwhile, neoconservatives were fearful of rogue elements in the 
Third World, especially the Muslim world, and believed that people in the Middle East 
respected U.S. military superiority.  Therefore, neoconservatives supported a stronger 
military presence there. 
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playing in the American economy, but it could also be seen as an attempt o shift public 
debate away from the Middle East. 
Before President Bush had an opportunity to define any specific or cont oversial 
foreign policy initiatives, the events of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in the 
presidency and for the nation as a whole.  American citizens were unified in their demand 
for an immediate response to this act of aggression.  National security was elevated to the 
top of the policy agenda and elected officials in both the executive and legislative 
branches of government were forced to refocus their priorities.  Partisanship took a 
backseat while the president and Congress joined forces to manage the crisis.  Both 
houses of Congress acted quickly to approve a resolution authorizing the president to use 
all necessary and appropriate force” against nations, organizatio s, and persons who had 
aided in the terrorist attacks.316  This meant that President Bush could no longer tolerate 
different foreign policy perspectives in his administration. 
It was critical that the president regain control over the natio ’s security.  One of 
the first steps he took was to assemble a “domestic consequences group” with Deputy 
Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten serving as chair.317  The Office for Strategic Initiatives 
(OSI) shifted its focus from long-term planning to research how previous presidents had 
responded to crises.  Karl Rove began to work with the domestic conseque c s task force 
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and helped manage congressional relations.  The National Security Council began to 
meet daily with the president’s war cabinet which included Vice President Cheney, Chief 
of Staff Card, National Security Advisor Rice, Secretary of State Powell, and CIA Chief 
George Tenet.318 
Based on the organization of other administrations one might expect that National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice would have been instrumental in setting the 
president’s foreign policy priorities and reassigning those priorities to reorder the 
president’s post 9/11 policy agenda.  But Rice’s role in national security was 
overshadowed by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
and to a lesser degree, Secretary of State Colin Powell.  Cheney was known to 
circumvent Rice and attempt to take over her major responsibilities while Rumsfeld often 
refused to share information with her.  Even though many of Bush’s top advisors had 
worked together in previous administrations, and had appeared to be unified i  their 
support of the President, internal disagreements among them began to emerge after the 
terrorist attacks and the pressures of an impending war. 
Some analysts argue that Rice followed the president’s orders without examining 
alternative actions or examining the consequences.319  But given Bush’s managerial style, 
it is unlikely that he would have been receptive to any attempts to engage him in analysis.  
He viewed himself as “the Decider” whose primary responsibility was making tough 
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decisions in difficult times and he often cut Rice and other advisors off before they could 
provide their complete assessment of the situation. 
A second step that Bush took after 9/11 was to evaluate his ability to make 
immediate and unilateral decisions to secure the homeland against repeated terrorist 
attacks within the existing organizational structure.  Many of the administrative functions 
related to national security were dispersed among a variety of administrat ve agencies and 
coordination of these agencies would be an unwieldy task.  The September 11 attack on 
the United States made it clear to the president that he would have to undertake the most 
massive reorganization of the Executive Office since Congress approved Roosevelt’s 
Administrative Plan in 1932.320 
In October 2001 President Bush used his executive authority to create th  Office 
of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to 
coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to “detect, prepare for, prevent, respond to, and 
recover from, terrorist acts within the United States.”321  Initially, the OHS and the HSAC 
were to function much like cabinet councils established by previous presidents.322  Bush 
                                                
320 During Roosevelt’s administration, Congress had authorized the president to issue 
executive orders to propose reorganization within the Executive Branch for the purpose 
of reducing expenditures and increasing efficiency in government. Reorganization 
authority remained available to presidents until the Supreme Court invalidated 
congressional reliance on the concurrent resolution to disapprove a president’s proposed 
plan in 1983.  The Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, signed by President Reagan 
resolved this issue, but the act expired at the end of 1984. This meant that President Bush 
could make minor changes in administrative agencies, but larger adjustment  had the 
potential of incurring congressional disfavor or, even worse, could be declared illegal. 
 
321 Executive Order no. 13,228, Federal Register 66 (October 10, 2001): 51882. 
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the past, clearly, in the aftermath of 9/11, there were differences.  See The 9/11 
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proposed that the HSAC have a membership consisting of “not more than 21 members 
appointed by the President” who would be “selected from the private sector, academia, 
professional service associations, federally funded research and development centers, 
nongovernmental organizations, State and local governments, and other appropri te 
professions and communities.”323  The council included secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
Health and Human Services, and Transportation; the attorney general; th  directors of the 
OMB, CIA, FBI, and Federal Emergency Management Administration; and chiefs of 
staff to Bush and Cheney.324  The HSAC was to meet periodically upon the request of the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to advise the president on strategy to 
secure the U.S. against terrorist attacks. 
The president distinguished the Homeland Security Advisory Council fromthe 
existing National Security Council under Rice’s leadership.  The HSAC was delegated 
responsibility for protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks while the NSC was still 
responsible for advising the President regarding foreign policy.  In spite of efforts by 
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Cheney to undermine Rice’s credibility, she still maintained her status with the president 
who relied upon her to get things done. 
President Bush appointed Thomas Ridge the first assistant to the president for 
homeland security, but shortly after being sworn in, the administration ran into a conflict.  
Even though widespread support for the president was undeniable, it did not mean that 
every member in Congress was willing to grant the president carte blanche.  Even in a 
crisis situation, legislators were vigilant in protecting their oversight authority.  For 
example, Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Ted Stevens (R-AK) wrote a letter to Ridge 
requesting that he testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee.  The 
administration refused stating that advisors to the president did not have to testify before 
Congress.325  This response was reminiscent of Cheney’s refusal to disclose inf rmation 
to the GAO earlier in the year and illustrated once again that Congress and the 
administration did not see eye to eye regarding executive privilege and legislative 
oversight.  In spite of this conflict, the administration benefited from the nation’s 
solidarity in the immediacy of the crisis as both Democrats and Republicans alike rallied 
to support the president. 
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It is not uncommon for executive power to expand during times of war when 
presidents are granted a full array of administrative tools (including national security 
directives, executive orders and proclamations) to design and implement policy 
objectives.  Clearly, Bush took advantage of the situation to assert unila eral powers 
during his second term.  This power play was backed by the White House counsel’s claim 
that “[T]he framers of the Constitution, I think, intended there to be astrong presidency 
in order to carry out certain functions, and [President Bush] feels an obligation to leave 
the office in better shape than when he came in.”326 
The president’s forceful response to 9/11 bolstered his approval ratings nd his 
surge in popularity gave him leverage over the 107th Congress which passed the Patriot 
Act in spite of concerns about constitutional issues.327  The 107th Congress also showed 
overwhelming support for a bill creating a new Transportation Security Administration 
within the Department of Transportation.328  From this point on, Bush wholeheartedly 
pursued the War on Terror and exuded new confidence in declaring to the wrld that our 
allies were either with us or against us. 
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At the beginning of 2002, President Bush laid out the American response to 9/11 
and won over American citizens, in spite of concerns that his “axis of evil” 
characterization might alienate some U.S. allies.  While Vice President Cheney focused 
on making the administration’s case for invading Iraq, President Bush focused on 
defusing underlying congressional discontent by initiating one of the most ambitious 
midterm campaigns of any president.  At the expense of domestic is ues that have 
typically favored Democrats, President Bush shifted the public’s attention to national 
security issues that favored Republicans and helped the GOP gain more congressional 
seats. 
Another example of the president’s popularity, and perhaps his most enduring 
success in expanding executive powers, was when the 108th Congress gave in to the 
White House version of the Department of Homeland Security Act.  In October 2002, 
Congress passed legislation to merge the Office of Homeland Security with the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council to form the Department of Homeland Security, but 
retained the assistant to the president for homeland security in theExecutive Office.329  
This organizational change resulted in four centers of power with influe ce over the 
formation of national security policy:  (1) the policy triad comprised of the secretary of 
state, secretary of defense, and the national security advisor; (2) the director of national 
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152 
 
intelligence and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; (3) the president’s closest White 
House advisers; and (4) the secretary of Homeland Security.330 
The Homeland Security Act allowed Bush to turn his back on the anti-
interventionist foreign policy rhetoric of his 2000 campaign which pledged to work with 
U.S. allies for peacekeeping and nation-building.  President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney advocated for a tough policy against terrorists, and Americans supported military 
intervention to make their homeland safe again. 
Although 9/11 unified Congress, the consensus over the need to protect and 
defend national security began to crumble when the Iraq invasion failed to disclose 
weapons of mass destruction.  At first, Bush held fast to his original strategy for the War 
on Terror, but after Stephen Hadley succeeded Rice as national security advisor, Bush 
became more open to considering alternative recommendations.  This is not to say that 
Rice had been ineffective, but that Hadley had benefited from a different environment, 
one in which the president had come to realize that his policies were not working as 
expected.331  The National Security Council went through several changes early in 2005, 
including: (1) simplification of internal organization with communications and legislative 
affairs functions returning to the White House; (2) a thirty percent reduction in staffing, 
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and (3) adding a second deputy to coordinate economic strategy, national security, and 
foreign policy.332 
Even though few legislators had challenged President Bush publically, conflicting 
political views continued to churn beneath the façade of a unified position towards the 
administration’s approach to protecting national security.333  Democrats and Republicans 
had concerns about constitutional separation of powers, about maintaining the 
prerogatives of the legislative branch, and about threats to civil liberties.334  But they had 
not felt empowered to voice their concerns until the failure to find weapons of mass 
destruction, combined with administrative bungling of Hurricane Katrina caused Bush’s 
ratings to plunge.  Even though Bush attempted to modify his foreign policy t ne at the 
beginning of his second term, it was too late to stave the backlash th t was brewing in 
Congress. 
B. Changes in U.S.-China Foreign Policy 
1. Pre-9/11 Institutional Tensions Over U.S.-China Policy 
 
To set the stage for understanding how institutional tensions have affected post-
9/11 China policy we briefly review the executive-legislative relationship that has 
evolved since the Nixon Administration first pursued normalization of relations.  Even 
though the joint communiqué signed by Nixon and Chou Enlai in February 1972 was a
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major breakthrough in U.S.-China diplomatic relations, Sino-American talks stalled 
under the Ford Administration.   
When President Carter took office, one of his stated foreign policy goals was 
normalization of relations with China.335  The Policy Review Committee headed by 
Secretary of State Vance cautioned that diplomatic relations with China might harm arms 
control negotiations, but still recommended that the president pursue negotiations and 
accept the Chinese demand to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 336 Meanwhile, 
knowing this demand would create opposition from the hawks in Congress, National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski convinced the president to enter into secret 
negotiations to avoid publicity.337 While the president argued publicly that China 
intended to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully and the Chinese cooperated by not 
challenging his pledge to protect Taiwan.   
Carter argued for normalization, claiming it would “contribute to the welfare of 
the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security 
and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.”338  But his failure to consult 
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prominent congressional leaders in the decision process led to an immediate political 
reaction.  Nonetheless, the response was mixed.  For instance, SenateMajority Leader 
Robert Byrd said it was “an important step that would help secure wo ld peace;” Senator 
Gerald Ford voiced “terse” approval; and Senator Goldwater called it a “cowardly act.”  
It was the criticism from angry conservatives that suggested Pr sident Carter would face 
a fight in Congress.339  The political struggle continued until Congress deleted language 
about a specific U.S. commitment to Taiwan in the Taiwan Relations Act.  Afterwards, 
the act passed 90-6 in the Senate, 345-55 in the House, and the president approved it 
April 10, 1979.340 
By midsummer 1979, President Carter indicated a willingness to consider Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) status for China.341  Unlike the previous debates over 
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normalization of trade relations, congressional opposition to an expanded relationship did 
not materialize.  In fact, MFN status drew support from Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-
WA) who was the author of the earlier Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions that affected both 
China and Russia. 
According to Richard Bush, three explanations for cooperation between the 
president and Congress in 1979 regarding China’s MFN status have dominated the 
literature.342 
1. China’s policies toward Asia and bilateral issues either paralleled or 
reinforced U.S. objectives, 
 
2. China was seen as an adversary of the Soviet Union and could 
cooperate with the U.S. on that front, 
 
3. The reforms in China appeared to be improving the political and 
economic well-being of the people.343 
 
For most of the 1980s, consensus prevailed in U.S.-China policy and Congress 
generally supported the president’s initiatives.344 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bi-polar nature of internaional politics 
changed and communist aggression was no longer a primary concern.  As traditional 
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security issues diminished in significance, the door opened for non-tradition l issues with 
a moral undertone.  Congress, and the public, turned their attention to concerns about the 
global economy, human rights, and the environment.  A wide spectrum of private 
businesses, special interest groups, and non-government organizations sought to 
influence these foreign policy debates. 
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, religious and human rights groups, 
labor unions, and students lobbied to elevate moral issues on the foreign policy agenda.  
Many legislators, believing President George H.W. Bush was too lenient towards China, 
relied on Tiananmen to interpret Jackson-Vanik as authorizing Congress to withhold 
China’s MFN status as an economic sanction against human rights violations.345  Policy 
differences expressed in the ensuing MFN debates ushered in the end of a China 
consensus.346 
In 1990 the House of Representatives passed the “conditionality bill” that 
proposed to place restrictions on China’s future eligibility for MFN status.  But the bill 
died when the Senate failed to act.  The next year, differences between the president and 
Congress intensified and the House of Representatives passed legislation to suspend 
China’s MFN status with a nearly unanimous vote.  With the president threatening a veto,
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the Senate deferred once again and China was granted MFN status for another year.347  
This set the stage for MFN to become an annual vehicle for debating U.S. policy towards 
China, and U.S.-China policy became hostage to domestic politics.348 
During the final weeks of the second session of the 102nd Congress, Senators Byrd 
(D-WV) and Bingaman (D-NM) sponsored legislation concerning the Exon-Florio 
Amendment.349  This bill, called the Byrd Amendment, was designed to strengthen Exo -
Florio by limiting presidential discretion to avoid investigation of proposed takeovers and 
increase scrutiny of foreign governments and foreign government-ow ed companies.350  
More importantly, the Byrd Amendment increased opportunities for legislators to apply 
political pressure to the president to conduct a review of proposed acquisitions. 
Meanwhile, during the 1992 election year, Bill Clinton’s campaign criticized 
President Bush for “coddling tyrants” in Beijing and pledged to be more assertive 
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towards human rights violations.351  Newly elected in 1993, President Clinton announced 
he would link MFN status to human rights in the future.352 
Prior to 1993, the business community had relied on the presidential veto to 
protect its business interests, but seeing this would no longer a guarntee under the 
Clinton Administration, and facing the possibility that China’s MFN status could be 
terminated, “the business community organized one of the most aggressive and effective 
lobbying efforts ever made in the foreign policy sphere” to push for renewal of China’s 
MFN status.353  Clinton then proposed a compromise in which the Chinese would have to 
attain bench marks to ensure continued MFN status and he imposed these benchmarks by 
executive order.354  Clinton effectively removed China policy from the grasp of 
politically motivated legislators but economic agencies within the ex cutive branch 
asserted that the executive order had not given adequate emphasis to economic 
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considerations.355  Ultimately, Clinton was persuaded to move away from the concept of 
conditionality towards delinking international human rights issues from economic issues. 
Following this flurry of activity over China’s MFN status, the Clinton 
Administration became preoccupied mostly with domestic issues and the state of the 
American economy.  While some analysts argue this domestic focusemerged because 
Clinton did not have a map to guide the foreign policy agenda during this initial post-
Cold War period, others argue that it emerged because the Republican-led Congress 
made such a strong effort to micromanage foreign policy.356  Yet, in spite of Clinton’s 
domestic focus, he did have some foreign policy successes.  Over the course of his 
presidency, institutions with foreign policy agendas multiplied and more and more of 
these institutions began to utilize Congress as their point of entryinto the policy making 
process. 
By the time President Bush took office, most legislators had an opinion regarding 
U.S.-China policy, even if foreign policy was not their area of expertise.  China has long 
held a place in the hearts and minds of Americans, and many continue to struggle with 
the concept of granting privileges, such as MFN, to a country that is governed by the 
Communist Party, even if those privileges benefit the American economy.  This 
ideological struggle is intensified when one considers that benefits may accrue to one 
sector of the economy, but may be detrimental to other sectors.  This tension is played out 
every day in Congress. 
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2. Post-9/11 Tensions Regarding U.S.-China Policy 
 
 After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration advocated for a global 
antiterrorist campaign with cooperation from similarly-minded natio s and American 
defense policy changed from deterrence to preemption.  In East Asia, thi  effort began 
with a conference between senior officials from Washington and ten member-states of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  During the confere ce, American 
officials discussed the strategic importance of Southeast Asia and convinced the ten 
ASEAN member-states to sign a counterterrorism pact.357 
President Bush also announced he would travel to Shanghai in October 2001 to 
attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) council heads-of-state meeting, to 
be followed by an official visit to China.358  The administration pursued several 
diplomatic exchanges with China with President Bush making two trips o China and 
China’s Vice President Hu Jintao and President Jiang Zemin visiting the United States.  
Although Bush did not relent in his support of Taiwan during these exchanges, a “new 
cordiality” began to emerge.359 
The Bush Administration’s shift in priorities from Clinton-era economics to 
military and security priorities was evident in the Pentagon’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
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Review Report which classified Asia as a “critical region.”360  A year later, in September 
2002, the Bush Administration released the National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America which solidified a policy of military predominance in which the United 
States committed to take whatever actions are necessary to p otect its security and the 
security of its allies.  This preemptive approach recognizes governments are responsible 
for what happens within their territory, but assumes an American rght of intervention if 
another government fails to act against terrorist activity.  Fearing legitimization of 
intervention in domestic affairs, many Asian nations, including China, began to question 
the increased U.S. military presence in East Asia,361 but the Bush Administration held 
fast to its policy of swift military responsiveness to future military challenges in the 
region.362 
Some analysts suggest Bush’s interest in high level exchanges had as much to do 
with U.S. military strategy in Asia as with U.S. policy towards China because once the 
administration began to consider foreign policy, it stated that it wanted to strengthen ties 
with traditional allies in the Asia-Pacific region, which excluded China.363  For example, 
in his testimony to Congress prior to Bush’s February 2002 visit to China, Assistant 
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Secretary James Kelly praised U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.-South Korea relations, but 
pointed out the negative as well as the positive when commenting on China.364  In 
another example, when Bush and his secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, committed 
to the buildup of national and theater missile defense systems, they looked to Japan, not 
China, for potential support.365  This approach did not escape attention in Beijing and 
raised concern over a more aggressive United States, perhaps encouraging Chinese 
leaders to engage in their own military buildup. 
In the following years, the Bush Administration continually warned against any 
power challenging U.S. interests with military force; and even though the Chinese had 
toned down their anti-American hegemony rhetoric, the administration continued to view 
China as a potential threat.  President Bush issued the strongest stat ments supporting 
Taiwan’s defense since the normalization of relations with China; he increased the 
Taiwan arms sale package; and he imposed more sanctions on China over reported 
proliferation of military weapons than any other president.  In addition to his firm 
position regarding military affairs, President Bush took a strong stand against China’s 
domestic policies, focusing on human rights abuses and repressed religious freedoms.366  
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The president’s hard line stance seemed to be in line with mainstream hought at the time 
and there was little opposition in Congress or the media.367 
Some speculate that China supported the U.S. anti-terrorist policies to avoid 
interrupting the domestic economy and commercial relations that were so important to 
China’s economic growth.368  While the U.S. focused on fighting terrorism, tensions over 
U.S.-China trade issues continued to ferment in Congress.  Following China’s 
membership in the WTO, an increase in the U.S.-China trade imbalance led to more and 
more complaints from U.S. manufacturing firms.  Several manufacturers charged China 
with unfair trade practices that threatened their ability to compete and resulted in the loss 
of American jobs.  Even though businesses were concerned about trade issues, they were 
also concerned about avoiding a disruption in trade with China.  The Bush 
Administration seemed to respect the need to maintain advantageous economic relations 
with China despite ideological differences, but members of Congress began calling on the 
administration “to take a more aggressive stance” against Chinese “unfair” trade 
policies.369 
On several occasions, President Bush criticized China’s currency valuation 
policies, and he even raised the issue in a meeting with Chinese Pr ident Hu Jintao on 
October 19, 2003.  But on October 30, 2003, when the Treasury Department released its 
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semiannual report on exchange rate policies, it fell short of stating that China 
manipulated its currency.  Therefore, by U.S. law, Treasury was not required to negotiate 
an end to China’s currency practices.370 
In January, 2005, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans traveled to Beijing to 
engage in a dialogue concerning China’s commitments to its WTO membership.  In 
meetings with Vice Premier Wu Yi and Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai, Secretary Evans 
focused on reducing intellectual property counterfeiting and piracy by strengthening the 
enforcement structure; eliminating non-tariff barriers to open up markets; moving to a 
flexible exchange rate; and creating a level playing field for all trading partners.371 
A few months later, when the Unocal issue arose in Congress, it appeared to the 
administration that Beijing was ready to change its position regarding China’s currency 
valuation.  At a G-7 meeting in April, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow indicated that 
China was ready to adopt a more flexible exchange rate. Snow’s reading of China’s 
willingness to change may have been based on his belief that the Bush Administration 
was strengthening its position, as illustrated in the Treasury’s International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies report to Congress, and not on any firm commitment by the 
Chinese.372  Less than one month later, in Treasury’s May 17, 2005 report, Snow changed 
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his tune and stated that the valuation issue is a “substantial distortion to world markets,” 
and he warned that Treasury planned to monitor China’s progress closely.373 
But at the same time that the Treasury Department was monitoring currency 
related issues, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) was facing intellectual property 
rights issues.  Under the terms of China’s WTO accession, China had greed to bring its 
intellectual property rights law in compliance with the WTO agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  Although the Bush Administrat on had stated 
repeatedly that China was making progress by passing new laws, tr ining judges and law 
enforcement officials, closing illegal production lines, seizing illegal products, and 
preventing exports of pirated products, the USTR held fast to the convicti  that much 
more needed to be done to improve China’s intellectual property rights protection.374 
Complaints from the business community continued and the USTR responded by 
announcing, on April 29th that it had placed China on the Special 301 Priority Watch Lis  
due to “serious concerns” over compliance with WTO obligations and failure to 
implement pledges to reduce IPR infringements.375  On July 11, 2005, the U.S.-China 
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Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) met and discussed intellectual property 
rights related issues. 
In July 2005, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice visited Beijing to discuss North 
Korea, counter terrorism, human rights and religions rights.  When asked about economic 
and trade issues, she deferred to Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and the JCCT who 
were also in China.  Although recused from addressing the Unocal bid due to her ten 
years of service on the Chevron board, Secretary Rice stated tha the relationship with 
China has 
improved dramatically over the last several years.  Our trade elations, 
while they are not uncomplicated and while the Chinese economy is 
transitioning in ways that are sometimes problematic for the American 
economy, it’s still a very healthy, robust and active economic 
relationship.376 
 
When asked about the Bush Administration’s characterization of China as  
threat, Rice responded that the administration did not perceive China as a threat; it was 
simply taking note of the size and pace of China’s military buildup.  In her view, the 
pressing issues for Washington were keeping up with China’s military; safeguarding 
intellectual property rights; and honoring the long-held One-China policy, the three joint 
communiqués, and obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.377  Later, in an interview 
with Time Magazine, Rice emphasized that the Chinese relationship i  complex.  
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Although China cannot be characterized as “all positive or negative,” t is the 
administration’s job is “to make China a positive influence on internaio l politics.” 378  
Clearly, Secretary Rice was downplaying Congress’s negative reaction to the Unocal bid. 
Similarly, other State Department officials refrained from commenting on the 
CNOOC bid and the congressional reaction it precipitated.  Deputy Secretary Robert 
Zoellick flatly refused to offer any thoughts on whether Congress wa  overreacting.379  
When asked if the administration had no formal position, National Security Advisor 
Steve Hadley responded, “The position is going to come out of the CFIUS process.”  
Elaborating further, he stated: 
There are a series of administrative and legal processes that ge  triggered . 
. . a standard process in law and regulation that we would have to pursue . 
. . if it becomes a formal proposal, then those procedures will have to b
invoked, and we’ll have to take a look at it.380 
 
Hadley also refused to take a political stand, making no comment on congressional 
outrage over the issue.  The administration’s position, as stated by Hadley was indicative 
of the classical “time-buying” strategy identified by Farnham.  When faced with trade-
offs that reduce acceptability (such as making a choice between promoting free trade and 
protecting national security), political decision makers will “often bide their time, relying 
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on the logic of events.  If there is nothing to be done at the moment, th y are content to 
wait for change in a more favorable direction” so as to “alienate fewer people” while 
evaluating opportunities to increase the public’s receptivity to the policy issue.381 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
According to the theoretical framework of new institutionalism, policy making in 
the United States is in a constant state of flux in which the institutions of the presidency 
and Congress continually act (either formally or informally) to assert powers granted 
under the Constitution to influence foreign policy decisions.  Formal rules set parameters 
for introducing legislation, and delineate the steps that a bill must go through to become 
law.  But policy making is much more complex than the rules set forth under the 
Constitution and in statutes and procedural rules.  This study hypothesizes that what takes 
place informally is what really matters when trying to explain why some issues become 
politicized when they are formally introduced as legislation, and why some bills become 
law and others do not. 
When presidents rely upon informal powers to increase their authority it threatens 
to destabilize the formal balance of power between the executive and legislative 
institutions.  To overcome this tendency, members of Congress will use formal 
constitutional powers to propose new laws and policies to bring the systm back into 
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equilibrium.382  However, because institutional constraints also inhibit Congress f om 
acting quickly and decisively, individual legislators will turn to informal powers as a 
means of increasing their political influence and ability to get legislation passed. 
While a natural ebb and flow is expected in a political system based on “checks 
and balances,” by the end of the twentieth century, the president’s formal authority had 
expanded while legislative oversight authority had diminished.  Some of th  drift towards 
presidential dominance may be explained by specific measures modern presidents have 
taken to gain more decision making autonomy; and some of this trend may be explained 
by the Congress’s failure to foresee the full spectrum of outcomes that could result from 
executive implementation of legislative mandates.  What distinguished President Bush 
from other presidents was the combination of his hierarchical approach t  managing his 
staff and delegation of responsibilities with an almost absolute insiste ce upon loyalty 
and discipline.  By Bush’s second term, policy weaknesses created by a limited flow of 
information and advice became more evident.  These weaknesses heightened concerns 
regarding executive powers and some members of Congress saw the controversy 
surrounding CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal as an opportunity to assert 
congressional oversight authorities. 
Institutional tensions between the president and Congress have created a policy 
making process that is fragmented, inefficient, and often difficult to predict.  This 
phenomenon is illustrated by the Unocal Case discussed in this dissertat on.  When 
Chinese-owned CNOOC contemplated its bid to acquire Unocal, CNOOC did not foresee 
                                                
382 When presidents overstep constitutional boundaries, the courts will also come into 
play to bring the system back into balance. 
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that it would become entangled in the institutional struggle between Congress and the 
presidency – a struggle in which each institution was vying for greater authority and 
autonomy in foreign policy decision making. 
Research shows that a variety of factors contributed to a legislative desire to shift 
the balance of power in foreign policy decision making during President Bush’s second 
term.  Immediately after September 11, 2001, Congress deferred to Bush and Cheney in 
the war on terror and the public supported the president’s decisive actions.  By 2005, 
foreign policy decision making had become decidedly weighted towards the presidency.  
But this shift in the balance of power did not go unnoticed by members of Congress – 
even legislators in the president’s own party who supported his political agenda were 
becoming concerned about the loss of legislative authority. 
Even though Congress had done very little to rein in the President Bush prior to 
2005, during that summer, the proposed Unocal takeover provided an opportunity for 
Congress to take on administrative shortcomings and transgressions.  Congress held 
hearings, issued proclamations, and modified legislation to make the president more 
accountable for the review of foreign acquisitions under the Exon-Florio Amendment.  
The Bush Administration seemed to just sit back while the issue played out in the 
legislature.  Was this because the Unocal bid caught President Bush off guard, like it did 
the Chinese, and he was confident that the Republican majority in Congress would shape 
policy to his liking?  Or was it because the president determined it was not a battle worth 
fighting?  The answer to this question lies in the institutions themselves and the historical 
context in which the institutions found themselves reacting to the CNOOC proposal. 
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One of the issues that had been brewing in Congress concerned presidential 
implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment.  Some legislators had begun questioning 
whether the Bush Administration’s singular focus on the War on Terror had left the 
nation’s security vulnerable in other respects – such as foreign acquisition of corporations 
with access to essential resources, technology, and know how.  Others had become 
concerned that they had abdicated congressional oversight responsibilities when giving 
the president such liberty to respond to terrorist attacks.  By the time CNOOC 
contemplated its bid to acquire Unocal a movement was already underway in Congress to 
strengthen legislative oversight of presidential authority overforeign acquisitions of U.S. 
corporations under the Exon-Florio provision. 
From the president’s perspective, other policy issues may have been de med more 
important at the time.  He may also have felt he could afford to let his Republican 
colleagues handle the issue.  However adept President Bush was at measuring the level of 
opposition in Congress and adapting his position to obtain his goals, he may have 
overlooked the more subtle, yet tangible, tools that Congress has available to impact 
executive powers.  A president’s unilateral powers are not absolute and Congress and the 
courts are always standing ready to reverse any executive actions should the president 
overextend his powers.  Such was the case with the Unocal acquisition. 
The next chapter reviews the primary statutes governing foreign acquisitions with 
a focus on the Exon-Florio Amendment enacted to provide the president statu ory 
authority to block foreign acquisitions impacting national security.  The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the history of Exon-Florio – how presidents have used their statutory 
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authority to promote or discourage foreign business transactions and how Congress has 
responded to the exercise of this authority.  Then, within the context of the CNOOC bid 
for Unocal, the chapter examines the struggle between the institutions of the presidency 
and Congress over the implementation of Exon-Florio.  Examining the Unocal Case from 
the analytical perspective of institutionalism provides insight into why Congress 











EFFECTUATING CHANGE IN STATUTORY LAW THROUGH 






 Foreign capital has played a role in the American economy and has contributed to 
the country’s development ever since colonial times. Even though it is generally believed 
that there are mutual benefits to foreign investments, most countries impose restrictions 
of one sort or another.  In the United States, there are no express provi ions in the 
Constitution for the federal government to regulate foreign investment, so we look to 
other constitutional powers for justification of these powers.  Most c mmonly, regulation 
of foreign investment is interpreted as falling under Congress’s authority to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States” 383 and to provide for 
national defense.384  In spite of this constitutional basis, not every legislator perceives the 
impact of foreign investment in the same way.  Some may encourage it s a means of 
offsetting the loss of jobs from U.S. companies investing abroad while others may see it 
as a threat to American industry.  But if foreign investment threatens to impair the 
nation’s security, legislators are faced with the challenge of weighing national security 
                                                
383 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 




needs against open trade principles.  Finding the balance between these two important 
national interests is dependent upon access to relevant and timely information.385 
After World War I the United States became a creditor nation with exports 
exceeding foreign imports.  By the 1970s foreign investment in American businesses had 
begun to rise, and Congress began to debate the merits and disadvantages of foreign 
investments.  Realizing the importance of access to data in the policy making process, 
Congress passed a number of statutes focused on how information is gathered and 
disclosed.  For example, the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act 
of 1976 states that the president shall collect information regarding international 
investment and U.S. foreign trade in services.386  In 1990, Congress amended the act to 
require that the president publish periodic information regarding foreign investment, 
including ownership by foreign governments,387 and to allow the president to request 
reports on the best available information from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) regarding the extent of foreign direct investment in any given 
industry.388  Another example is the Foreign Direct Investment and International 
                                                
385 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Foreign Investment in the United States: Major 
Federal Statutory Restrictions, (Report No. RL33103, March 27, 2008), by Michael V. 
Seitzinger (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2009), 3-4. 
 
386 U.S. Code 22, §§ 3101 et seq.  The president delegated responsibility for direct 
investment to the Commerce Department and for portfolio investment to the Treasury 
Department under Executive Order 11961, Federal Register 42 (January 19, 1977): 4321. 
 
387 U.S. Code 22, § 3103(a)(5). 
 
388 U.S. Code 22, § 3103(h). Foreign direct investment is defined by statute as the 
ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person (individual, branch, 
partnership, association, government, etc.) of 10% or more of the voting securities of an 
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Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990 which allows the BEA to access data from the 
Census Bureau. 389  The purpose of the statute is to provide the BEA with additional dat  
so that it can improve the accuracy and analysis in the reports that it provides to the 
Congress and the public regarding foreign direct investment. 
In spite of the statutes directed at collecting and disclosing data regarding foreign 
investment in the United States, members of Congress have grown increasingly 
concerned about loss of control over resources and industries that are essential to our 
economy and our national security.  This has been less of a concern for the economy 
when foreign investment is made by persons or governments from nations that provide 
reciprocal investment opportunities.  But concerns have been heightened wh n 
investments are made by citizens or governments from nations that do not follow 
reciprocal trade policies, or when foreign investments are made in industries and 
resources deemed vital to national defense.  Whenever concerns are heightened, Congress 
considers specific legislation to regulate mergers, acquisition , and takeovers of 
American corporations. 
Globerman and Shapiro suggest that even though there has “always been political
opposition” to foreign direct investment, particularly when it involves acquisitions of 
large host country corporations, legal barriers to inward foreign direct nvestment have 
been “substantially weakened” in both developed and emerging economies in r cent 
decades.  This seems to suggest that host economies recognize net b nefits to the host 
                                                                                                                                                 
incorporated U.S. business or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business 
enterprise.  Code of Federal Regulations, title 15, §806.15(a)(1). 
 




country.390  Given this trend, one would expect the 109th Congress to have viewed 
CNOOC’s proposed acquisition more favorably.  But the history of this case shows that 
the pendulum may be swinging in the other direction as members in Congress push for 
more rigorous delineation of the executive’s statutory authority over foreign acquisitions 
and greater scrutiny of executive decisions. 
 
II.  LAWS GOVERNING MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TAKEOVERS 
 
Over the years, Congress has enacted specific laws to govern mgers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers of American corporations.391  Which laws apply, and how 
they apply, depend upon the origins of the entities proposing the corporate acquisitions 
and the particular details of each offer.  Acquisitions proposed by omestic entities are 
governed by the Premerger Notification Act (PNA) and are subject to review by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).392  Acquisitions proposed by foreign entities are governed primarily by the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)393 and the Defense Production 
                                                
390 Steven Globerman and Daniel Shapiro, “Economic and Strategic Considerations 
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 26 
(2009), 164-165. 
 
391 For simplicity, we will use the terms “mergers,” “acquisitions,” or “takeovers” 
interchangeably to discuss the offers that ChevronTexaco and CNOOC proposed for the 
purchase of Unocal.  
 
392 Premerger Notification Act, U.S. Code 15, §18a. 
 
393 International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Public Law 95-223, codified 




Act of 1950 (DPA) and its subsequent amendments,394 and may be subject to review by 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).395  Because the two 
corporations that proposed to takeover Unocal and its wholly owned subsidiary Union Oil 
of California in 2005 had different origins they were subject to different laws.  As a 
domestic entity, ChevronTexaco’s offer was subject to review by the FTC.  As a foreign 
entity, CNOOC’s offer was subject to review by the CFIUS. 
A. Domestic Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers 
Although the PNA does not indicate which agency is to review which domestic 
transaction, traditionally, those in the petroleum industry have when be reviewed by 
the FTC.396  In 2005, when ChevronTexaco announced its plan to acquire Unocal, the 
PNA required the reporting of all transactions resulting in the acquiring party’s holding 
assets or voting securities:  (1) in excess of $200 million, or (2) between $50 million and 
$200 million plus the assets or voting securities of the acquired party.397  A 30-day 
waiting period begins on the day the reviewing agency receives the materials specified in 
                                                
394 Defense Production Act of 1950, Public Law 81-744, codified at U.S. Code (1950). 
 
395 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5021, Public Law 100-418, U.S. 
Statutes at Large 102 (1988): 1107, 1425-26, amending Title VII of the D fense 
Production Act of 1950, codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), § 2170 et seq.). 
 
396 U.S. Code 15, § 18a.  See also, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Unocal: Legal 
Implications of Acquisition Bids by Chevron Corp. and China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation,” (Report No. RS22192, August 5, 2005), by Janice E. Rubin and Michael V. 
Seitzinger, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 2005). 
 




section 18a.398  If the reviewing agency requests “additional material or documentary 
material relevant to the proposed acquisition” prior to the expiration of the initial 30 days, 
the waiting period may be extended an additional 20 days.399  Alternatively, the original 
waiting period may be terminated prior to the end of 30 days if the revi wing agency 
provides notice in the Federal Register that it intends no further action.400  But if the 
merger partner or the acquiring party is a non-U.S. entity, national security may be an 
issue and other legislation is controlling. 
The primary purpose of FTC review is to ensure competition in the Amrican 
domestic markets.  When investigating acquisitions, the FTC is committed to gathering 
extensive information; obtaining input from a wide variety of sources; and emphasizing 
scientific methodology in its analyses.  For example, in July 2004, William E. Kovacic, 
General Counsel of the FTC, appeared before a subcommittee of the Hous C mmittee 
on Government Reform to present testimony on factors that contributed to recent gasoline 
price increases and steps that might decrease gasoline prices in th  short and long term.401  
A week later he appeared before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and 
                                                
398 U.S. Code 15, § 18a(b)(1)(A), (B). 
 
399 U.S. Code 15, § 18a(e). 
 
400 U.S.Code 15, § 18a(b)(2). 
 
401 William E. Kovacic presenting prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, 
“Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect 
Competitive Markets,” on July 7, 2004, to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd sess.  Available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/Kovacic.shtm 




Commerce to present testimony on initiatives to protect competitive markets in the 
production, distribution and sale of gasoline.402  In his testimony, he identified the basic 
tools the FTC uses to promote competition in the petroleum industry as “ch llenges to 
potentially anticompetitive mergers, prosecution of non-merger antitrust violations, 
monitoring industry behavior to detect anticompetitive conduct, and research to 
understand petroleum sector developments.”403  Kovacic emphasized the premium that 
the FTC places on “careful research, industry monitoring, and investigations” to 
understand the industry and to identify obstacles to competition.404 
The FTC plays an important role in protecting competition in the petroleum 
industry.  From 1981 to 2004, the FTC had taken enforcement action against 15 major 
petroleum mergers, four of which were either abandoned or blocked as a result of FTC or 
court action; in the remaining 11 cases, the FTC required the merging companies to 
                                                
402 William E. Kovacic presenting prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, 
“Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect 
Competitive Markets,” on July 15, 2004 to the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on Status of U.S. Refining Industry, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd sess.  Available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
Kovacic.shtm (accessed December 12, 2007). 
 
403 William E. Kovacic presenting prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, , 
“Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect 
Competitive Markets,” on July 7, 2004, to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives 108th Cong., 2nd sess. Available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/ Kovacic.shtm. 





divest substantial assets.405  The openness of the FTC process is illustrated by the 
availability and depth of its reports.406 
B.  Foreign Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers 
Foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers are distinguished from domestic 
acquisitions in that they are subject to different laws, both within the United States and 
the home country.  Although U.S. citizens value free markets, both the president and 
Congress have long been aware of how difficult is it to balance free trade principles with 
national security concerns, especially during times of war.  Ely in the twentieth century, 
Congress found it necessary to pass the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to give the 
federal government authority to prohibit financial transactions in time of war.407  
Similarly, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), which broadened the 
government’s power to channel domestic production capacity to meet national defense 
needs, also served to limit foreign investment in sectors of the economy that were 
particularly sensitive during wartime.408 
                                                
405 William E. Kovacic presenting prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission, 
“Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect 
Competitive Markets,” on July 7, 2004, to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. Available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/Kovacic.shtm 
(accessed December 12, 2007). 
 
406 See for example, Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Inv stigation Data, 
Fiscal Years 1996-2003 (February 2, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/ 
05/040527 petrolactionsHHIdeltachart.pdf (accessed March 5, 2009). 
 
407 Trading with the Enemy Act, U.S. Code 12 (1917), § 95a. 
 




While a foreign acquisition may not give rise to an actual national emergency, it 
may have implications regarding future national security concerns.  In 1975, President 
Ford established the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
to address this issue.409  President Ford granted the CFIUS broad responsibilities for 
monitoring and evaluating the impact of foreign investment, but in reality, the committee 
had little authority.  President Ford’s successors issued subsequent execu ive orders to 
expand these powers, but they too had varying and debatable degrees of success.410 
In 1977, the 95th Congress amended the Trading with the Enemies Act by passing 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.411  The IEEPA grants the president 
broad powers to deal with any “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security, 
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.412  However, to invoke these powers, the 
                                                
409 President Ford formed the CFIUS in response to the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and 
fears that the influx of Arab “petrodollars” would allow the foreign countries to control 
corporate America.  See Executive Order no. 11,858, Federal Register 40 (May 7, 1975): 
20263. 
 
410 Executive Order no. 11,858, Federal Register 40 (May 7, 1975): 20,263 has been 
amended by Executive Order no. 12,188, Federal Register 45 (January 2, 1980): 969; 
Executive Order no. 12,661, Federal Register 54 (December 27, 1988): 779; Executive 
Order no. 12,860 Federal Register 58 (September 3, 1993): 47,201; and Executive Order 
no. 13,286, Federal Register 68 (February 28, 2003): 10619. 
 
411 International Emergency Economic Powers Act(IEEPA), Public Law 95-223, Title II, 
§ 201, U.S. Statutes at Large 91 (1977): 1625, codified as amended at U.S. Code 50 
(1977), §§ 1701-1707. 
 
412 IEEPA, Public Law 95-223, Title II, § 201, U.S. Statutes at Large 91 (1977): 1625, 




threat must be imminent enough for the president to declare a national emergency.413  
According to former Commerce Secretary Baldridge, taking such an action would be “the 
equivalent of a declaration of hostilities against the government of he acquirer 
company.”414  Therefore, in many instances, presidents (who are respectful of the 
innuendos of diplomacy) were powerless to take action against foreign mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers for political reasons and because the business tra sactions fell 
short of an “imminent threat.” 
By the 1980s, growing concern over Japan’s rise as an economic power and 
competitor in the technology industry, led Congress to amend section 721 ofthe Defense 
Production Act of 1950 with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.415  
Since then, exclusive of a national emergency, foreign acquisitions have been governed 
                                                
413 IEEPA, Public Law 95-223, Title II, § 201, U.S. Statutes at Large 91 (1977): 1625, 
codified as amended at U.S. Code 50 (1977), § 1702 (a)(1)(B). 
 
414 Commerce Secretary Baldridge, speaking about “Acquisitions by Foreign 
Companies,” on at hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st sess.,1987, 15 
 
415 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5021 enacted H.R. 4848, Public 
Law 100-418, U.S. Statutes at Large 102 (1988):1107, amending Title VII of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), app. § 2170.  It was signed into 
law by President Reagan and lapsed in October 1990. The original authorization was 
scheduled to expire in 1991, but was made permanent by Section 8 of the Defense 
Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, Public Law 102-99, U.S. Statutes at 
Large 105 (1991): 487 (1991).  President George Bush signed H.R. 991, which made 
Exon-Florio a permanent provision of the Defense Production Act, Public Law 102-99, 
105 U.S. Statutes at Large 487 (August 17, 1991). See “Bush Signs Defense Measure 





by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.416  This act has come to be known as the 
“Exon-Florio Amendment” after its sponsors Senator J. James Exon (D-NE) and 
Representative James J. Florio (D-NJ).417 
C.  Legislative History of Exon-Florio Amendment 
The congressional hearings regarding the Omnibus Trade and Competitiven ss 
Act are instructive as to foreign trade concerns as well as the institutional tensions 
between the president and Congress.  The act was first introduced in the House as an 
amendment to H.R. 3 by Rep. Dick Gebhardt (D-MO) to order the executiv  branch to 
examine trade with countries that had a large trade surplus with the U.S.  In the hearing 
on April 28, 1987, debate was limited and time was divided and controlled by the chair 
and ranking minority members of eleven committees.418 
Banking Committee Chair Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH) objected to section 905 of 
the bill, which would require the secretary of Commerce to immediately investgate, upon 
the request of the head of any agency, any foreign takeover of a U.S. corporation to 
                                                
416 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Public Law 100-418, 5021, 102 
U.S. Statutes at Large 1107, (codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), app. § 2170 reprinted in 
H.R. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1-497 (1988) (hereinafter “Exon-Florio 
Amendment (1988)” or “Exon-Florio (1988)” or “§ 2170”).  The provisions of the 1988 
Exon Florio Amendment were amended again under the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) on October 24, 2007. 
 
417 Exon-Florio Amendment, § 2170. 
 
418  Hearing on Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, Cong. 
Rec., 100th Cong. 1st sess., April 28, 1987, 133, no. 66: H2548.  One hour was provided to 
the following committees: Ways and Means; Foreign Affairs; Energy and Commerce; 
Agriculture; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.  One-half hour was provided to 
Education and Labor; Government Operations; Public Works and Transportation; 
Judiciary; Merchant Marine and Fisheries; and Small Business. 
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determine the effect on national security.  She reminded the House that the Banking 
Committee had sole jurisdiction over defense production and the Defense Production Act 
of 1950.  She objected to “usurping” the committee’s jurisdiction under the guis of an 
omnibus trade bill.  However, Mr. LaFalce (D-NY), chairman of the House Banking 
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, reminded the delegates that President 
Reagan’s trade policies had caused the trade deficits that were the oot of the problem.  
As a consequence, U.S. competitiveness had reached “crisis proportions” and the trade 
bill was necessary to address a multitude of trade policy problems. 
Meanwhile, Democrats in the Senate had been working on their own version of a 
bill ever since the 1986 elections had made trade an “urgent legislative priority.”419  The 
cosponsors of S. 1420 introduced the bill on February 5, 1987.  After 19 days of hearings, 
the bill was favorably reported to the Senate upon a 19-1 vote. When the clerk reported S. 
1420 on June 23, 1987, Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) emphasized the bipartisan 
nature of the bill and the effort to include the administration in its formation.  He noted 
that the Finance Committee had held 60 days of hearings and heard ov r 650 witnesses 
during the 99th and 100th Congresses.420 
Senate Finance Committee Chair Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) stressed the bipartisan 
consensus that trade should be the “number one legislative priority” of the 100th Congress 
                                                
419 Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 177450.  In 
2005, then Minority Leader Byrd had asked Bentsen to head a study group.  After issuing 
a report in April, Bentsen then recommended trade legislation which was the impetus for 
S. 1420. 
 
420 Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 177448-9. 
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which he said was demonstrated by fact that he was able to introduce S. 1420 with the 
support of 56 cosponsors, 25 of which were Republicans.421  Bentsen also stated that the 
committee had tried to bring the president on board, but hinted at the tension between the 
administration and Congress when he declared:  “No president can be  strong and 
effective negotiator unless he has the support of the American people.  And no President 
can be certain of that support unless he works with Congress.”  In this spirit, Bentsen 
believed the provisions of the bill would “make Congress a partner, a d not a puppet, in 
our trade policy.”422 
Senator Byrd addressed the media’s criticism of the Democratic Congress and 
denied the suggestion that Democrats were inclined towards protectionist legislation.423  
Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) commented that the Senate bill was “les  protectionist” than 
the House bill, and Ranking Finance Committee Member Bob Packwood (R-OR), 
warned Congress against being “panicked into protectionism by grimstatistics.” 
Packwood said he was persuaded by Chairman Bentsen’s arguments that “by tolerating 
unfair practices in some special cases, we encourage them in all cases.”  As such, 
Packwood emphasized that there is a “powerful national interest . . . in making clear that 
the United States will not tolerate trade agreement violations.”424 
                                                
421 Senator Bentsen, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Actto the 
Senate, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 14750. 
 
422 Ibid., 14751. 
 
423 Senator Byrd, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act to the Senate, 
on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 147523. 
 
424 Senator Packwood of Oregon, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 17453. 
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Clearly, the hearing was focused on U.S. competitiveness in relation to the growth 
of other economies, particularly Japan and to a lesser degree, Germany.  There were only 
a few passing comments concerning China in the lengthy hearing with the most 
substantive comment being made by Senator Heinz (R-PA).  He warned that there may 
be an amendment to the trade bill to provide favored treatment for the People's Republic 
of China – not for economic reasons but for the political purpose of advancing U.S.-
China foreign relations. 
The Chinese are very skillful; they are very bright, and they have quickly 
figured out that their price for such improvement should be improved 
economic relations, which to them means selling more here, regardless of 
whether it is dumped, subsidized, or fraudulently entered in violation of 
our bilateral textile agreement. The amendment that we might face would 
throw trade policy to the winds when the Chinese have their eyes firmly 
fixed on the proper objective -- the economic bottom line.425 
 
Senator Danforth (R-MO) reminded the Senate that Congress, not the executive branch 
has responsibility for foreign commerce under the Constitution.  As a practical matter, 
Congress delegated the day-to-day operation of trade policy to the president because the 
legislative branch is not equipped to conduct the administrative details.  Danforth 
summarized the debate as follows: 
[T]he overall responsibility for international trade is in the hands of the 
Congress and, therefore, we do have a strong role to play and if the current 
system is not operating effectively, if it has broken down, then Congress 
should step in and make sure that we have a trading system that does 
work. 
 
Now, I say that the existing system has obvious problems. I would say that 
it has obvious problems because it is not really a system. We have so 
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delegated responsibility to the President that the President almost on the 
basis of whim can determine when to act and when not to act in 
enforcement of the laws that have been enacted. 
 
One of the ongoing debates that has occurred both in committee and in the 
press and will occur on the floor of the Senate in the next week or so has 
to do with the issue of Presidential discretion. It is a tough question, 
Presidential discretion. 
 
On one hand, we recognize that we do not want to tie the President's hand  
completely. The President has overall responsibility for foreign policy, for 
the faithful execution of the law. We do not want to be in a situation where 
the President has absolutely no room to maneuver. 
 
But, on the other hand, we have so delegated authority to the President of 
the United States, we have so granted him discretion in the past, that the 
laws that have been enacted by the Congress have often been dead-letter 
laws. . . .426 
 
This legislative history is particularly instructive for analysis of the politicization 
of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.  The Exon-Florio Amendment was formally introduced in 
1988 when President Reagan’s open investment policy and growing U.S. foreign debt 
reinforced the perception in Congress that U.S. firms were becoming particularly 
vulnerable to foreign takeovers.  President Reagan had delegated the executiv ’s 
regulatory and investigative authority under Exon-Florio to the CFIUS, an inter-agency 
committee which had been created by President Ford to include members from executive 
branch departments and the Executive Office of the President, and ws chaired by 
secretary of Treasury.427  [See Table 4]  But the potential takeover of two U.S. companies 
raised Senator Exon’s concern about how the White House was handling its authority 
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under the legislation.  Fujitsu, Ltd. of Japan proposed the purchase of Fairchild 
Semiconductor Corporation and Sir James Goldsmith of Great Britain at empted a hostile 
takeover of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.  Goodyear Tire & Rubber had a large 
facility in Nebraska and had appealed to Senator Exon to help prevent the offer.428 
Several government agencies agreed with Senator Exon that the two companies 
were important to national security – Fairchild produced a microchip with military 
applications and Goodyear had several Pentagon contracts – but the White House said 
that it could not prevent the takeovers unless there were a national emergency.429  The 
Pentagon objected to Fujitsu purchasing Fairchild because it had no confidence that 
Fujitsu would protect classified technology.  The Commerce Department objected 
because U.S. companies had been denied the right to compete with Fujitsu in Japan when 
they had proposed to sell supercomputers there.430  On the other hand, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the State Department, and the Treasury Department leaned 
towards supporting foreign investment in the U.S. and they were more inclined to 
approve the transaction.431 
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In the end, neither the Fujitsu nor the Goldsmith transactions were consummated.  
The Japanese firm responded to the increasing support for protectionist legislation in the 
U.S. by backing down from their proposal.  Goldsmith’s bid did not receiv  the same 
degree of opposition at the Federal level, but it did lead the Ohio legislature to strengthen 
the ability of state corporations to resist hostile takeovers from oreign interests.432  This 
was accomplished by allowing corporate directors to consider not just he impact of a 
proposed takeover on the shareholders, but also the impact upon employees, suppliers, 
creditors, and customers. 
The stated purpose of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment was to strengthen the 
process by which proposed foreign transactions are analyzed by “the President or the 
President’s designees” and to give the president authority to prevent or restructure foreign 
acquisitions that threatened to undermine national security.  According to Christopher A. 
McLean, Senator Exon’s legal counsel and staff co-author of the law, the senator “had to 
fight every step of the way for this Presidential authority.”433  The proposed bill had 
stated that prohibition or suspension of a transaction was authorized when a transaction 
threatened to impair “national security and essential commerce.”  But the Reagan 
Administration objected to the phrase “essential commerce.”434  Secretary of Commerce 
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Baldridge contended that the language was too broad and the Exon proposal would 
“mean a diversion away from the principles” that the administration had been trying to 
espouse – that is, “national treatment for investment, open investment policy, and 
everything that goes with it.”435  Former Treasury Deputy Secretary Richard Darman 
argued that the language potentially represented a “radical reversal of U.S. policy 
favoring increasingly open investment regimes” and, as written, would have “a chilling 
effect on foreign investment in the United States.”436  In the end, the “essential 
commerce” phrase was removed. 
There was also considerable debate in Congress over the definition of the 
“national security.”  In hearings before the House, Representative Florio argued for 
expansion of the term “so as to be able to go beyond very militaristic interpretations.”437  
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Later, Representative Fish (R-NY) attempted to define “natio l security” with a warning 
that national security “is not limited to those industries which develop and produce rifles, 
and fighter bombers.  It includes the ability to provide a broad range of human services, 
materials, products and technological innovations.”438  Ultimately the definition was 
omitted purposefully from the final bill to the give the president broad discretion in 
invoking the statute.439  Afterwards, during the administrative rulemaking process, the 
Department of Treasury received over 500 pages of comments from more than seventy 
parties.  The comments focused primarily on clarifying the meaning of “national 
security,” but Treasury rejected the comments based on the rationale that it needed to 
maintain the congressional intent expressed in the Conference Report.440 
As enacted in 1988, Exon-Florio gave the president broad discretionary authority 
to take “appropriate” action to suspend or prohibit proposed or pending forein mergers, 
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acquisitions, or takeovers of U.S. businesses by persons engaged in interstate commerce 
which “threaten[s] to impair the national security.”  The presid nt “may” make an 
investigation, but “only if” he determines that other laws are inadequate or inappropriate 
to protect national security and there is “credible evidence” that the transaction would 
impair national security.441  The president’s determination as to whether Exon-Florio 
kicks in was not subject to judicial review.442 
Although members of Congress could not agree on certain definitions, and 
decided to exclude them, they did agree on several factors that the president could 
consider when deciding whether to block a foreign merger, acquisition or takeover.  
These were: 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense 
requirements; 
 
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national 
defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, 
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services; 
 
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign 
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the U.S. to meet the 
requirements of national security.443 
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The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment established the following process:  (1)
investigation of the acquisition must commence within 30 days after receipt of written 
notification of the proposed or pending acquisition of a U.S. company to determine 
whether there are any national security concerns, (2) 45 days to complete the 
investigation to determine whether those concerns require a recommendation to the 
president for possible action, and (3) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or 
prohibit the acquisition.444  Then the president may seek judicial remedy, including 
divestiture, in federal courts if necessary to enforce his decision. 
As a means of protecting corporate interests, the information provided in the 
Exon-Florio investigation was made exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act, except for the purpose of an administrative proceeding or judicial 
action.445  In addition, the statute provided that Congress or any of its authorized 
committees could access information provided during the investigation.446  
D.  Presidential Implementation of Exon-Florio 
 Not only is Exon-Florio’s legislative history important for understanding the 
politicization of China’s bid for Unocal in 2005, but how presidents have interpret d and 
implemented their statutory authority under the amendment is also imp rtant.  In this 
section, we analyze congressional hearings and debates, and subsequent efforts to amend 
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the statute, in order to understand the statute’s flaws and the difficulties presidents have 
encountered in implementing the statute as enacted. 
On February 2, 1990, during the Senate’s recess, former President George H.W. 
Bush reported that he had invoked his Exon-Florio authority for the first time.  The 
president’s report informed the Senate of his decision to order the China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) to divest all its in erest in MAMCO 
Manufacturing, Inc., a company incorporated under the laws of the Stat of Washington, 
which manufactured aircraft components that had potential commercial o  military use.  
Former President Bush based his decision on finding “credible evidence” that the 
“foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security” and that no other law provides adequate and appropriate authority for him to 
protect national security.447 
CATIC was an export-import company of the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace 
Industry which engaged in research and development, design, and manufacturer of 
military and commercial aircraft, missiles, and aircraft engines, and had business dealings 
with various U.S. companies.  MAMCO voluntarily notified the CFIUS of CATIC’s 
intention to acquire MAMCO, and the acquisition was consummated in November 1989 
while the CFIUS review was in process.  On December 4, 1989, the CFIUS made a 
determination to conduct a formal investigation and informed the parties to the 
transaction.  During the investigation, officials from the Departments of Commerce and 
Defense visited MAMCO on behalf of CFIUS and gathered data regrding MAMCO’s 
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production and technological capabilities.  President Bush made his decision to order 
divestment based on the results of this investigation.  However, because of the “sensitive 
nature of the evidence,” the report did not specify details.  Instead, the President informed 
the Senate that CFIUS would “be available, on request, to provide the appropriate 
committees, meeting in closed sessions, with a classified briefing.”448 
Although the publically stated reason was that by acquiring MAMCO, the 
Chinese could have access to U.S. aerospace companies and products which were 
restricted by export controls, some have suggested that the president’s determination was 
politically motivated.449  This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the case was 
reviewed just one year after the political riots in Tiananmen Square when there was 
considerable anti-China sentiment and many legislators were seeking human rights 
sanctions. During the initial 45-day review of the MAMCO acquisition, the Bush 
Administration did not impose any restrictions to protect against the transfer of sensitive 
information and technology and there was no immediate action taken to protect na ional 
security.  Furthermore, even though the statute provided that mediation occur within three 
months of the president’s order, the president did not ensure that CATIC surrender its 
interest in MAMCO until one year later. If national security had been an imminent 
concern, one would have expected more immediate action. 
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President George H.W. Bush’s handling of the MAMCO case was question d by 
certain members of Congress and a number of foreign investment related bills began to 
appear in both chambers.  For example, on April 25, 1990, Senator James Exon (D-NE) 
introduced S. 2516, cosponsored by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Arlen Specter (R-PN), 
and David Boren (D-OK), to allow the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) access to information collected by the Bureau of the Census.  It was 
determined that this access would improve the accuracy and analysis of BEA reports to 
the public and to Congress on foreign direct investment in the United States, and would 
enable CFIUS to conduct more thorough and informed analysis regardin the impact of 
foreign takeovers of American companies. 
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology held a hearing in which 
the Departments of Commerce and Treasury testified in support of the bill.  On July 31, 
1990, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology ordered S. 2516 favorably 
reported by voice vote with an amendment offered by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and 
Senator Exon providing for a BEA foreign investment report to CFIUS.  The report 
would be made, upon request, and would outline the level and extent of foreign direct 
investment in an industry, including foreign government investment, by country, without 
disclosing individual investment information.450  Now, under P.L. 101-533, when a 
request for a report is made to BEA in connection with a CFIUS investigation under 
Section 721, the report must be provided within 14 days. 
                                                




Meanwhile, during House proceedings and debates, Representative Helen Bentley 
(R-MD) expressed disappointment in the1988 Exon-Florio Amendment.  Although the 
CFIUS was comprised of “heads of eight federal agencies, and chaired by the Secretary 
of the Treasury,” Representative Bentley lamented,  
There is absolutely no requirement for foreign investors to notify anyone 
in the Government of their intent to purchase anything . . . . Foreign 
investors can purchase U.S. companies and do purchase them at will.  Any 
attempt Congress has made, as in the Bryant bill of last year, to get some 
kind of registration of foreign ownership, has been knocked down every 
time.451 
 
Representative Bentley identified other signs of weakness in the 1988 legislation, 
including: (1) Exon-Florio only offered the option of CFIUS review if someone 
challenges the foreign acquisition; (2) Even though eight agencies were represented on 
CFIUS, only three needed to agree to a sale; (3) In two years, CFIUS had made only 
three recommendations to the president, and of those, only one was to stop a sale; (4) In 
just three months during 1990, 209 U.S. companies had passed into foreign ownership.452 
From the context of her testimony, it appeared that Representativ  Bentley was more 
concerned with the amendment’s ineffectiveness in protecting U.S. assets than protecting 
national security interests. 
In spite of the conflict in the Gulf area, and congressional concern about foreign 
direct investment in the U.S., the 101st Congress failed to enact the DPA authorization 
bill in 1990, and the DPA expired for the first time since it was fir t enacted. 
                                                





Representative Thomas Carper (D-DE) responded in the House by introducing H.R. 991 
to extend the expiration of the DPA until September 30, 1991, and to make it retroactive 
to October 20, 1990.453   In testifying as the new chairman of the House Economic 
Stabilization Subcommittee of the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, 
which had jurisdiction over the DPA, Carper discussed three “relatively 
noncontroversial” amendments.454  The first was to provide antitrust protection to 
voluntary agreements as part of petroleum-related international agreements.  The second 
was to clarify defense contract priority and allocation provisions, a d the third was to 
make permanent the 1988 Exon-Florio provisions which require executive revi w of 
foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of domestic firms that might affect U.S. 
security interests adversely.455 
Representative Tom Ridge (R-PA), the ranking member of the subcommittee, 
emphasized the importance of the DPA, and danger of forcing the president to operate 
without the benefit of the DPA during critical stages of the Gulf crisis.  He also stressed 
how the 1988 Exon-Florio provisions give the president necessary authority to eview 
proposed mergers that might adversely affect U.S. national security.  Representative 
Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH), past chairwoman of the Economic Stabiliztion Committee, 
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spoke of extensive efforts to “modernize the act,” consultations with “an advisory group 
composed of high former military and civilian executives and industriali s,” and strong 
bipartisan support.  Representative Chalmers Wylie (R-OH), ranking member of the 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, echoed the others’ comments and 
reiterated the need to make the Exon-Florio provisions permanent with an illustration of 
“a takeover involving the transfer of nuclear technology [that] could have potentially 
gone through because DPA had expired.”456 
Representative Cardis Collins (D-IL) noted a diversity of views as to how the 
administration had handled implementation of Exon-Florio.  While some criticized the 
administration for not being aggressive enough and others felt the administrat on’s 
“reluctance to intervene” was appropriate, the overwhelming consensu  was that Exon-
Florio should be exempt from the sunset terminations of the DPA.  Again, citing the 
example of the proposed Japanese takeover of Moore Special Tool Company, the sole 
U.S.-owned supplier of ultra-high-precision grinding equipment to the U.S. nuclear 
program, Representative Collins pointed to the significance of providing CFIUS with the 
statutory authority to act.  In this case, she said, it was onlyafter the Economic 
Stabilization Subcommittee announced it would consider the takeover at a hearing that 
the Japanese firm, Fanuc Machine Tool, withdrew its offer.457 
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Aside from the national security issue, Representative Philip Sharp (D-IN) noted 
two other benefits from making Exon-Florio permanent.  First, it would strengthen 
Congress’s institutional leverage over how the administration implements its Section 721 
authority.  Second, it would create greater confidence on the part of the international 
business community, rather than the ambiguity of an unpredictable sttute.458  Within this 
context, it is not surprising that the House voted 416 in favor of H.R. 991 with no 
opposition, and 17 not voting, and the bill was sent to the Senate.459  On August 2, 1991, 
the Senate agreed to the conference report on H.R. 991 to extend the expiration date of 
the Defense Production Act of 1950.460 
Representative Sharp emphasized his concern about Congress’s ability to monitor 
and regulate transnational mergers, joint ventures, and takeovers by introducing the 
International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act to the Commerce, Consumer 
Protection and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee on June 12, 1991.461  He noted that some transnational mergers may not fall 
into the commonly accepted definition of national security, but may raise other concerns, 
such as antitrust or competitiveness issues.  The bill was an attempt to provide a linkage 
between the regulatory domains of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification 
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regulation of the Clayton Antitrust Act and the national security review under the Exon-
Florio Amendment. 
At the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee hearing, Theodore Moran, 
international business professor at Georgetown University, testified that there are 
“genuine national security threats associated with foreign investment” and these national 
security threats arise when foreign companies attempt to acquire U.S. companies in 
“industries where external suppliers are extremely concentrated.”462  Furthermore, he 
noted, global “proliferation of restrictions on flows of technology and capital” also 
threatens U.S. national security and welfare.463  Mr. Moran proposed a “concentration 
test” where the largest four firms (or countries) should control o more than fifty percent 
of the market, so that they would lack the ability to collude to manipulate the market.  He 
concluded that this approach, based on “principles that have always guided the American 
preference for free markets” would allow the market, rather than government bureaucrats 
to pick winners and losers.464 
In addition to antitrust protection, Representative Sharp expressed a need to 
oversee businesses engaged in commerce related to the United Sta s’ defense industrial 
base.  Sharp’s bill proposed making the Hart-Scott-Rodino mandatory premerg r 
requirement of the Clayton Antitrust Act the starting point for review of foreign direct 
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investment.  But, in addition to the normal antitrust thresholds set by Hart-Scott-Rodino, 
H.R. 2631 would “establish clear and precise national security triggers.” 465  While the 
bill would give the president additional authority under Exon-Florio to precondition a 
merger or acquisition so that national security concerns are met, it also addressed 
Congress’ institutional concern that presidential implementation of Ex n-Florio lacked 
transparency and accountability.  So that Congress and the public could better understand 
how CFIUS operates, the bill required an annual public report on CFIUS 
investigations.466  In 1991, after extensive comment, the Treasury Department issued 
final regulations implementing the Exon-Florio provision.467  These regulations created a 
voluntary system of notification by the parties to an acquisition, but allowed for notice by 
agencies that are members of CFIUS.468  It was assumed that large firms would have an 
incentive towards voluntary notification because the regulations stipulate that when 
companies do not notify CFIUS of foreign acquisitions which are governed by Exon-
Florio, the acquisitions remain subject indefinitely to divestment or other appropriate 
actions by the President. 
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In 1992, Congress again expressed concern about the review process after a
French state-owned company, Thomson-CSF, Inc., proposed to acquire LTV 
Corporation’s missile division.  Originally, Senator Byrd drafted a bill that would have 
prohibited the sale of LTV Corporation to any non-U.S. company,469 but this bill stalled 
as the president indicated he was inclined to block the transaction.  The results of the 
CFIUS investigation, strong congressional scrutiny, and broad public awareness made the 
acquisition much too risky and controversial.  Then, towards the end of the legislative 
session, Senator Byrd introduced Amendment 3077 to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The cosponsors were Senators Exon, Riegle, 
Sarbanes, Bingaman and Dixon. 
Although debate was limited, it was passionate due to the fact that it was 
introduced subsequent to an attempt to block the Thomson-CSF transaction.  One of the 
main concerns about the Thomson-CSF proposal was the issue of French government 
control over Thomson-CSF’s parent company and sensitive LTV technology.  This 
concern was consistent with Congress’s long history of disapproval over France’s third-
party transactions involving the transfer of military equipment.  Ultimately, Thomson-
CSF withdrew its proposal in response to the politicization of the transaction and 
anticipation of the outcome.  After restructuring its proposal to include joint acquisition 
with U.S.-based defense contractor, Loral Group, which agreed to purchase the LTV 
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Missile Division and thereby reduce Thomson-CSF’s interest to less than ten percent, 
Thomson-CSF was able to get the acquisition approved.470 
Regardless of the outcome of the LTV case, Senator Byrd had succes fully 
introduced Amendment 3077 (“Byrd Amendment”) which inserted a new subsection 
721(a) to the DPA requiring mandatory investigations of foreign mergers, acquisitions, or 
takeovers when the acquirer is “controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government” and the merger, acquisition, or take over “could affect the naional security 
of the United States.”  The amendment provided that such investigation “shall commence 
not later than 30 days after receipt by the President or the President’s designee of written 
notification,” and the investigation “shall be completed not later than 45 days after its 
commencement.”471 
The redesignated subsection 721(f) was amended to add two additional factors or 
the president to consider when making a decision to block a foreign merger, acquisition, 
or takeover: 
(1) the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military 
goods, equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or 
proliferates missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; and 
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(2) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological 
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security.472 
 
The amendment also added the requirement that the “President shall immediately 
transmit to the secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives a 
written report of the President’s determination of whether or not to take action” to include 
a “detailed explanation of the findings and factors considered in making the 
determination.473  Finally, the amendment added the “sense of the Congress” that the 
president should include the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and 
the assistant to the president for National Security in the membership of the CFIUS. 
The comments of the Byrd Amendment sponsors are particularly instructive for 
understanding Congress’s concerns about CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.  “We face the 
dilemma of how to prevent foreign companies, particularly those controlled by their 
governments, from raiding the U.S. economy and snatching up the prized jewls of 
America’s industrial base without discouraging legitimate foreign investment in our 
economy,” said Senator Byrd.474  Even though global defense spending was dramatically 
reduced since the end of the Cold War, there were negative side effects on the industry; 
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one of which was the failure of weaker defense firms making them ripe for acquisition.  
In Senator Byrd’s opinion, although the Exon-Florio Amendment provides the executive 
branch with “all the tools” it needs “to ensure the stability and safety of our industrial 
base,” presidents have not chosen to use these tools.  Senator Byrd feared that “we have 
established a pattern where only the most blatantly risky cases rec ive scrutiny and even 
then they are likely to get the go-ahead.”475 
Senator Exon echoed Senator Byrd’s concerns, emphasizing that President 
George H.W. Bush had used his powers under Exon-Florio Amendment “rather 
conservatively.”  He did not fault the president, but suggested that changes in “what can 
be expected in the post cold war era” required updating the law.  Of course, it is not 
surprising that Senator Exon would shy away from criticizing the statute that he had 
authored.476  By way of contrast, Senator Riegle (D-MI) emphasized that the 
Reagan/Bush Administration was “blinded by its free trade and open investment 
ideology.”  Reigle suggested that the presidents’ narrow interpretation of the authority 
Congress gave them kept them from seeing the “cumulative impact” of foreign 
takeovers.477 
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Senator Sarbanes (D-MA) emphasized that cases involving foreign-owned 
companies fall into a different category “by definition … because they are not dictated 
strictly by market forces.”  He also expressed concern about the “generic issue of foreign 
government ownership of U.S. defense contractors.”478  Emphasizing that even the U.S. 
government did not own its own defense contractors, he questioned whether it would be a 
good idea to let foreign governments own them.  Mr. Sarbanes concluded that the 
changes proposed by the amendment would allow the president to consider additional 
factors in considering whether to block a transaction.  In addition, the new reporting 
requirements would increase transparency.  In the past, presidents were not required to 
provide an explanation as to why they made the decisions they did.  As a result, it has 
been “virtually impossible for Congress and the public to know what policy had been 
developed by the administration in applying the Exon-Florio provision or to hold the 
administration accountable.”479 
In short, the Byrd Amendment made three significant changes to the original 1988 
Exon-Florio Amendment.  First, it shifted the focus from the intended us  of the acquired 
assets to national origin of the entity acquiring the assets.  Review was mandatory if an 
acquiring entity was controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign entity.  Second, it 
lowered the threshold for determining when review should occur.  No longer did the 
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CFIUS need to find that the transaction “threatens to impair national security,” instead 
the CFIUS only needed to find that the transaction “could affect national security.”480  
Finally, it expanded the scope of factors that the president was to consider and 
emphasized technological leadership in maintaining national security. 
Even though the Byrd Amendment improved the statute, it was not the panacea 
for handling foreign mergers; rather, it was a compromise.  The first compromise was 
that reporting of a merger was still voluntary.  Voluntary filing by foreign entities was 
included in the original Exon-Florio Amendment to demonstrate the U.S. government’s 
support of open trade.  The reporting option was based on the “safe harbor” principle, 
that is, if parties to a merger were to notify CFIUS of a proposed or completed merger, 
and the CFIUS were to determine that a transaction did not pose a thr at to national 
security, then the foreign entity could rest assured that the president would not order 
divestiture at a later time.  But if the parties failed to notify the CFIUS of the transaction, 
it would leave the door open for future investigation and remedies.  The risk of 
nondisclosure was heightened by the fact that any remedies imposed by the president 
were not subject to judicial review, leaving the foreign entity wi h no legal recourse once 
the president makes a decision.  In spite of the incentive for voluntary notification, some 
members of Congress continued to believe voluntary notification was a fl w in the statute 
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because sensitive information could exchange hands before any CFIUS review or 
presidential decision. 
A second improvement in the statute was to require mandatory investigations in 
certain circumstances.  The compromise language stipulates that CFIUS had 
responsibility for making the determination that national security “could” be affected by 
the transaction, that the subject U.S. company would be under foreign "control," and 
possibly, that a foreign company was "acting on behalf of" a foreign government.  
Without clear definitions of terms, the Byrd Amendment still left a lot of room for 
interpretation and, consequently, a lot of room for disagreement as to that interpreta ion. 
Third, even though the Byrd Amendment specified additional factors for CFIUS 
to consider regarding sales of military goods and technology to countries supporting 
terrorist activities, some analysts have noted that the CFIUS already considered these 
factors as part of the review.481   But even if the changes were minor, or redundant, by 
identifying specific factors in the statute, Congress was attempting to ensure that those 
factors would be given greater political weight during the review process.482  This 
research into the CNOOC case and other bids proposed by Chinese corporati ns confirms 
that the CFIUS did give these statutorily defined factors more ca ful consideration in 
subsequent reviews. 
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Fourth, the Byrd Amendment addressed Congress’s concern about the lack of 
transparency in how presidents had been implementing Exon-Florio in the CFIUS 
investigative process. The amendment required specific guidelines for initiation of the 
process and milestones for each stage of the review, that is, thereview must begin within 
30 days of written notice, the review must be completed and a recommendation made to 
the president within 45 days, and the president must make a decision within 15 days. In 
addition, the president was required to report to Congress immediately regarding any 
decisions after undertaking an investigation, and a Quadrennial Report was required to 
provide details as to any credible evidence concerning industrial espionage or attempted 
control over leading technology.483   Even though some have argued that the Byrd 
Amendment had little legal consequence, the message that Congress sent to the president 
and the CFIUS had political consequences.  That is, it was clear that Congress would 
review CFIUS consideration of investments proposed by foreign government-owned 
entities more assiduously. 
On February 16, 1994, pursuant to amendments to the Defense Production Act, 
the Treasury Department issued proposed implementing regulations.  Treasury defined 
"foreign government" broadly to include any government body exercising governmental 
functions, such as state and local authorities.484  The regulations also specified that a 
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mandatory investigation would not be required where the foreign government entity was 
merely a "passive participant in an acquisition by a foreign person."485  The inclusion of 
this language demonstrates how administrative agencies are able to assume control over 
how laws and statutes are implemented, especially when Congress does not provide clear 
definitions or statutory guidance. 
In short, the Byrd Amendment to Exon-Florio was “designed to serve as a 
surgical instrument to prevent control of critical defense-related industries by hostile 
governments or transfer of sensitive technologies to strategic competitors” by focusing on 
the origin of capital in determining whether a transaction threaen d national security.486  
But in 2000, the GAO published its report and concluded that the process f r identifying 
foreign acquisitions which affect national security still could be improved.487  Some of 
the weaknesses identified by the report are as follows:  First, the reporting process still 
did not ensure that all national security-related acquisitions were reviewed.  The CFIUS 
continued to rely upon voluntary reporting and Congress assumed that companies would 
report contemplated foreign acquisition to the CFIUS early in the process because the 
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president retained authority to force divestiture for acquisitions that were not reported.488  
Second, the CFIUS still did not know the extent to which foreign acquisition  of U.S. 
companies might have an effect on national security.  This was because no records were 
kept of acquisitions identified by member agencies or contacts madewith parties to the 
acquisitions to encourage voluntary reporting.489  Third, even though other laws and 
regulations required the reporting of some security-related acquisitions to individual 
agencies, the agencies were not required to report this information to the CFIUS.490  
Instead, Treasury officials reported that the CFIUS member ag ncies continued to obtain 
information about acquisitions of potential concern by reviewing busines  media 
sources.491  This resulted in inconsistent reporting from one agency to the next.  Fourth, 
since agency referrals to the CFIUS were informal, agencies did not maintain formal 
records of contacts and agency actions pertaining to the contracts, resulting in little to no 
follow-up regarding the referrals.492 
Over the years, foreign countries, and their investors, have expressed concerns 
that American presidents would interpret the Exon-Florio provisions too br adly and 
there would be a trend towards more protectionist policies.  In fact, presidents have been 
reluctant to apply the statute too broadly for fear of interfering with foreign trade and 
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investment opportunities.  This reluctance is documented in the 2000 GAO Report 
indicating that only seventeen percent of 7,371 foreign acquisitions reported to the 
Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1988 to 1999 were reported 
to the CFIUS.493  [See Table 5]  Of those reported, only seventeen were investigat d, 
seven were withdrawn, and only one was blocked by the president. 
In spite of these weaknesses, according to McLean, the Exon-Florio Amendment 
has not failed. “Before the law was enacted, presidents had very few tools to protect the 
national security when a foreign entity took control of an important security asset of the 
United States,” he said.  “The test of the law is not how many tr sactions that have been 
stopped, but that transactions involving foreign purchasers are scrutinized to ensure that 
the national security is protected.”  494 
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TABLE 5:  Foreign Acquisitions, Voluntary Reports, and Dispositions 495 












1988 869 14a 1 0 1 0 
1989 837 204 5 2 3 1 
1990 839 295 6 2 4 0 
1991 561 152 1 0 1 0 
1992 463 106 2 1 1 0 
1993 554 82 0 0 0 0 
1994 605 69 0 0 0 0 
1995 644 81 0 0 0 0 
1996 686 55 0 0 0 0 
1997 640 62 0 0 0 0 
1998 673b 65 2 2 0 0 
1999 c 79 0 0 0 0 
2000 c 72 1 0 1 1 
2001 c 55 1 1 0 0 
2002 c 43 0 0 0 0 
2003 c 41 2 1 1 1 
2004 c 53 2 2 0 0 
2005 c 65 2 2 0 0 
   
a  Filings began in September 1988 
b Data not complete 
c Data not available 
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 III. POST 9/11 IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO  
September 11, 2001 marked a major shift in the international world order.  
Previously, national security threats were state-based and foreign t ade policies reflected 
that world order.  After the terrorist attacks on American soilin 2001, the focus of 
national security was no longer on nation-states, but on non-state actors, and their 
relationships to different nation-states.  Along these lines, President Bush added the 
Department of Homeland Security to the CFIUS which had the effect of shifting the 
balance of power on the committee from agencies that focused on the economic benefits 
of foreign direct investment to agencies that focused on the complexities of providing 
national security.496 
Consistent with the heightened concerned about national security and the 
authorities provided to the president under the Homeland Security Act, many in Congress 
believed that President Bush’s post 9/11 interpretation of the Exon-Florio Amendment 
would change.497  This would have been consistent with the popular belief that a more 
expansive view of national security is required when threats by non-state actors are 
considered.  Analysts such as Christopher Fenton suggested that the changed global 
environment required an expansion of new relationships 
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to preclude terrorist access to the international financial system and mainly 
include: the protection of industries required for the execution of the 
global anti-terror campaign, security threats posed by foreign control of 
particular domestic industries, and potential third-party transactions 
between foreign entities that acquire these industries.498 
 
In spite of past efforts to increase congressional oversight of CFIUS 
investigations, foreign transactions continued to be reviewed in a “highly secretive” 
manner.499  Although intended to protect sensitive proprietary information, Senator 
Richard Shelby (R-AL) emphasized that this secretive process made congressional 
oversight difficult.  For example, some of the CFIUS-reviewed cases that continued to 
raise congressional concerns were: (1) the proposed acquisition of Silic n Valley Group, 
Inc. (SVG), a manufacturer of computer semiconductor lithography with military 
applications, by ASM Lithography (ASML), a Netherlands company; (2) the 2003 
proposed acquisition of a majority stake in the bankrupt Global Crossing Ltd, a fiber 
optic network provider, by Singapore Technologies Telemedia and Hutchison Whampoa 
Ltd. of Hong Kong;500 and (3) the purchase of Magnequench, Inc., a high-precision 
magnet manufacturer by a Chinese consortium. 
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The proposed acquisition of the SVG had been set for review under President 
Clinton, but SVG withdrew its proposal after intervention by the Department of Defense 
and some members of Congress.  When ASML reapplied under the George W. Bush 
Administration, the CFIUS was deadlocked at the end of the 45-day review and had to 
work overtime to reach a consensus.  Finally, the CFIUS issued a formal 
recommendation in which it conditioned approval on restructuring which included ASML 
agreeing to sell SVG’s Tinsley Laboratories, a manufacturer of optical components for 
spy satellites.501 
The Bush Administration was criticized for how it handled the ASML-SVG deal.  
Fenton suggests the “most legitimate and relevant” reasons for the cri icism were that : 
(1) the CFIUS was overstepping its bounds by evaluating both direct and indirect effects 
of an acquisition; (2) the Department of Defense was seeking to expand its influence by 
insisting upon “performance requirements” rather than agreeing to informal guarantees 
which had been acceptable in the past; (3) the Bush Administration preferred to require 
restructuring of foreign acquisitions rather than deny business opportunities; and (4) the 
committee’s decision making stalemate was caused by irreconcilable ideological 
differences.502 
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Accordingly, on February 20, 2004, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), chairman of 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Senator Sarbanes (D-MD), 
ranking member of the committee, requested another Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) study of the implementation of Exon-Florio.503  While the GAO was conducting 
its study, and prior to the release of its findings, the Chinese-controlled CNOOC was 
secretly contemplating a proposal to acquire Unocal. 
Early in 2005, when rumors surfaced that CNOOC was preparing a bid, executive 
investigation of a proposed merger still was not mandatory.  Specifically, the statute 
stated,  
The President or the President’s designee may make an investigation to 
determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and 
takeovers proposed or pending . . . by or with foreign persons which could 
result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States.504 
 
A few months later, when CNOOC formally announced its interest in Unocal, 
members of Congress were still awaiting the results of the GAO report.  General 
questions about administrative review of foreign acquisitions, uncertainty stemming from 
the secret review process, and heightened concern about national security following 
September 11 contributed to the elevation of the CNOOC proposal on the congr ssional 
policy agenda. 
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IV:  THE UNOCAL ACQUISITION CASE 
 
A.  FTC Review of ChevronTexaco’s Proposed Merger 
ChevronTexaco submitted its plan for the proposed merger to the FTC on April 4, 
2005 while the FTC was involved in an administrative hearing with Unocal ver a 
previous charge that Unocal unlawfully monopolized the market for reformulated 
gasoline meeting the specifications of the California Air Resources Board (CARB).505  
According to the FTC, the alleged monopolization resulted from Unocal misrepresenting 
its research regarding the reformulated gasoline as nonproprietary while also pursuing a 
patent on the technology.506 
In reviewing the proposed Chevron-Unocal merger, the FTC acknowledged that 
ChevronTexaco and Unocal both had extensive oil and gas operations.  But since Unocal 
did not have any refineries or gasoline stations, and few other downstream operations, the 
FTC determined “virtually all of the competitive overlaps between the two firms are in 
unconcentrated upstream markets, and the merger thus creates no competitive risk.”507  
However, the FTC warned, if ChevronTexaco acquired Unocal, and Union Oil’s 
questionably obtained patents, then ChevronTexaco would be in a position to “obtain 
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sensitive information and to claim royalties from its own horizontal downstream 
competitors.”  This, the FTC believed, would “have an adverse effect on ompetition” 
and “would inevitably have required an extensive inquiry and possible litigation.”508 
This concern was resolved by executing an Agreement Containing Consent Order 
(Consent Agreement) which became final after a 30-day public comment period.509  The 
Consent Agreement mandated that upon merging, neither ChevronTexaco nor Unocal
take any action to enforce the patents or collect royalties, includi g pending litigation; the 
order also required that Unocal would disclaim its reformulated-gasoline patents and 
release the patent information to the public.510  Because resolution of the 
patent/monopolization matter was predicated upon the ChevronTexaco-Unocal merger, a 
successful bid from another entity would require FTC to reopen the administrative 
hearing on the issue.  Since reopening the hearing would involve additional legal costs, 
many assumed it was in Unocal’s best interest to complete the merger with 
ChevronTexaco. 
The next section turns to discussion of the legal obligations ChevronTexaco had 
as a corporate entity to its shareholders, and how these obligations impo ed another 
formal constraint upon the congressional reaction to the CNOOC proposed takeover. 
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B.  ChevronTexaco Corporate Obligations to Shareholders 
The operations of business associations and corporations are largely gov rned by 
statutory law.511  The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 received almost unanimous 
acceptance and has been adopted in forty-nine states, with the exception of Louisiana.  
Since then, very few amendments have been made.  This consistency, alo g with decades 
of litigation, has given corporations a good sense of the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise and how the courts may interpret those issues.  A second statute, he Model 
Business Corporation Act, was very influential in the development of sate corporation 
statutes.  The difference between “uniform” statutes and “model statutes is that uniform 
statutes are designed to create nationwide uniformity of provisions applicable to the 
corporations, whereas model statutes suggest that jurisdictions may pick and choose from 
a template and make amendments or changes as desired.  As a result, th re is 
considerable variation in the state corporation statutes. 
Unocal’s board of directors was obligated to comply with the corporation law of 
Delaware where Unocal was legally incorporated.512  Unocal was also subject to the 
Federal laws, such as the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Code 15, § 77a et seq. which 
imposes specific requirements on corporations engaged in the public sale of securities.  
While discussion of the specific details of these statutes goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it is important to understand that Unocal’s directors we e bound by the duty 
of care and the business judgment rule adopted in Delaware. 
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In general, the standard of due care is met under corporate law iftwo tests are 
met: (1) due care must be used in “ascertaining relevant facts and law before making the 
decision,” and (2) the decision must be made after reasonable deliberation.513  The 
American Law Institute has defined the duty of care and business judgment rule as 
follows: 
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the directo ’s 
or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that 
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a 
like position and under similar circumstances. . . . 514
 
A director fulfills the duty of making a business judgment in good faith if he is “informed 
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director reasonably 
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances” and the director “rati nally believes 
that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.”515 
Under Delaware law, directors are charged with an “unyielding fiduciary duty to 
the corporation and its shareholders.”516  The rule itself is “a presumption that in making 
a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
                                                
513 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Partnerships: 
Cases and Materials, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990), 752. 
 
514 The American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations, § 4.01 (1994) cited in Robert W. Hamilton, C rporations Including 
Partnerships and Limited Partnerships: Cases and Materials, (St Paul, MN: West 




516 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Partnerships: 




faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best int rests of the 
company.”517  In regards to acquisitions, whether directors make an informed decision, in 
good faith, includes how they timed the acquisition, how it was initiated, structured, 
negotiated, disclosed to directors, and how approvals were obtained from directors and 
shareholders.  An informed decision also includes financial considerations of the 
proposed acquisition, including assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any 
other factors that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of the company’s stock.518 
Directors may be held liable for taking actions that are so improvident, or risky, a  
to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent business practices.  However, 
courts are reluctant to interfere with corporate affairs, “except in the egregious case of 
bad judgment or when there is evidence of bad faith.”519 
Although deliberations concerning the CNOOC proposed acquisition were not 
made public, the directors had a duty to give the CNOOC offer detailed nd judicious 
consideration before bringing the ChevronTexaco proposal to the stockholders f r a vote.  
Because the directors were obligated to bargain for a fair price, and to make an informed 
decision based upon the information that was available to them, they would have to 
weigh the pros and cons, the costs and benefits, of both the ChevronTexaco and CNOOC 
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proposals.  This duty of care played into the unfolding of events surrounding the Unocal 
case. 
C.  CNOOC’s Proposed Acquisition of Unocal 
 There has been a great deal of speculation as to why CNOOC would choose to 
enter the U.S. market through a takeover rather than by building a new subsidiary.  
Assuming that CNOOC was interested in profits, like most investors, it would be 
attracted to the most profitable option.  The advantage of an acquisition  that it would 
allow “relatively quick entry into a foreign market.”520  By being the first to enter a 
foreign market, investors may avoid barriers that are created by prior entry of other 
investors.  In addition, when markets are growing slowly, there is an advantage to being 
able to enter a market rapidly through an acquisition instead of forming a subsidiary.521 
Globerman and Shapiro note that corporations are motivated to invest abroad 
because of the opportunity for “enhance[ing] the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
investor.”522  Foreign investment provides “complementary assets” which “include 
marketing and distribution networks in the host country and technological and manageri l 
knowledge resident in the host country.”523  Another motive is “to exploit the investing 
firm’s competitive advantages in the host market.  Where those advantages are rooted in 
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firm-specific knowledge or other intangible assets, they are typically best exploited by 
internalizing their utilization within a wholly owned affiliate.” 524  But this usually 
requires knowledge of the host market conditions and the host country environment. 
Considering the net advantages of acquisitions, Globerman and Shapiro conclude 
that the Chinese companies are more likely to find acquisitions to be the most 
advantageous way to enter the U.S. market.525  Early in 2005, prior to the FTC hearing 
discussed above, CNOOC had commissioned a review of Unocal’s assets, and rumors 
had begun to surface that CNOOC was interested in purchasing Unocal.526  Although 
neither CNOOC nor Unocal would comment on the reports, Unocal’s stock jumped and 
analysts began to speculate as to whether CNOOC had the financial ability or managerial 
expertise to pull off such an ambitious deal.527  The possibility of a petroleum company in 
a developing country purchasing a western petroleum company with a hundred year 
history was “hot news” in the energy industry.528 
In the meantime, a number of bills which were working their way through 
Congress helped set the stage for politicizing any offer made by CNOOC.  For example, 
eleven bills had been introduced in the 108th Congress to address China’s currency peg, 
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and these bills reappeared in the 109th Congress:  S. 14 (Stabenow, D-MI), S. 295 
(Schumer, D-NY), and H.R. 1575 proposed to raise U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods by an 
additional 27.5% unless China appreciated its currency; S. 277 (Lieberman, D-CT) 
directed the president to negotiate with countries that manipulate their currency; and HR 
1216 (English, R-PN) and S. 593 (Collins, R-ME) would apply U.S. countervailing laws 
dealing with government subsidies to nonmarket economies such as China.  Early in 
April, the Senate approved Amendment 309 to S. 600, the Foreign Affairs Authorization 
Act, which would impose an additional 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese goods if China did 
not appreciate its currency to market levels.  In response to this amendment, the Senate 
leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295, with the same language, no later than July 
27, 2005 on the condition that the sponsors of the amendment would not sponsor similar 
amendments for the rest of the 109th congressional session.529 
Later in the month, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that he had placed 
China on the Special 301 Priority Watch List due to failure to increase protection of U.S. 
intellectual property rights.  The Trade Representative urged China to prosecute criminal 
piracy cases and to improve market access to products with intellectua  property rights 
protection; and it warned China that it may bring a case against it to the World Trade 
Organization for failure to enforce the intellectual property right laws. 
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The political environment surrounding U.S.-China trade issues was made worse 
for the CNOOC bid when the Treasury Department released its International Economic 
and Exchange Rate Report on May 17, 2005.  The report reinforced legislators’ fears 
regarding China’s currency by concluding that China was substantially d storting world 
markets by pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar.  The report stressed that China should 
move towards a more flexible exchange rate and that Treasury would closely monitor 
progress in this area over the next six months. 
While Congress was debating China’s trade policies, CNOOC Executiv  
Chairman Fu Chengyu’s plans to submit a bid were delayed when CNOOC’s non-
executive directors decided to hire independent advisors to review his proposal.530  Then, 
while the review was taking place, ChevronTexaco finally announced its own offer for 
Unocal on May 27, 2005.531  At that time, the possibility of a CNOOC bid was still not
off the table.  Congressional reaction to this possibility seemed unnecessary to many 
observers given that the offer had not yet been made and CFIUS review had not yet been 
triggered under the Exon-Florio Amendment.   But by the time that the CNOOC board 
voted on June 22, 2005 to counter-offer an $18.5 billion cash offer for Unocal,532 
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lawmakers in Washington had already begun questioning whether the Bush
Administration should intervene and the issue was heating up.533 
On the day following the announced bid, the Bush Administration held to the 
position that the question of a national security review was “hypothetical” because the 
transaction had not yet occurred.534  While the administration did not appear unduly 
concerned, the question permeated the media which certainly played a role in stirring up 
the controversy.  Perceiving the upcoming rivalry with CNOOC, ChevronTexaco may 
have added fuel to the debate by focusing on the fact that CNOOC is controlled and 
financed by the Chinese government and playing on fears that China would divert oil to 
China on a non-commercial basis.535 
Meanwhile, the idea that CNOOC’s bid was politically motivated, or w uld have 
an effect on U.S. security, was immediately rejected by most members of the financial 
community and China specialists.536  There are benefits to the domestic owners of assets 
acquired by foreign investors, as well as by the host country consumer .  If foreign 
owners can operate acquired assets more efficiently that the dom stic owners, they can 
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afford to bid higher prices for the assets.  It is also assumed that productivity gains 
associated with the acquisition will be passed on to the domestic consumers in the form 
of lower prices.  The stronger the domestic competition, the more likely that consumers 
will benefit.537  In spite of these advantages, the issues of political motives and threats to 
national security continued to heat up as members scrambled to draft legislation to block 
the Chinese proposal. 
D. Bills Introduced and Debated in Congress  
 
The socio-historical approach of institutional theory requires examining the 
relationships of individuals and institutions.  This considers the bills which were 
introduced in Congress after it was rumored that CNOOC was preparing  bid to 
purchase Unocal.  Examination of the legislative history gives insight into why members 
of Congress politicized this particular business transaction. 
 At the end of 2004, the U.S. Trade Representative had issued its third annual 
China WTO compliance report.  Although the report stated that China’s efforts had been 
“impressive” it reiterated that China’s performance in certain reas was less than 
satisfactory and the country had a long way to go to reach compliance.538  The main areas 
of concern included failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, undervaluing of 
the Chinese currency by pegging it to the U.S. dollar, and lack of transparency of trade 
laws.  These deficiencies continued to persist while the trade imbalance between the U.S. 
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and China continued to grow.  This caused several members of Congress to call upon the 
Bush Administration to take a more aggressive stance against China’s “u fair” trade 
policies.  At the same time, fearing a lack of executive action, a number of bills were 
introduced to mandate changes in U.S.-China trade policy.  A few of thesebills are 
relevant to the mood of Congress towards both the administration and China in 2005. 
Representative Kirkpatrick (D-AZ) staged a direct attack against the Bush 
Administration by introducing an amendment to H.R. 3055 (the FY2006 Appropriatins 
Act for various agencies) which prohibited the Department of Treasury from using funds 
to recommend approval of the sale of Unocal to CNOOC.539  But the language was rather 
extreme and was deleted by the Senate.  It was not included in the Conference Report 
which passed the House and Senate and was eventually signed into law, but Kirkpatrick 
did make her point.540 
Several other bills addressing the currency issue were introduced in the 109th 
Congress.  For example, S. 14 (Stabenow, D-MI), S. 295 (Schumer , D-NY), and H.R. 
1575 (Myrick, R-NC) directed the Treasury secretary to negotiate with China to accept a 
market-based system of currency valuation.  These bills went so far as to impose a duty 
on Chinese goods if the president were unable to certify to Congress that China had 
stopped manipulating the exchange rate and was complying with accepted market-based 
trade policies.  Although President Bush had been known to criticize China’s currency 
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peg, he had not made any progress with the issue.  On April 6, 2005, the Senate 
leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295 later in the session, and it may have passed, 
but on June 30th Senator Schumer and the other sponsors agreed to delay consideration of 
the bill after the Bush Administration informed them that China wasexpected to make 
progress on the reforming its currency.  These promises, however, did not assuage all the 
members of Congress from wanting to send a strong message to the Chinese (and the 
Bush Administration) about China’s trade policies, especially after news of the CNOOC 
bid hit the press. 
On June 17, 2005, two Republican members of Congress from California, 
Representatives Richard W. Pombo and Duncan Hunter, wrote a letter to President Bush 
stating that American companies would continue to have difficulty competing against the 
Chinese and urged the president to initiate a review based on the Defense Production Act.  
Then, on July 24, 2005, another group from the House of Representatives directed a l t r 
to the administration’s Secretary of Treasury Snow expressing co cern about China’s 
“ongoing and proposed acquisition of energy assets around the world, including assets of 
U.S.-based energy and oil companies.”  The letter stated specific issues for CFIUS to 
review in order to protect U.S. energy security. 
While ChevronTexaco may have been lobbying the California congressional 
delegation to intervene in the hostile bid, Exxon Mobil Chief Executive Lee Raymond 
warned against legislative interference.  “To the extent that they preclude the Chinese 
from buying assets here, it could easily come back and reflect that we won’t be able to 
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buy assets in a foreign country.”541  According to Vice President for International 
Economic Affairs for the National Association of Manufacturers Frank Vargo, American 
businesses “have our issues with China, but investing in the U.S. is not one f them.”542  
Similarly, Liu Jianchao, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, claimed that it was 
a “corporate issue” and that he could not comment on the case, however h  
“encourage[d] the U.S. to allow normal trade relations to take place without political 
interference.”543  In fact, Beijing energy consultant, He Jun, warned that if the United 
States “treats China as a threat, it will inevitably have to find its own path to meet its 
energy needs.”544  This, of course, would be contrary to the Bush Administration’s 
interest in discouraging China from cultivating energy deals with “rogue” states. 
On the other hand, Peter Robertson, Chevron-Texaco’s vice-chairman, accused 
the Chinese of not competing fairly.  “Clearly, this is not a commercial competition,” he 
stated.  “We are competing with the Chinese government, and I think that is wrong.”545  
Robertson also contended that Chevron was in a better position to develop Unocal’s 
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assets than CNOOC.  He also hinted that CNOOC had less than honorable intentions and 
might “steer natural gas produced in Indonesia to the Chinese market” rather than the 
broader Asian market.546  Of course, this kind of comment from a rival company in a 
merger and acquisition is not surprising.  Todd M. Malan, executive director of the 
Organization for International Investment, a Washington association that represents U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, warned 
If our process is viewed as merely a proxy for Chevron’s views or subject 
to political intervention, and not a true national security review, then w  
ought to be prepared for that to happen when a U.S. company wants to 
make an investment in China.547 
 
Meanwhile, the Bush Administration continued to avoid taking a position on the 
issue.  Secretary John W. Snow told the Senate Finance Committee that the question of a 
national security review was “hypothetical” because the transaction had not yet occurred, 
and Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, made no comment.548  This 
perceived lack of interest, or support, from the administration was not well received by 
Finance Committee members from both political parties.  For example, Senator Ron 
Weyden (D-OR) was put off by the administration’s diffidence, while Senator Jim 
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Bunning (R-KY) said that the administration had made little progress in negotiations over 
China trade policy, complaining that the CFIUS told them “to take a hike.”549 
In spite of the sentiments of those on the Senate Finance Committee, it is unlikely 
that the president was just brushing the issue aside.  In fact, the proposed acquisition put 
the Bush Administration in a difficult position.  Responding to a push by conservatives, 
President Bush had been taking a harder line toward China than previous presidents.  At 
the same time that the CNOOC bid had became a hot issue, the Pentagon and Defense 
Department had been criticizing China for increasing its military spending while failing 
to use economic pressure to convince North Korea to end its nuclear program.  On the 
economic front, Secretary Snow had already informed Congress about negotiations to 
convince the Chinese to change their currency policy.  In the administration’s view, it 
would be counterproductive to take punitive action against China.550 
Congress was not convinced and on June 30, 2005 the House passed H.Res. 
344551  The resolution expressed the sense of the House of Representatives “that a
Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of critical United States energy 
infrastructure and energy production capacity could take action that would threaten to 
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impair the national security of the United States.”552  Pursuant to the House rules, Mr. 
Ney (R-OH) and Ms. Kilpatrick (D-AZ) each controlled 20 minutes on the floor.  Mr. 
Ney supported the immediate adoption of the resolution which asked that the president 
initiate a thorough review of any potential takeover of Unocal by CNOOC “as soon as 
any agreement of such a takeover is announced.”553  He justified the action on the 
grounds that in times of rising energy prices “ready access to energy resources is a vital 
element” to economic and national security.  Furthermore, he cited diff rences in how a 
“Communist government” and the U.S. government interpret trade agreements.  He 
suggested that the Chinese government sees treaties as “the starting point for negotiation” 
whereas the U.S. government views treaties as “documents that must be adhered to.”554  
As a consequence, Mr. Ney was “skeptical” that CNOOC would honor assu ances to 
dedicate regional oil production to American consumption.  In his view, CNOOC’s 
proposal was a means of perpetuating China’s unfair trade practices which would 
threaten security “by holding out the prospect that every drop of oil, every unit of natural 
gas produced by that company could end up being shipped to China.”555 
Ms. Kilpatrick testified to her bipartisan support for not spending any money for a 
“Communist-owned” company and not supporting further loss of technology t  the 
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Chinese when they do not protect intellectual property rights.  Her primary concern was 
protecting American business.556  Similarly, the chairman of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Mr. Barton (R-TX), supported the resolution because of the lack of 
reciprocity in Chinese law which “does not allow a foreign company to have a controlling 
interest in a company in China.”  He was also concerned that the mon y for the purchase 
was coming from a government loan which would more than double the debt.557 
On the other hand, Mr. Moran (D-VA) stated he did not oppose CFIUS review of 
the contract.  Although he said he “[could] not stand State-controlled economies,” he 
opposed Congress taking actions that would encourage the Chinese to invest in 
governments that are a threat to the U.S.  He also expressed the opinion that Chinese 
acquisition of Unocal, which produced only one percent of U.S. oil and gas, would n t 
constitute a threat to national security.  Furthermore, he reminded Congress that the U.S. 
oil companies have drilling rights in China, off the coast, and “all over th  world.”  If 
Congress were to pass this resolution and others like it, it would interfere with free 
enterprise and the free global economy.  He suggested that CNOOC’s American educated 
CEO understood the market system,  CNOOC had a good track record, and unlike its 
competitor, ChevronTexaco, would preserve American jobs.558 
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Mr. Paul (R-TX) indicated reservations over legislation in which the federal 
government was “involving itself in the sale of a private American ompany” with 
shareholders and a board of directors.  Rather than creating security problems, he argued 
that “international trade and economic activity tends to diminish tensions.”559  Similarly, 
Mr. Pete Stark (D-CA) opposed the resolution, claiming that the Republican Majority 
which “has already sold the entire farm to foreign central b nks and multinational 
corporations” was now trying to blame the Chinese for our dependence on foreign oil.  
He used his time to boast that he had “proudly voted for renewable energy” and 
legislation that supported American workers.560  This was an important statement to 
interject since California voters were heavily dependent upon positive trade relationship 
with China, but were also suffering from increasing gasoline prices. 
The Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), 
supported the attempt to block the sale because it involved “a strategic sset and a 
strategic lever for Communist China.”561  Mr. Michael Capuano (D-MA) stated that it 
was a good resolution, but pointed out that CNOOC’s bid for Unocal was not the 
“elephant in the room.”  The real issue, he felt, was the exponential increase in the debt 
owed to China, and the jobs, money and economic power we were sending overseas.  Mr. 
Robin Hayes (R-NC) emphasized the “strong signal” the legislation would send to China 
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– that the U.S. would no longer stand for the loss of jobs, currency manipul tion, and 
violation of intellectual property rights that were harming American busines.562  Mr. Earl 
Blumenauer (D-OR) also stressed the need to get our “fiscal house in order” and stop 
making loans to the Chinese.  He voiced the fear held by others that the Chinese might 
start dumping our bonds and cause havoc with fiscal policy.563 
Mr. J.D. Hayworth (R-AZ) called on his peers to put aside “campaign screed that 
would criticize the opposing party” and “find some common agreement, apart from the 
grandstanding and campaigning that is so easily enjoined.”564  Yet, Ms. Marcy Kaptur 
(D-OH) could not resist the temptation to state that “America has lost her independence” 
and the economy is worse under the current president.565  Mr. Bill Jefferson (D-LA) took 
this opportunity to praise the fact that he had “supported free trade” since he had been in 
Congress and was continuing to do so with this resolution. He stated that the more China 
seeks control over assets for themselves, the more difficult it will become for the U.S. to 
claim it is a free, market-based economy.566 
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Mr. Michael Oxley (R-OH) refocused the debate on the fact that CFIUS review 
was a slow process and that as chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over the 
Defense Production Act,567 he felt it was critical that the administration act quickly.  He 
then recited a number of statistics relating to China’s increased oil consumption and 
emphasis on “owning the import oil at the production point” which threatens the free 
market.568  This concluded the debate and the vote was taken.  The measure passed by a 
vote of 398 to 15.  The speed with which the resolution moved through the House and th
strong majority vote was testimony to the skill of the sponsors as well as to the timeliness 
of the issue. 
Less than two weeks later, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing 
on the proposed CNOOC-Unocal merger.  In his opening remarks on July 13th, Duncan 
Hunter (R-CA) addressed the issue of whether review of the CNOOC-Unocal merger was 
outside the scope of national security reviews normally conducted by Congress.  He said 
it was within their jurisdiction because “energy is a strategic commodity” and the 
infrastructure, drilling rights, and exploration capabilities that Unocal uses to bring 
energy to the open market represent strategic assets.  Even though Unocal was a small 
producer in the U.S., Hunter said that the fact that the company was a major provider of 
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natural gas in South East Asia and a primary investor in Central Asi n oil pipelines 
contributed to its strategic importance.569 
In addition, Hunter seemed offended by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s “demand 
that the U.S. Congress correct its mistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues 
and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between ent rprises of the two 
countries.”570  On the other hand, ranking minority member Ike Skelton (D-MO) noted 
that the hearing was taking the committee into uncharted territory and even though he 
was sure no one wanted to impair the nation’s security, he cautioned committee members 
that the CNOOC acquisition was just a “theoretical possibility” not an inevitability since 
Unocal could accept ChevronTexaco’s offer.571 
Emphasizing that Congress is accountable to the American people, not the 
Chinese government, Hunter called upon the first witness, R. James Woolsey, former 
director of Central Intelligence, for his testimony.  Woolsey tated that China is the most 
dominant dictatorship in the world and the strategic task of the Communist Party is “to 
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secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy to build 
modernized, regularized, revolutionary armed forces.”572 
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Jr., President and CEO of the neoconservative Center for 
Security Policy, followed by stating that it would be “folly to abet” Communist China’s 
efforts to acquire more of the world’s finite resources.  If demand for oil were to grow at 
the projected rate of 60 percent, then the U.S. and China are on a “collision course.”  
Although the Chinese said the proposal was a “purely commercial transaction,” Gaffney 
saw it as an “ominous” long-term, global strategy to dominate strategic energy 
resources.573  To support his case, Gaffney suggested that CNOOC’s willingness to pay 
above market prices only makes sense from a strategic perspective.  In advising 
Congress, Gaffney indicated that the strategic nature of Unocal’s business and the 
legislative intent of Exon-Florio to interpret the statute broadly made CFIUS review 
mandatory.  However, Gaffney reiterated that review should not take plc until the issue 
is ripe, which in this case would be after the August 10, 2005 shareholder decision. 
Gaffney also reiterated the flaws in Exon-Florio, including lack of transparency in 
the process and Congress’s failure to give itself oversight power.  Since Congress has 
exclusive power over commerce with foreign states under the Constitution, Gaffney 
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recommended that Congress proceed to change the statute.  On the other hand, Mr. Jerry 
Taylor, Director of Natural Resources Studies at the libertarian Cato Institute, argued that 
fears are “ill-founded” that the CNOOC transaction would harm natio l security by 
making the U.S. more dependent upon foreign oil or by giving China a weapon to use 
against the U.S.574  As an economist, he suggested that supply disruptions would increase 
prices regardless of where they occur.  Physical access to oil is irrelevant because oil is 
available in world spot and futures markets.  There are very few long-term contracts, and 
even if there were, long-term contracts provide no guarantees that they may not be 
broken, or that assets may be nationalized.  If physical access were important, Mr. Taylor 
suggested, other oil companies would have gotten into a bidding war against CNOOC.  
But Mr. Taylor identified several reasons why they did not.  First, the oil that might be 
diverted to China would only displace what would have been imported otherwise.  
Second, Unocal’s production was only about 0.23% of global production and would have 
very little impact on the world market.  Third, China and the U.S. havethe same interest 
in low prices, and in fact, high prices would hurt China more than the U.S. because its 
economy cannot respond to price spikes as efficiently as the U.S. economy.575 
When asked whether Mr. Taylor believed any of China’s acquisitions of foreign 
corporations were strategic, Mr. Taylor responded that they were economically strategic.  
He did not find it surprising that the Chinese government would want to diversify its 
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investments away from U.S. debt and move towards investing in U.S. assets.  In support 
of his belief that the Unocal acquisition would not be a threat, Mr. Taylor stated that the 
U.S. holds $105 billion worth of China’s assets while China only has $8 billion of U.S. 
assets.  Purely economic arguments led others to challenge Mr. Taylor’s ssumptions and 
expertise.  Mr. Hunter argued that even though this one acquisition would only impact “a 
quarter of one percent of world production” additional acquisitions could appro ch 5 
percent or 10 percent and that could cause a spike in price.  Admitting that 5 percent 
would be significant, Mr. Taylor expressed the opinion that “It’s hard to imagine 
[CNOOC] putting together that kind of portfolio.”  “Historically,” he said, “reserves are 
primarily controlled by producer states regardless of contract, and they’re not generally 
controlled by those with contractual rights to exploit and sell.”576 
Mr. Woolsey then commented that Mr. Taylor was an energy analyst with 
“blinders on” and not a defense analyst.  This led Mr. Weldon to interject that the real 
concern in the CNOOC-Unocal debate was China’s growing military c pability.  In fact, 
the Cox Commission on which he served several years earlier concluded by a 9-0 vote 
that U.S. security was being harmed severely by China’s acquisition of American 
technology.  Mr. Taylor agreed that “acquisition of military technology would be 
worrisome,” but to his knowledge Unocal technology did not have any military 
application and nothing was proprietary – anything Unocal had in the oil sector was 
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available through contractors and private vendors.  If there were any military applications 
or proprietary technology, he said that a security review would provide restrictions. 
The Armed Services Committee hearing turned into a heated debate regarding 
U.S.-China trade policy and whether America was making progress towards democracy, 
openness and transparency in China by assuming such a large trade deficit. Mr. Taylor 
continued to emphasize that only “marginal producers can affect world price” for oil and 
the only scenario he could conceive in which China would be a marginal producer would 
be if it physically occupies Middle East oil reserves or developed an unknown field.  But 
Mr. Woolsey stressed that the U.S. may be on a “collision course” with China – 
depending upon China’s domestic situation, Chinese leaders may “look for a foreign 
enemy.”  Mr. Gaffney agreed saying that Chinese leaders have been saying for years that 
“war with the U.S. is inevitable.”  Senator D’Amato agreed with what come called an 
“alarmist view” and reiterated that little progress had been made between the U.S. and 
China on major issues such as currency, intellectual property rights, subsidization, and 
arms proliferation. 
Mr. Taylor countered that military analysts have a history of overestimating 
capabilities of other countries, just as the CIA did with the Soviet Union.  He stressed that 
“every country on the planet” has similar goals of “a robust economy,” and they will “use 
their military and their national self-interest” to achieve it.  Attempting perhaps to lower 
the intensity of the debate, Representative Vic Snyder (D-AR) quoted Dr. Schlessinger 
who said “If you call someone an enemy often enough, they will become y ur enemy.”  
“And China is not our enemy today,” said Snyder. 
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Woolsey continued to take the stance that China’s economic growth was 
dependent upon an aggressive military strategy.  He quoted Zhu Feng, security expert at 
Beijing University, to make his point: 
Many people argue that oil interests are the driving force behind the Iraq 
war.  For China, it has been a reminder and a warming about how 
geopolitical changes can affect its energy issues.  So China has decided to 
focus much more intently to address its security. 
 
 Walter Jones (D-NC) brought up a Washington Times article which quoted an 
unidentified energy advisor to the Chinese government as saying, “No matter if it’s a 
rogue oil or a friend’s oil, we don’t care. . . . Anyone who helps China w th energy is our 
friend.”577  Bringing the hearing back to the issue of the role of CFIUS in the proposed 
Unocal bid, Jones’ stated his opinion that Congress had abdicated its constitutional 
authority too many times.  He emphasized how the loss of 1.5 million jobs to China 
demonstrates that Congress and the administration need to “do what we c n to influence 
this sale if it comes about.” 
Mr. D’Amato agreed.  “The most important thing we can do is defend our own 
interests.”  He went on to say that “Congress has exclusive and complete power to 
regulate these transactions if it so chose, because it has the sole authority under the 
constitution to do so.”  In his opinion, “the behavior of CFIUS over the years needs 
complete review and I think that the power over foreign commerce needs to be re-exerted 
by this body.”  This statement sums up the issue underlying the Committee’s four hour 
debate and points to the primary reason behind Congress’s politicization of the Unocal 
                                                




bid.  That is, members of Congress were concerned about the efficacy of the Exon-Florio 
Amendment and whether it was being implemented in a manner that would balance the 
opposing interests of maintaining an open trade policy while protecting the nation’s 
security. 
While the House was debating its concerns about CNOOC’s bid for Unocal and 
the issues surrounding presidential interpretation of the Exon-Florio Amendment, the 
Senate was working on its own legislation.  On July 15, 2005, Senator Byr n Dorgan (D-
ND) introduced Senate Bill 1412.  Some of the highlights of the debate included concerns 
that CNOOC was a state-controlled corporation, the Chinese government provided 
CNOOC with deep subsidies which diminished competitveness of American 
corporations, the Chinese government did not grant U.S. businesses reciprocal treatment 
regarding acquisitions of Chinese companies, the CFIUS review process was inadequate, 
and that, in spite of all these concerns, free trade with China should remain a priority.578 
The rhetoric in Congress was intense, but perhaps the most decisive factor for the 
Chinese was when Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 towards the end of 
July.  As enacted, section 1837 required a national security review of international energy 
requirements.  Specifically relating to the CNOOC offer was a clause that the findings 
concerning China’s growing energy needs were to be reported to both Congress and the 
President not more than 120 days after enactment of the Energy Polic Act.  This 
provision prevented any instrumentality, including CFIUS, from concluding a national 
security review concerning an investment in energy assets of any U.S. owned corporation 
                                                




by any entity owned or controlled by China until 21 days after the report was submitted 
and the President had certified receipt of the report.579  This restriction was so prohibitive 
that CNOOC could not compete with ChevronTexaco, even with the offer of more 
money.  With no other recourse, CNOOC withdrew its bid on August 2, 2005. 
Afterwards, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) released the following 
statement. 
There was nothing wrong with CNOOC taking over Unocal and for that 
reason I didn’t oppose the merger.  But the furor over China treating 
American companies and workers unfairly up and down the line is real. 
And while it led to an incorrect result in this case, it must be dealt with.  
For instance China likely wouldn’t allow an American company to buy a 
similarly situated Chinese company.  If China were open to American 
companies buying Chinese companies, I think CNOOC would have had a 
much easier time of it.580 
 
 Speaking from the House, Representative Pombo (R-CA) issued a statement that 
“CNOOC’s withdrawal from this bidding process is good news for the fre  market, the 
American consumer and U.S. national security.”581  He stated that it was “pure irony that 
Congress expressed near-unanimous concern” over the CNOOC bid while many
legislators continue to oppose efforts such as development in ANWR, to increase our 
domestic energy supplies.  It was clear that Mr. Pombo used this opportunity to promote 
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his own political agenda, but it is unclear as to whether his personal interests were in the 
best interest of U.S.-China foreign policy. 
E.  How Politicization of CNOOC Bid Helped Expedite Exon-Florio Reform 
 Pursuant to law, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
released its Third Annual Report to Congress on November 9, 2005. The statute 
mandates that the Commission “monitor and investigate and report to Congress on the 
national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China.” 582  In doing so, the Commission 
adhered to the central principle that “economic health and well-being are a fundamental 
national security matter” and that during the year, the CNOOC proposed acquisition of 
Unocal highlighted that linkage.583  The report further states that “far too little, if any” 
progress was made in balancing economic and security issues during 2005.  
 On February 28, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 556  
to ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the 
creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such 
investments are examined for any effect they may have on national 
security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the Unit d 
States, and for other purposes.584 
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The requirement to report on U.S-China trade relations was in place years before 
Congress passed the 2005 Energy Policy Act with the more explicit requirement 
concerning review of U.S. energy assets owned or controlled by China.  For this reason, 
some might argue that the stipulation in the Energy Policy Act was unnecessary, that is, if 
it were not for the fact that Congress felt powerless to force the President to act 
expeditiously on the proposed CNOOC bid. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“ Foreign policy issues are most pronounced when there is a serious conflict 
between domestic and international interests.”585  In the CNOOC case, heightened 
concern about America’s vulnerability and the concern for increased national security 
efforts conflicted with business interests in free trade and the pot ntial impact of trade 
restrictions on the domestic economy.  Legislators took advantage of this conflict in 2005 
to politicize the CNOOC bid for Unocal and make long-sought changes i the president’s 
authority under the Exon-Florio Amendment.  Congress’s political strength ruled the day, 
in spite of CNOOC’s extensive planning and reliance upon experienced American 
strategists. 
Most analysts agree that American-educated CNOOC Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer Fu Chengyu was the motivating force behind the bid for Unocal.  Of 
China’s three oil companies, CNOOC was in the best position to take on Wall Street.  
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The company was not too large, but had a number of exploration and production joint 
ventures with foreign oil companies, including Chevron, operating off the China coast.  
Half of its eight board members were non-executive directors and were foreigners.  
According to Fu, even though a state-owned parent owned the majority interest in the 
company, it was run “no differently than Western companies” whose motivati ns “are 
purely commercial.”586 
But not all the CNOOC board members were one hundred percent behind the 
proposed acquisition.  When the acquisition was first conceptualized, executive board 
members consisted of CEO Fu Chengyu, CFO Mark Qiu (an investment banker), 
CNOOC President Zhou Shouwei, and CNOOC Vice President Luo Han.  Zhou started 
as an engineer in 1982 before being appointed to the board in 1999 and becoming 
president in 2002.  Luo represented CNOOC in its offshore production joint venture wi h 
Chevron and Eni. 
The board also included four independent nonexecutive directors in accord n e 
with Hong Kong stock market regulations where CNOOC, Ltd. is listed.  The 
independents were Kenneth Courtis, professor of economics and Asia vice chairman at 
Goldman Sachs; Erwin Schurtenberger, former ambassador to China who resigned in 
April and was replaced by Aloysius Tse, former partner at KPMG; Royal Dutch/Shell 
executive Evert Henkes; and Australian solicitor Chiu Hong Sung. 
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Mr. Fu selected Charles Li, a senior banker at J.P. Morgan who had worked at 
CNOOC in the 1970s and had assisted with tapping into Western capital markets, as a 
key player in planning the Unocal bid.  After learning English as a young man, Mr. Li 
received a scholarship to attend the University of Alabama where he arned a Masters 
degree in journalism.  Then after earning a law degree at Columbia University, he was 
hired by Brown & Wood which had a China practice.  While working at Brown & Wood, 
Mr. Li did some work for Merrill Lynch & Co. and was later rec uited to join Merrill as a 
banker.  During this time he worked on a secondary offering of China Mobile, a 
landmark deal, which caught the attention of J.P Morgan. It was after moving to J.P. 
Morgan, that Mr. Li first thought about putting together CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.587 
With his experience, Mr. Li recognized that there are hurdles to cross in putting 
together mergers and acquisitions, and Washington is one hurdle that must be considered.  
CNOOC’s team consisted of foreign advisors, including Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & 
Field, a Dallas law firm with ties to both political parties, which was selected to lead the 
effort in Washington.  Late in 2004, Goldman Sachs joined the CNOOC team with Bill 
Wicker, the new head of Asian investment banking, leading the charge.  The Brunswick 
Group, a media-strategy firm, was hired for its specialization in mergers and acquisitions.  
Public Strategies Inc. of Austin was selected to handle communicatio s because of its 
close ties to the Bush Administration.  The “point person” for Public Strategies, Mark 
Palmer, was an expert in crisis communications and emphasized the importance of 
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“getting people to see the business rational for this proposed merger.”588  In addition to 
the communications advisors, CNOOC hired two law firms, Davis Polk & Wardwell and 
Herbert Smith of Hong Kong.  The independent directors, who expressed concerns about 
the proposal, were advised by investment bank N.M. Rothschild & Sons, consulting firm 
CRA International, and law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.589 
In spite of the heavy hitters and the ties to the Bush Administration, the CNOOC 
team was not able to overcome the political backlash in Congress.  The timing might 
have been better if it had not been for ChevronTexaco’s announced bid.  This action 
forced CNOOC to go public with a hostile bid during a politically volatile time.  Just as 
the Senate Finance Committee was holding its hearings on U.S.-China economic 
relations, the Bush Administration was pushing Congress to pass the 2005 Energy Policy 
Act.  U.S.-China trade relations and security policies were at the center of the legislative 
agenda and the CNOOC bid was being introduced as an example in debate after debate.  
In this way, the timing of the CNOOC bid for Unocal played into the hands of key 
legislators, some of whom had been trying for years to muster support for strengthening 
the Exon-Florio.  After 41 members of Congress called for CFIUS review of the 
proposal, Fu Chengyu attempted to neutralize opposition to the bid by writing a letter to 
Congress stating: 
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We know this bid is historic for both companies and will be closely 
scrutinized by everyone involved.  I want you to know we encourage that 
review and welcome opportunity to participate.590 
 
But CNOOC’s effort to go through the CFIUS process was not enough to overcome the 
anger and mistrust that had been brewing among various legislators and within different 
congressional committees.  Not only did CNOOC have the disadvantage of taking the 
brunt of criticism for all of the perceived shortcomings in U.S.-China trade negotiations, 
it also suffered from misunderstanding and mistrust of a political and economic system 
based on different assumptions and values.  
Even those legislators who were supportive of the achievements that China had 
made in opening up to the West, modernizing its society, and integrating into the global 
economy, found a common platform for opposing the CNOOC acquisition.  They wer  
united in their concern that the Exon-Florio Amendment was no longer effective in the 
post-9/11 world.  By failing to define national security, granting the pr sident broad 
discretionary powers to interpret the amendment, and being complacent bout reporting 
responsibilities, Congress had abdicated its powers under the Commerce Clause.  The 
combination of Congress’s desire to take back power from the executive branch and 
strengthen its oversight authority, along with political pressure to mandate that China 
adopt democratic values and the rule of law, and fears that the Chinese government was 
scheming to overtake the U.S. as a world hegemony created a “perfect storm” resulting in 
the demise of CNOOC’s first foray into the U.S. oil industry. 
  
                                                










IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNOCAL CASE FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKING 
 
 
In 2005, when Chinese-owned CNOOC proposed a hostile bid to acquire 
American-owned Unocal it sparked an unexpected clash of events analogous t  a “perfect 
storm” in Washington.  The expediency with which Congress reacted to CNOOC’s bid 
provided a unique opportunity for observing and analyzing how U.S. foreign policy is 
made and implemented.  This study adopted the theoretical approach of new 
institutionalism as a means of understanding and explaining the roles that executive and 
legislative branches play in forming, implementing, and overseeing foreign policy 
initiatives. 
New institutionalism emerged in response to the shortcomings of the realist 
approach which focuses on the interaction of nation-states and diminishes the 
significance of political values and collective choice in making foreign policy.  In 
adopting the institutional approach, the analysis is redirected to the interaction between 
institutions and institutional actors.  The study assumes that institutions are infused with 
values over time and the consistency provided by society’s acceptan  of these values 
creates both a sense of security for the populace as well as an obstacle for policy makers 
who are confronted with the need to adapt to changing global environments.  The 
theory’s explanatory power is particularly applicable in a new millennium characterized 
by China’s explosive growth and increased influence over the global economy, 
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America’s phobia about China’s potential for global dominance, and an unprecedented 
sense of vulnerability to terrorist attacks. 
 Although there have been efforts within the institutional school to bifurcate the 
theory, this study focused on an integrated approach by adopting core elem nts of the 
historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches to new institutionalism.  The basic 
premises were as follows: 
(1)  An institution’s history is important because it creates values which 
become imbedded in the system. 
(2)  Actors attempt to make rational decisions but the maximization of utility 
is often compromised by the democratic decision making process. 
(3)  Due to formal constraints, political actors will try to identify informal 
mechanisms for accomplishing their policy goals. 
(4)  The success of a policy initiative in the U.S. Congress is dependent upon a 
variety of factors, including public awareness, constituent support, party support, 
presidential support, and timing. 
In the American system of governance, the Constitution is fundament l.  It grants 
separate powers to Congress, the president, and the judiciary.  It also incorporates a 
system of “checks and balances” to keep any one of the three institut ons from becoming 
too powerful.  As a result, policy making is often fragmented, ineffici nt, and difficult to 
predict.  This was the case in 2005 when Congress was struggling with drafting 
legislation that would balance conflicting objectives in the areas of open trade, 
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comparative advantage in a global economy, intellectual property rights pro ection, 
natural resource development, and national security. 
Achieving balance in the American political system is complicated by the 
separation of powers among the institutionalizations of the president, th  legislature, and 
the judiciary.  Over the years, both the presidency and Congress have gained autonomy 
and have become more complex while preserving coherence and the ability to adapt to 
change — elements that have strengthened the institutions without diminishing the 
possibility that at any point in time one institution may dominate policy making.  The 
struggle between the institutions of the presidency and Congress is an on-going process.  
At the same time, exogenous factors may arise that create windo s of opportunity for 
one of the institutions to assert its authority over the other.  But the system constantly 
seeks balance.  Therefore, whenever the power is weighted towards one in titution, actors 
in the less dominant institution will look for a window of opportunity to rebalance the 
system.  Since windows of opportunity are temporary moments in time, political actors 
must be prepared to act when the conditions are ripe. 
After 9/11, the president was in a position of strength for implementing foreign 
policy initiatives.  The shock of the terrorist attacks combined with President Bush’s 
strong rhetoric and decisive actions elevated his popularity to unprecedented levels in 
American politics.  This gave him a clear advantage in pushing is political agenda 
through Congress, especially when the policies were concerned national security.  
President Bush’s managerial style also served to place the White House and his cabinet in 
a position to gain strong control over foreign policy decision making.  Strong control 
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over communications networks and relationships with the media also contributed to the 
President Bush’s political success. 
However, by 2005, when the CNOOC bid leaked to the press, the president’s 
ratings were beginning to fall and support for him in Congress was no lo ger 
unconditional.  Political capital earned after 9/11 had been spent and Americans were 
questioning policies that did not accomplish their stated goals, such a the failure to find 
the weapons of mass destruction which had provided the rational for the war in Iraq and 
failure of the Office of Homeland Security to provide first responder relief to victims of 
Hurricane Katrina.  It was amid events such as these that key legislators in Congress 
found an opportunity in the CNOOC bid for demonstrating how presidents had 
misinterpreted the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment and the 1992 Byrd Amendment and 
thereby failed to comply with the statutory intent of protecting Americans, their 
resources, their economy, and their national security. 
Senators Shelby (R) and Sarbanes (D) had suspected these shortcomings when 
they asked for a GAO study of the president’s implementation of Ex n-Florio a year 
earlier in 2004.  This type of request would not have been unusual coming from the 
opposite party as the president’s.  However, in this case, it was a bipartisan request 
symbolizing an informal mechanism, permitted rather than required by the law, which 
could serve to undermine the president’s performance and give Congress a politic l 
advantage in shaping foreign investment decisions.   
It is significant to this analysis that key Republicans joined with Democrats to 
introduce legislation that would force the president’s hand in blocking the CNOOC 
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transaction.  House Resolution 344 was purely a political move.  It was a non-binding 
resolution on the part of one chamber in Congress to take a foreign policy stand, to make 
a statement to the administration about how the United States should handle foreign 
acquisitions of American corporations.  The sponsors of the bill played on the public’s 
heightened awareness of the nation’s vulnerabilities in an effort to in imidate the Chinese 
to drop their proposal and consider making other foreign policy concessions.  Support for 
the resolution was overwhelming and it did make an impression on the Chinese 
government – at least to the extent that Beijing expressed indignation over political 
intervention in the business transaction even though Chinese leaders wer loath to admit 
that inexperience in capitalist markets may have contributed to the failed hostile takeover. 
Although H.R. 344 received the most attention in the media, various other bills 
debated in the 109th Congress focused on China.  In analyzing the debates, it was obvious 
that individual members in Congress had varying concerns about China’s foreign 
policies, ranging from human rights to currency pegs and from intellectual property rights 
to a military build-up.  It also became obvious that the CNOOC acquisition was being 
used as an example of the weaknesses in the Exon-Florio process, the need to reform the 
statute, and the need for Congress to rein in the discretionary powers granted to the 
president.  Some of the changes members were suggesting were to sp cify timelines for 
presidential action, to increasing agency reporting requirements, a d to improve 
opportunities for overall congressional oversight of CFIUS implementatio  of the 
president’s statutory authority. 
260 
 
Another reason for members to support legislation blocking the CNOOC deal was 
revealed through analysis of the hearings and testimony.  This was the desire to support 
American businesses and American jobs and to discourage economic competiti n with 
China.  Even if CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal was based on purely economic, rather 
than political motives, the outcome was to the benefit of American-owned 
ChevronTexaco.  In its 2005 Annual Report, ChevronTexaco announced that the 
company had achieved annual earnings of $14.1 billion, the highest in its history.  This 
achievement was partially due to successful integration of Unocal’s exploration and 
production operations which enhanced the company’s portfolio of assets in areas of 
strategic importance. 
In the previous two years, ChevronTexaco’s portfolio had declined at a higher 
rate.  The company claimed this had been due to damage to facilities and infrastructure 
by hurricanes and tropical storms and to the sale of nonstrategic properties.  This 
downward trend was offset by acquiring Unocal and properties that complimented and 
enhanced ChevronTexaco’s position in the Gulf of Mexico and Permian Basi . During 
the first five months after the acquisition, ChevronTexaco reported th  net daily 
production from former Unocal properties, averaged 53,000 barrels of crude oil and 
natural gas liquids and 360 million cubic feet natural gas, or 113,000 barrels on an oil 
equivalent basis.591 
ChevronTexaco claims its U.S. portfolio was “anchored by mature assets” in the 
United States and Gulf of Mexico and was improved by disposing of nonstrategic assets 
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such as Unocal’s offshore assets in Canada.  Already the largest holder of natural gas 
resources in Australia, ChevronTexaco gained additional exploration blocks through the 
Unocal acquisition. There were other benefits of the acquisition. For instance, 
ChevronTexaco held 10.3% working interest in Azerbayan International Operating 
Company (AIOC) and acquired 8.9% equity interest in the pipeline which transports 
AIOC production from Baku Azerbaijian through Georgia to deep water port facilities in 
Ceyhan, Turkey.  ChevronTexaco also acquired interest in 3 producti n sharing contracts 
in Bangladesh encompassing more than 3.5 million acres and by earl  2006 
ChevronTexaco supplied 20% of Bangladesh’s natural gas market.592 
These downstream acquisitions complimented ChevronTexaco’s strategies for 
upstream businesses, that is, to “grow profitability in core areas, build new legacy 
positions, and commercialize natural resource base by targeting North American and 
Asian Markets.”593  Unocal’s upstream portfolio of assets bolstered ChevronTexaco’s 
position in the Asian-Pacific, Gulf of Mexico and Caspian regions.   
From the perspective of ChevronTexaco, the politicization of CNOOC’s proposed 
acquisition in 2005 certainly benefited the American corporation’s busines  interests. 
Yet, the efforts of so many members of the 109th Congress to politicize the Unocal case 
so as to facilitate reform of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment stalled after CNOOC 
withdrew its bid in August of 2005.  Nonetheless, the actions of key legislators were not 
in vain as the stage was set for the proponents of reform to continue their mission during 
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the second session in 2006.  Advocates for Exon-Florio reform had stirred up the 
necessary momentum for mandating institutional change by shifting foreign policy 
decision making powers back toward the legislative arena while giving Congress greater 
oversight over foreign acquisitions of American corporations. 
The coup de grâce for overcoming institutional resistance to change in th  balance 
of power between the presidency and Congress came when Congress lea ned through the 
media, rather than the president, that United Arab Emirates-owned Dubai Ports World 
was in the process of purchasing Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
(P&O).  The London-based P&O was the world’s fourth largest port operator with 
operations in over twenty U.S. ports from Maine to Texas.  The port operat r was 
responsible for securing cargo coming in and out of ports, the port facilities themselves, 
and the hiring of security personnel.  The proposed transaction would transfer control of 
substantial terminal functions at America’s major East and Gulf Coast ports to Dubai 
Ports World. 
In consideration of the port operator’s critical functions, on Monday, February 13, 
2006, Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Tom Coburn (R-OK), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), 
and Chris Dodd (D-CT) joined Representatives Chris Shays (R-CT), Vito Fosselia (R-
NY), and Mark Foley (R-FL) in sending a bipartisan letter to Treasury Secretary John 
Snow urging immediate CFIUS review and scrutiny of security issues as required by law.  
The letter cited the requirement that “the President or his designee investigate the impact 
on national security of a foreign acquisition if the acquisition ‘could result in control of a 
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national 
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security of the United States.’”  It emphasized that the “country’s maritime ports are 
critical to our national security, vital to our military capability, and essential to our 
economy.  Some ninety-five percent of all goods imported to the U.S. arrive through our 
ports.”  Furthermore, the letter noted that Dubai “has been named as a key transfer point 
for shipments of nuclear components that were shipped to Iran, North Korea, and Libya . 
. . and the UAE was one of only 3 countries (including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) that 
recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.”  On February 27, 
2006, Senator Schumer introduced legislation, with five Democrats and five Republicans 
as sponsors, to deal with the Dubai Ports issue.  Stating that “homeland security is a 
number one priority,” Mr. Schumer raised the following questions:  (1) whether CFIUS is 
the right committee to conduct reviews since it was set up more than 20 years ago to 
justify economic deals, (2) whether a report would serve a purpose if it is kept secret and 
only provided to the President, and (3) whether Congress could be able to find a 
constitutional way to disapprove the deal.594  Ms. Collins followed by introducing a joint 
resolution disapproving the conclusion of the CFIUS regarding the Dubai Ports 
acquisition.595 
The next day, Ms. Harmon (D-CA), member of the House Intelligence Committee 
and Homeland Security Committee introduced S.J. Res. 32 in the House and called for 
the CFIUS to rescind the decision, conduct a formal 45-day investigation, and brief 
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Congress before allowing the deal to proceed.596  On March 1st, Representative Corrine 
Brown (D-FL) was one of many representatives to testify.  She stat d that she had been 
lobbying the President for additional funds for the nation’s port and infrastructure, 
especially in Florida.  “This is absolutely the wrong time for ou  government to make a 
decision that could give the impression of vulnerability,” stated Brown.597  Mr. Feeney 
(R-FL) also from Florida had stated the previous day that homeland security is the 
number one issue facing the nation and that the administration has a strong record, but 
“Americans throughout my district expressed deep concern that this fast track deal has 
not been given the type of scrutiny that all of us took an oath to do when e said we 
would protect our country.”598  
In March 2006, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee held 
a hearing on the Exon-Florio Amendment with a focus on Dubai Ports World’s proposed 
acquisition of P&O.599  Chairman Richard Shelby opened the hearing by remarking that 
the “credibility and integrity” of the CFIUS process is vital to American national 
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security.600  In his opinion, the Dubai Ports World case once again raised the conc rns 
that Congress expressed over the 2005 CNOOC case.  Mr. Shelby reiterated that there 
were serious gaps in the CFIUS review process that prevented full assessment of 
acquisitions, that the process lacked transparency and avoided congressional oversight. 
Senator Sarbanes said he had long been concerned about how foreign purchases 
of U.S. assets are evaluated which is why he and Senator Bayh had requested a GAO 
report to address these concerns.  What amazed Mr. Sarbanes was that the GAO report 
had been delivered in September 2005 and the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Committee had held two hearings to discuss weaknesses in the CFIUS process before the 
Dubai controversy arose; and yet, CFIUS did not appear to have heeded any of the advice 
in the report when allowing the Dubai Ports World transaction to move forward. 
Every other member of the committee that spoke during the hearing expressed 
similar concerns.  Senator Allard (R-CO) opposed the transaction for security reasons 
but, he said, the “much broader concern [is] how we even got to this point and the answer 
lies in a flawed CFIUS process.”601  Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) was emphatic that 
the issue of homeland security “should not be negotiated, sidestepped, or ignored in any 
of the processes that have been developed.”  She was appalled that the importance of port 
security was “ignored” and said that it would not have mattered what foreign company 
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was involved.  “I believe American companies accountable to the American people 
should manage the operations of these vital national security interests,” Stabenow 
added.602 
The realization that the Dubai Ports World transaction had been in the works just 
as Washington was settling down from the passionate debates over the CNOOC-Unocal 
transaction and while Congress was deliberating over the GAO report was shocking to 
these Committee members as well as others in Congress.  It was all that the proponents of 
reform needed to convince their peers that the CFIUS process was broken and needed to 
be fixed. 
During the second session of the 109th Congress, members introduced over two 
dozen measures to address the various concerns that arose from the CNOOC and Dubai 
Ports World acquisition bids.  Some of the deficiencies addressed in these bills included: 
(1) CFIUS uses too much discretion in determining which transactions to 
investigate; 
(2) CFIUS members incorrectly interpreted statutory requirements for 
investigations of transactions involving firms owned or controlled by foreign 
governments; 
(3) Commonly accepted definitions of national security were no longer 
applicable in a post-9/11 world; 
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(4) Time constraints on CFIUS to complete reviews did not provide adequate 
time for conducting thorough reviews and completing the necessary tasks; 
(5) Members of the CFIUS did not appear to be well-informed of the 
outcomes of reviews and investigations regarding pending transactions; and 
(6) Reporting requirements did not provide Congress enough time to fulfill its 
oversight responsibilities.603 
The most prominent bills introduced in the second session of the 109th 
Congress were H.R. 5337 and S. 3549.  The stated purpose of H.R. 5337 was to 
ensure national security while promoting foreign investment, creation of and 
maintenance of jobs, and to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States.604  The stated purpose of S.B. 3549 was “to strengthen government 
review and oversight of foreign investment in the United States, to provide for 
enhanced Congressional oversight with respect thereto. . . .”605 
Both bills called for statutory establishment of the CFIUS.  While H.R. 
5337 would have retained the basic committee structure, S.B. 3549 would have 
added the Director of National Intelligence and eliminated the members from the 
White House staff.  Both bills sought to clarify significant definitions.  For 
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example, the House bill defined “covered transactions” as any transaction which 
could result in the control by any person engaged in interstate commerce in the 
U.S. by a foreign government or entity acting by or on behalf of a foreign 
government.”  National security was to include issues relating to homeland 
security, including “critical infrastructure.”606 
Although the bills gave CFIUS more authority to negotiate, they both also 
sought more congressional oversight of the committee.  While the House bill 
required semi-annual reports, the Senate bill only required an annual report, but 
specified the content of the report in great detail.  In addition to tightening up 
reporting requirements, the bills provided for greater intelligence review.  The 
Senate bill provided that governors of relevant states shall be notified in the 
review process, while the House bill required that the departments of Treasury 
and Homeland Security must agree on all decisions.  The Senate bill also added 
factors for the president to consider, such as “long term projections of U.S. 
requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and materials” and 
the “effect on U.S. technology leadership in areas affecting national security.”607  
Both House and Senate bills garnered support on July 26, 2006, and even though 
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there were details to work out in conference, the 109th Congress adjourned before 
the Conference Committee had time to convene.608 
The issue was picked up again in the 110th Congress where Exon-Florio 
was finally revised.609  As modified, the statute preserved the basic elements of 
the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment, such as voluntary reporting and 
confidentiality, but made significant changes regarding implementatio  and 
congressional oversight.  The most notable changes accomplished by the2007 
amendment are as follows: 
(1) The statute provided more structure and clarity to the process by requiring 
Treasury to designate a lead agency for conducting the investigation, and by giving 
CFIUS explicit authority to negotiate and enter into mitigation agreements with the 
acquiring company based on risk analysis. 
(2) The scope of Exon-Florio review was expanded to include transactions 
involving “critical infrastructure,” which was defined as any vital system or asset, 
physical or virtual, whose destruction or incapacity would have a “debilitating impact” on 
national security. 
(3) CFIUS was mandated to consider a country’s relationship with the Unit d 
States and record in supporting nonproliferation of arms and counterterrorism.  This 
                                                
608 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Exon-Florio Foreign Investment Provision: 
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609 The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) was enacted on 
October 24, 2007 to amend Section 721 of the Defense Production Act. 
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included consideration of whether the country in question sells military goods to 
countries which the Department of Defense has identified as a regional military threat. 
(4) The previous focus on national defense was expanded to include factors 
which impact the nation’s ability to protect homeland security.  This includes 
consideration of long-term energy supplies and the potential diversion of technology by 
the acquiring company to military applications. 
(5) The statute closed the loophole in the Byrd Amendment by requiring 
CFIUS perform an investigation within 45 days unless the Department of Treasury and 
the head of the lead agency on the transaction jointly determine that the transaction would 
not have an impact on national security. 
(6) CFIUS was given the authority to reopen review of previously approved 
transactions based upon intentional or material breach of a mitigation agreement. 
(7) The secrecy issue was addressed by requiring that officials give Congress 
prompt notice of approved transactions with an explanation of the rationale behind the 
committee’s actions.  Congress was authorized to request classified briefings from 
CFIUS. 
 Even after politicizing two major foreign investment cases – CNOOC’s proposed 
acquisition of U.S.-based Unocal and the proposed acquisition of London-based P&O by 
Dubai Ports World – it took two congressional sessions to revise the 1988 Exon-Florio 
Amendment.  It may seem that the passage of time and failure of the 109th Congress to 
finalize the bill diminishes the impact of the two events.  But time is relative, and the 
accomplishment of the 110th Congress was significant when one considers that members 
271 
 
had been trying to modify the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment ever since the 102nd 
Congress had realized the shortcomings of the 1992 Byrd Amendment. 
Ushering legislation through Congress is difficult at best, and the process is 
complicated by the constraints of formal rules and values, the political dynamics between 
the president and Congress, the intervention of political parties and special interest 
groups, and expectations of constituents.  The more complex the system and the players, 
the more difficult it is to develop effective policies.  This is the dilemma that government 
institutions face. 
This study shows how the Constitution provided the foundation for conflict 
between the executive and legislative branches by institutionalizing the system of 
“checks and balances.”  The founding fathers accomplished their goal of preventing any 
one branch from becoming too powerful, but they did not foresee the complexity of 
drafting and implementing policy in twenty-first century America.  The institutions have 
become more complex and have developed a life of their own.  Today, it takes an 
experienced politician to maneuver his or her way through formal rules and traditional 
resistance to change to accomplish a policy goal.  Long-time members of Congress have 
a political edge over an incoming president, especially one that has not had extensive 
experience in Washington, as it is not as easy to move a ship of hundreds of individually-
minded legislators.  Every member comes to Washington with their own values and 
personal commitments to their party and their constituents. 
President Bush’s managerial style created an additional challenge for reformists.  
While we might expect a unified Congress to be able to overcome the influence of a w ak 
272 
 
president over the policy making agenda, it was a different matter under the strong Bush 
Administration.  However, members of the 109th Congress were able to overcome the 
obstacles of a tightly controlled cabinet and administrative staff, and a constituency that 
was loyal to the president and his party, to unify Congress against the CNOOC’s 
acquisition of Unocal in spite of executive preference for nonintervention. 
Fortunately for the proponents of legislative reform, the timing of the CNOOC 
proposal helped elevate concerns about implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment 
to the top of the policy agenda in 2005.  What had seemed like a perfect storm to the 
CNOOC directors was a fortuitous set of events for members of Congress yearning to 
reform the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment, impose more restrictive requirements for the 
president and CFIUS in reviewing foreign acquisitions, and mandate mor  stringent 
reporting requirements so that Congress could exercise its oversight authority. 
Although Americans had long supported free and open trade policies, the events 
of 9/11 had created a sense of vulnerability and urgency for developing and 
implementing national security policies.  At the same time, mmbers who had been 
struggling with China’s trade policies, and perceived violations of the rule of law, ound a 
venue for voicing their concerns, and hoped to make headway with new trade legislation. 
The research shows how the Speaker of the House controls the legislative agenda 
with the suspension of rules; how bills may or may not get to the floor thr ugh the gate 
keeping Rules Committee; and how committee chairs play a critical role in manipulating 
the content and tone of testimony in hearings.  Getting legislation through all these 
273 
 
obstacles requires more than an understanding of the formal process; it requires the 
ability to finesse informal mechanisms that will create coalitions of power and support. 
Members of the 109th Congress formed bipartisan coalitions to support legislative 
reform so as to rebalance the power between the legislative and xecutive branches.  The 
tendency for members to support a president from their own party was clearly diminished 
by the perception that the president was sidestepping his authority to promote free trade 
at the expense of protecting national security, energy resources, and critical technology.  
The real victory came in the 110th Congress when Republicans joined Democrats to 
oppose the Republican president’s preference for avoiding additional legislative 
constraints.  Congressional members coalesced to provide the statutory basis under the 
2007 modifications to the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment for greater legislative oversight 
of CFIUS review of foreign direct investments. 
The difficulty of getting bills through each house of Congress and then reaching 
consensus between the two houses cannot be overstated.  The process is complicated by 
the large number of participants and the preferences of their constitue ts, the multiplicity 
of formal procedures and informal relationships within Congress, and interactions with 
and loyalty to the administration.  How members vote is often clouded by their personal 
values, the information they receive, and trade-offs that must be mad with regard to 
other policy issues. 
The ability of Congress to develop effective policies is diminished b cause 
compromise is necessary to create winning coalitions.  An open, democratic process may 
increase responsiveness to the public and interest groups but it diminishes the potential 
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for passing responsible legislation.  Members often have short-term constituency 
preferences and re-election takes precedence over long-term policy interests.  Debates 
have become platforms for gaining political support and often lack substantive solutions.  
Therefore, in analyzing hearings and debates it is important to go beyond political 
motives and innuendos to identify real policy concerns.  In this study, that meant looking 
beyond posturing vis-à-vis foreign trade with a “communist regime” n order to identify 
common issues of concern.  Here, the common thread was not just that Chin  bases it 
development on principles that are different from the capitalist West, but that the U.S. 
executive office had failed repeatedly to implement safeguards gainst acquisitions of 
U.S. corporations by a foreign government-owned corporations, such as CNOOC, which 
may pose a threat to national security and the economic well being of American 
enterprise. 
In a post-9/11 world, business may no longer be “as usual” but will require 
additional protection against the unforeseen perils which are bound to arise in a global 
economy.  This study shows how an overwhelming majority of legislator  were able to 
agree that the American predilection towards an open trade policy, which has contributed 
so much to economic growth and prosperity, must be tempered with an element of 
caution.  In this case, this element of caution was accomplished by reforming the 1988 
Exon-Florio Amendment to require that the president be more accountable to Congress 













Aberbach, Joel D. “The State of the Contemporary American Presidency: Or, Is Bush II 
Actually Ronald Regan’s Heir?” In Campbell and Rockman, 46-72. 
 
Adams, David A. “Managing China’s Transition.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 129, 
no. 7 (July 2003). 
 
Alden, Edward and Stephanie Kirchgaessner. “Congress to Vote on Ways to Limit China 
Bid.” The Financial Times, July 1, 2005. 
 
Alexander, Gerard. “Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation.” 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 13, no. 3 (2001): 249-70. 
 
Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell. Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966. 
 
Andrews, Edmund L. “Capital Nearly Speechless on Big China Bid.” New York Times, 
June 24, 2005. 
 
Andrews-Speed, Philip and Sergei Vinogradov. “China’s Involvement in Central Asian 
Petroleum: Convergent or Divergent Interests?” Asian Survey 40, no. 2 (March-
April 2000): 377-397. 
 
Andrews-Speed, Philip, Xuanli Liao, and Roland Dannreuther.  St ategic Implications of 
China’s Energy Needs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Arnold, Wayne. “Asian Reaction to Unocal Bid is Muted.” New York Times, June 29, 
2005. 
Bachevich, Andrew J. “Different Drummers, Same Drum.” The National Interest 64 
(Summer 2001): 67-77. 
 
Bachman, David. “The United States and China: Rhetoric and Reality.” Current History 
(September 2001): 257-262. 
 
Bader, Jeffrey A. “The Energy Future: China and the U.S. – What the Unit d States 
Ought to Do.” (paper presented at Conference on China Energy, William 
276 
 
Davidson Institute, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, February 
2006). 
 
Barboza, David and Andrew Ross Sorkin. “Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bid for U.S.  
Company.” New York Times, June 23, 2005. 
 
Barnes, James A. “Bush’s Insiders.” National Journal, June 23, 2001, 
http://nationaljournal.com. 
 
Barrionuevo, Alexi. “In China’s Unocal Bid, Little Risk to U.S. Supply.” International 
Herald Times, July 1, 2005. 
 
Barrioneuvo, Alexi and Andrew Ross Sorkin. “Chevron Criticizes Rival Suitor.” New 
York Times, June 25, 2005. 
 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Christopher Green-Pedersen and Bryan D. Jones. “Comparative 
Studies of Policy Agendas. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (September): 
959-974. 
 
Baum, Richard. “From ‘Strategic Partners’ to ‘Strategic Competitors:’ George W. Bush 
and the Politics of U.S. China Policy.” Journal of East Asian Studies 1, no. 2 
(2001): 191-220. 
 
Beasley, Ryan K., Juliet Kaarbo, Charles F. Hermann, and Margaret G. Hermann. 
"People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking: Insights from Comparative Case 
Studies." International Studies Review 3 (Summer 2001): 217-250. 
 
Berke, Richard L. and David E. Sanger. “Some in Administration Grumble as Aide’s 
Role Seems to Expand.” New York Times, May 13, 2002. 
 
Béland, Daniel. “Ideas, Interest, and Institutions: Historical Institutionalism Revisited. In 
André Lecours, 29-50. 
 
Béland, Daniel. “Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 15, no. 5 (August 2008): 701-718. 
 
Bell, Daniel. “Election 2000 and Future Prospects.” Society (May/June, 2001): 78-82. 
 
Bell, Lauren Cohen, “Following the Leaders or Leading the Followers? The U.S. 
President’s Relations with Congress.” Journal of Legislative Studies 10, nos. 2-3 




Berman, Dennis K. and Russell Gold. “As Rancor Mounts, CNOOC Needs to Push its 
Offer for Unocal; Chinese Oil Company Finds Itself Put on the Defensive by 
Anti-China Sentiment.” Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2005. 
 
Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. “The Coming Conflict with America.” Foreign 
Affairs 1, no.2 (March-April 1997): 18-32. 
 
Birdsell, David S., “George W. Bush’s Signing Statements: The Assault on 
Deliberation.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10, no.2 (2007): 335-360. 
 
Birnbaum, Norman. “After the Debacle.” Political Quarterly 72, no. 2 (April-June 2001): 
146-158. 
 
Blumenthal, Dan. “China and the Middle East: Providing Arms.” Middle East Quarterly 
12, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 11-19. 
Bradsher, Keith, “China Struggles to Cut Reliance on Mideast Oil.” New York Times, 
September 3, 2002. 
Brick, Andrew B., ed. The Heritage Lectures, No. 338, An Asian Studies Center Forum, 
America’s China Policy and the Role of the Congress, the Press, and the Private 
Sector. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1991. 
 
Broder, David S. “The Reticent President.” Washington Post, April 22, 2001. 
 
Brown, Chris, and Kirsten Ainley. Understanding International Relations. 3rd ed. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. 
 
Brown, William Holmes and Charles W. Johnson, House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, 
Precedents, and Procedures of the House. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003. 
 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor. 
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983. 
 
Bullock, Charles S. “Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: 
Freshmen of the 92nd Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1 (1976): 201-212. 
 
Burke, John. The Institutional Presidency. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1992. 
 
Burstein, Paul and April Linton. “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and 
Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence a d 




Bush, Richard. “Clinton and China: Scenarios for the Future.” China Business Review 
(January/February 1993). 
 
Bush, ———. “The Roles of Congress in Shaping Washington’s China Policy.” In Brick.  
 
Cable, Vincent and Ferdinand, Peter. “China As An Economic Giant: Threat Or 
Opportunity?” International Affairs 70, no. 2 (April 1994): 243-261. 
 
Campbell, Colin and Bert A. Rockman, eds. The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals 
and Prospects. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004. 
 
Campbell, Kirt M. and Celeste Johnson Ward. “New Battle Stations.” Foreign Affairs 82, 
no. 5 (September/October 2003). 
 
Campbell, Donald T. “Degrees of Freedom” and the Case Study.” Comparative Political 
Studies 8 (July 1975): 178-193. 
 
Campbell, John L. “Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy.” Annual Review Sociology 28 
(2002): 21-38. 
 
Cannon, Carl M. “The Point Man.” National Journal 34, no. 41 (October 11, 2002): 
2956-64. 
 
Carlsnaes, Walter. “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analyses.” 
International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992): 245-270. 
 
Chanlett-Avery, Emma. “Rising Energy Competition and Energy Security in Northeast 
Asia: Issues for U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, updated February 9, 2005, (accessed through Congressional Research 
Service. 
 
Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 1, no. 42 (February 2005): 33-51. 
 
China Economic Information. “China Produces 1.236 Billion Tons of Coal.” (March 3, 
1999). 
 
Clark, Judy R. “ChevronTexaco Agrees to Acquire Unocal in $18 Billion Transaction.” 
Oil and Gas Journal 103, no. 14 (April 11, 2005): 27-29. 
 
Clark, Martin. “LNG: China – Fools Rush In.” Petroleum Economics 71, no. 7 (2004): 
24-25. 
 
Clemens, Elisabeth S. and James M. Cook. “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining 
Durability and Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 441-66. 
279 
 
Cohen, William S. “Principles for National Security Consensus.” Washington Quarterly 
24 (Spring 2001): 75-81. 
 
Coleman, J.S. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990. 
 
Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, 
the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Colomer, Josep. “Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe.” Journal of Democracy 6 
(1995): 74-85. 
 
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the 
Commission, July 15, 1998, 104th Congress, 2nd sess. 
 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 4 December 1982. Review of Socialist 
Law (1983): 183-208. 
 
Cook, Lynn J. “Powerful Bidders: A Thirsty China.” The Houston Chronicle, January 10, 
2005. 
 
Corr, Christopher F. “A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment and 
Operations: How Much is Enough?” The American University Journal of 
International Law & Policy 9 (Winter 1994): 417-464. 
 
Covin, Jeffrey G. and Dennis P. Levin. “A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship as 
Firm Behavior.” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 16, no. 1 (1991): 7-25. 
 
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in 
the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Crane, Barbara B. and Jason L. Finkle. “The United States, China, and the United 
Nations Population Fund: Dynamics of U.S. Policymaking.” Population and 
Development Review 15 (March 1989). 
 
Crockett, David A. “The Contemporary Presidency: “An Excess of Refinement”: Lame 
Duck Presidents in Constitutional and Historical Context.” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 38, no. 4 (December 2008): 707-721. 
 
Cruz de Castro, Renato. “U.S. War on Terror in East Asia: The Perils of Preemptive 
Defense in Waging a War of the Third Kind.” Asian Affairs, An American Review 




Daalder, Ivo H. “In the Shadow of the Oval Office: The Next National Security Advisor.” 
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 114-129. 
 
Daalder, Ivo H. and James M. Lindsay. “Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution.”  In 
Greenstein, 100-137. 
 
Dahl, Robert. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989. 
 
Daniel, Caroline. “Kissinger Warns of Energy Conflict,” The Financial Times, June 2, 
2005. 
 
Darley, Julian. High Noon for Natural Gas: The New Energy Crisis. White River 
Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 2004: 142, citing “President 
Focuses on Energy Security in Radio Address,” White House, February 23, 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020223.html (accessed 
February 13, 2004). 
 
Deitrich, John W. “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the MFN Debates.” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 2, no. 29 (June 1999): 280-96. 
 
De Young, Karen. “Falling on His Sword: Colin Powell’s Most Significant Moment 
Turned Out to be His Lowest.” Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2006. 
 
Dickinson, Matthew J. “Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and Presidential Decision 
Making: A Theory and a Test.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 
2005): 259-288. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell, eds. The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 
Introduction, 1-40. 
 
Dittrick, Paula. “CNOOC Bid Raises States in the Takeover of Unocal.” Oil and Gas 
Journal 103, no. 24 (June 27, 2005): 25. 
 
Dorian, James P. and David G. Fridley, eds. China’s Energy and Mineral Industries: 
Current Perspectives. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. 
 
Dorn, James A. “U.S.-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC.” Policy Analysis 553 
(November 2005): 1-16. 
 





Downs, Erica S. “The Chinese Energy Security Debate.” The China Quarterly 177 
(March 2004): 21-41. 
 
Downs, Erica S. China’s Quest for Energy Security. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000. 
 
Dumbaugh, Kerry. “Interest Groups: Growing Influence.” In Myers, Oksenberg, and 
Shambaugh, 113-148. 
 
Dumbaugh, ———. “China-U.S. Relations in the 109th Congress.” Congressional 
Research Service Report RL32804. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 
updated December 31, 2006. 
 
Dumbaugh, ———. “China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status: Congressional 
Consideration, 1989-1998,” Congressional Research Service Report 98-603. 
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1998. 
 
Eastman, John C. “Why Dick Cheney is Fighting the GAO.” Ashbrook Center for Public 
Affairs, July 2002, hppt://www.ashbrook.org/tools/printerpage.asp (accessed 
December 5, 2008). 
 
Economy, Elizabeth, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications fr the United States. 
Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (August 2005): 409-425. 
 
Edwards III, George C. and Desmond S. King, eds. The Polarized Presidency of George 
W. Bush. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Edwards III, George C. “Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion.” 
In Campbell and Rockman, 16-45. 
 
Elster, Jon. “Constitution-making in Eastern Europe.” Public Administration 71 (1993): 
169-217. 
 
Elster, Jon and Rune Slagstad. Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Epstein, Harry and David Apter, eds. Comparative Politics. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 
1963. 
 
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State 
Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Fan, J., W. Sun, and D.M. Ren, “Renewables Portfolio Standard and Regional Energy 
Structure Optimisation in China.” Energy Policy 33 (2005): 279-287, 
http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol (accessed June 30, 2005). 
282 
 
Farnham, Barbara. “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” 
Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004): 441-463. 
 
The Federalist No. 64: The Powers of the Senate from the New York Packet (Friday, 
March 7, 1788). Avalon Project at Yale Law School eds. 1996, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm (accessed December 28, 
2006). 
 
Feller, Gordon Feller. “China’s Rising Demand for Oil and Pipeline Has Worldwide 
Implications.” Oil & Gas Journal (May 2005): 232-5. 
 
Fenno, Richard R. Jr. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1973. 
 
Fenton, Christopher R. “U.S. Policy towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-September 
11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security.” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 41 (2002-2003): 195-249. 
 
Ferris, James M. and Shui-Yan Tang. “The New Institutionalism and Public 
Administration: An Overview.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 3, no. 1 (1993): 4-10. 
 
Finn, Teresa. “China’s National Oil Companies.” The China Business Review 
(September-October 2005): 12. 
 
Fiori, Stefano. “Alternative Visions of Change in Douglass North’s New 
Institutionalism.” Journal of Economic Issues 36 (December 2002): 1025-1043. 
 
Flaherty, Martin A. “The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law.” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 67 (Autumn 2004): 168-193. 
 
Flynt Leverett and Jeffry Bader. “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the 
Middle East.” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06): 187-201. 
 
Foreign Policy Editors. “Clinton’s Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy, No. 121 (November-
December 2000.): 18-29. 
 
Fortier, John C. and Norman J. Ornstein. “President Bush: Legislative Strategist.” In 
Greenstein, 138-172. 
 
Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband. Foreign Policy by Congress. New York: 




Frankfort-Nachimias, Chava and David Machimias. Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 
 
French, Howard W., “In a Class for Diplomats, China Cultivates African Ties.” 
International Herald Tribune (Paris), November 21, 2005. 
 
Friedan, Jeffry A., and David A. Lake. “International Relations as a Social S ence: Rigor 
and Relevance.” ANNALS of the American Association of Political and Social 
Science 600 (July 2005): 136-156. 
 
Friedman, Lawrence M. A History of American Law. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
Inc., 1985. 
 
Garrison, Jean A. “Explaining Change in the Carter Administration’s China Policy: 
Foreign Policy Advisor Manipulation of the Policy Agenda.” Asian Affairs: An 
American Review 29, no.2 (Summer 2002): 83-98. 
 
Garrison, ———. Making China Policy: From Nixon to G.W. Bush. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 2005. 
 
Gelb, Bernard A. “Unocal Corporation’s Oil and Gas.” Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress (July 26, 2005). 
 
George, A. “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy.” In Holsti, 
Siverson, and George. 
 
Gerber, Elisabeth R. “Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representatio : The Effects of State 
Legislative Institutions on Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 49 (June, 1996): 
263-286.  
 
Glaser, Bonnie. “Playing Up the Positive on the Eve of the Crawford Summit.” 
Comparative Connections (July-September 2002), http:www.csis.org/pacfor 
(accessed 2/23/07). 
 
Globerman, Steven and Daniel Shapiro. “Economic and Strategic Considerations 
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States.” Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management 26 (2009): 163-183. 
 
Goddard, Stacie E., and Daniel N. Nexon. “Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of 
International Politics.” European Journal of International Relations 11 (March 
2005): 9-61. 
 
Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival.” Working Papers, 
Brown Center for International Politics (September 1996), http://0-
www.ciaonet.org. (accessed August 2006). 
284 
 
Goldstein, ———. Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International 
Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
 
Goodman, Peter S. “Big Shift in China’s Oil Policy.” Washington Post, July 13, 2005. 
 
Gourevitch, Peter A. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics.” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978): 881-911. 
 
Graham, Edward M. “Who’s Afraid of CNOOC?” Far Eastern Economic Review 28 
(July 2005):24-27.  
 
Graham, J., and V. Kramer, “Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies.” Senate 
Commerce Committee, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976. 
 
Greenberg, Maurice R. “On Leadership.” The National Interest (Winter 2005/2006): 25-
29. 
 
Greener, Ian. “The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies.” Politics 25, no. 1 
(2005): 62-72. 
 
Greenstein, Fred I., ed. The George W. Bush Presidency. Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Greenstein, ———. “The Leadership Style of George W. Bush.” In Greenstein, 1-16. 
 
Grier, Kevin B. and Michael C. Munger. “Committee Assignments, Constituent 
Preferences, and Campaign Contributions.” Economic Inquiry 29 (1992): 24-43. 
 
Guzzini, Stefano. “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in Internatio l Relations.” 
European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 533-568. 
 
Haass, Richard N. War of Necessity, War of Choice. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. 
 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the 
Erosion of American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 
 
Hall, Peter A. “Policy Paradigms: Social Learning, and the State.” Comparative Politics 
25 (April): 275-296. 
 
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms.” Political Studies XLIV (December 1996): 936-957. 
 
Hall, Richard L. “Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making.” American 
Political Science Review 81(1987): 105-127. 
285 
 
Hamilton, Lee H. “Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy, Remarks at the Trilateral 
Commission Meeting.” (1999), http://www.trailateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/trlgtxts/ 
t53/ham.htm (accessed October 31, 2006).  
 
Hamilton, Lee H. with Tama Jordan. A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of 
the President and Congress. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2003.  
 
Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1992. 
 
Harty, Biobhán. “Theorizing Institutional Change.” In Lecours, 29-50. 
 
Hayashi, Yuka. “China Studies Japan’s Mistakes as the Pursuit for Oil Companies.” Wall 
Street Journal (Eastern Edition), August 3, 2005. 
 
Helco, Hugh and Lester Salamon, eds. The Illusion of Presidential Government. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1981). 
 
Herbert, Mikkal, “Asia’s Energy Insecurity, China, and India,” Testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 26, 2005. 
 
Hess, Stephen, with James P. Pfiffner. O ganizing the Presidency. 3rd ed. Washington 
D.C.: Brookings, 2002. 
 
Holsti, O.R., R. Siverson, and A.L. George, eds. Change in the International System, 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980. 
 
Hoover, Herbert. Presidential Publication No. 112. Special Message to the Congress 
Proposing a Study of the Reorganization of Prohibition Enforcement 
Responsibilities, June 6, 1929, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
21819&st=hoover&st1=reorganization (accessed August 21, 2009). 
 
Hoover, Herbert. Presidential Publication No. 50. Special Message to th Congress on the 
Reorganization of the Executive Branch, February 17, 1932 and June 30, 1932. 
Available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23449&st=hoover&st1 
=reorganization (accessed August 21, 2009). 
 
Hoover, Herbert. Presidential Publication No. 423. Special Message to the Congress on 
the Reorganization of the Executive Branch, June 30, 1932. Available at 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23381&st=hoover&st1=reorganizat




Hult, Karen M. “The Bush White House in Comparative Perspective.” In Greenstein, 51-
77.  
 
Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968. 
 
Ikenberry, G. John, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. “Introduction: Approaches 
to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy.” International Organization 
42 (Winter 1988): 1-14. 
 
Immergut, Ellen M. “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism.” Politics and 
Society 26 (March 1998): 5-35. 
 
Inderfurth, Karl and Loch K. Johnson. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security 
Council. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
International Energy Agency. China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. (Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2006). 
 
International Energy Agency. International Energy Outlook: Energy Profile for China. 
(Paris: 2000): 10, available at http://www.bu.edu/cees/binna/304/energy profiles/ 
China.htm (accessed 24 Jan. 2005). 
 
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2004). 
 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, D.C., IMF, 2005, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02data/docssubm.com 
(accessed March 29, 2009). 
 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C.: IMF, May 
1993. 
 
Isaacs, Harold R. Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India. New 
York: John Day, 1958. 
 
Jackson, James K. “The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign Investment.” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (updated Feb. 23, 2006): 1-
6. 
 
Jacobs, Lawrence R. “The Promotional Presidency and the New Institutional Toryism: 
Public Mobilization, Legislative Dominance, and Squandered Opportunities.” In 




Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Benjamin I. Page. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy? 
American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 107-123. 
 
Jarvis, Darryl S.L. “Multinational Enterprises, International Relations and International 
Business: Reconstituting Intellectual Boundaries for the New Millennium.” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (June 2005): 201-223. 
 
Jervis, Robert. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.” 
International Security 24 (Summer 1999): 42-63. 
 
Jin Liangxiang. “China and the Middle East: Energy First.” Middle East Quarterly 12, 
no. 2 (Spring 2005): 3-10. 
 
Johnson, Charles W.  How Our Laws Are Made. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2003. 
 
Jones, Bryan D., Tracey Sulkin, and Heather A. Larsen. “Policy Punctuation in American 
Political Institutions.” American Political Science Review 97 (February 2003): 1-
23. 
 
Jones, Charles O. The United States Congress: People, Place, and Policy. Dorsey Press, 
1982.  
 
Juster, Kenneth I. and Simon Lazarus. Making Economic Policy: An Assessment of the 
National Economic Council. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997. 
 
Kahn, Joseph, “Behind China’s Bid for Unocal: A Costly Quest for Energy Control.” 
New York Times, June 27, 2005. 
 
Kaiser, Robert G. and Steven Mufson. “‘Blue Team’ Draws a Hard Line on Beijing, 
Action Hill Reflects Informal Group’s Clout.” Washington Post, February 22, 
2000. 
 
Kaplan, Mortan. System and Process in International Politics. New York: Wiley, 1957. 
 
Katz, D. and R.L. Kahn. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York: John 
Wiley, 1966. 
 
Katznelson, I. and H.V. Milner, eds. Political Science State of the Discipline. New York: 
Norton, 2002. 
 





Kegley, Charles W., Jr. “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths 
and the New International Realities.” International Studies Quarterly 37 (June 
1993): 131-146. 
 
Kelley, Christopher S. “Rethinking Presidential Power – the Unitary Executive and the 
George W. Bush Presidency.” Presentation, 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association. Chicago, IL, April 7-10, 2005. 
 
Kelley, Christopher S. and Bryan W. Marshall. “The Last Word: Presidential Power and 
the Role of Signing Statements.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 
2008): 248-267. 
 
Keohane, Robert O., ed. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Killenbeck, Mark R., ed. The Tenth Amendment and State Sovereignty. Lanham, MA: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
 
Klare, Michael T. “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Strategic Energy Dilemma.” Current 
History (April 2006): 182-186. 
 
Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004. 
 
Klatt, W. “Chinese Statistics Updated.” The China Quarterly 84 (December 1980): 737-
743. 
 
Koffler, Keith. “Ridge to Testify, Within Limits, on Cabinet Creation Plan.” 
GovExec.com, June 7, 2002, www.govexec.com. 
 
Kovacic, William E. “Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: 
FTC Initiatives to Protect Competitive Markets.” Prepared statement of the 
Federal Trade Commission presented before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, 
Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reforms 
(July 15, 2004). 
 
Kovacic, ———. “Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC 
Initiatives to Protect Competitive Markets.” Prepared Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission presented before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air 
Quality, Committee on Energy and Commerce (July 7, 2004). 
 
Kravitz, Walter. “Evolution of Senate’s Subcommittee System.” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 411 (1974): 30, 




Kravitz, ———. “The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 15, no. 3 (August, 1990): 375-399. 
 
Kumar, Martha Joynt. “The Contemporary Presidency: Communications Operations in 
the White House of President George W. Bush: Making News on His Terms.” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (June 2003): 366-93. 
 
Kumar, ———. “Managing the News.” In Edwards and King, 353-54. 
 
Lampton, David M. “America’s China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: Clinton 
Ends Linkage.” China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 597-621. 
 
Lecours, André, ed. New Institutionalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. 
 
Lee, David Taiwei. The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act: Twenty Years in Retrospect. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Lee, Herbert and Ian Storey, eds. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. 
London: Routledge Curzon, 2002, Introduction, 1-20. 
 
Leahy, Joe, Sheila Mcnulty, Kevin Morrison, and James Politi. “Chevron and Unocal 
Edge Nearer Merger.” The Financial Times (June 10, 2005). 
 
Leverett, Flynt and Jeffrey Bader. “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the 
Middle East.” The Washington Quarterly 29, no.1 (Winter 2005-2006): 187-201. 
 
Levi, Margaret. “Theories of Historical and Institutional Change.” Political Science 
(Summer 1987): 684-688. 
 
Levi, ———. “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
Historical Analysis.” In Lichbach and Zuckerman, 19-41. 
 
Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division.  Documents from the 
Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention Broadsides Collection 
1774-1789. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/continental (accessed 
December 28, 2006). 
 
Lichbach, Mark I. and Alan S. Zuckerman. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, 
and Structure, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Lieberman, Robert C. “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political 




Light, Paul C. The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
 
Lilienthal, Alfred M. “In Memoriam: J. William Fulbright: A Giant Passes.” The 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 13, no. 7 (May 1995): 50, 92-93. 
 
List, Christian. “A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions.” 
American Political Science Review 98 (August 2004): 495-513. 
 
Liu Ji. “Making the Right Choices in Twenty-First Century Sino-American Relations.” In 
Zhao, 243-255.  
 
Lubman, Stanley. “The ‘Dragon as Demon’ Images of China on Capitol Hill.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 13, no. 40 (August 2004): 541-565. 
 
Lubman, ———. “Through a Glass, Dimly.” Problems of Post-Communism 47, no. 2 
(March/April 2000): 34-44. 
 
Luft, Gal and Anne Korin. “The Sino-Saudi Connection.” Commentary 117, no. 3 (March 
2004): 26-29. 
 
Mackenzie, G. Calvin. “The Real Invisible Hand: Presidential Appointees in the 
Administration of George W. Bush.” PS: Political Science and Politics 35, no. 1 
(March 2002): 27-30. 
 
Madison, James. 1782. Notes of Debates, Thursday November 21, 1782. In Letters to 
Congress: Vol. 19, August 1, 1792-March 11, 1783. Library of Congress: 409. 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html (accessed June 1, 2007). 
 
Malik, J. Mohan. “Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic 
Losses after 11 September.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (August 
2002): 252-293. 
 
Malik, Khalid. “Opening Address at the Launch of China Human Development Report,” 
Beijing (November 16, 2008), available at http://www.undp.org.cn/modules 
(accessed on March 28, 2009). 
 
Manley, John F. “The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 397 (September 1971): 60-70. 
 
Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, 




Manning, Robert A. The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas of Energy, Security 
and the Pacific Future. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life.” The American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984): 
734-749. 
 
Mastanduno, Michael. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. 
Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 
1997): 49-88. 
 
Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press, 1974. 
 
McDonnald, Terrance J., ed. The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
 
McElwrath, Michael R. “International Energy Focus: CBM in China.” Electric Light & 
Power 83:3 (May-June): 16. 
 
McGregor, Richard, Enid Tsui, and Andrew Yeh, “China Chases A Global Oil Presence: 
Country’s Demand for Oil is Generating Heat in World Markets.” The Financial 
Times, January 10, 2005. 
 
McKibbin, Warwick, J. “Environmental Consequences of Rising Energy Use in China.” 
Paper prepared for the Asian Economic Policy Review conference held in Tokyo 
on October 22, 2005. 
 
Milbank, Dana. “Cheney Refuses Records’ Release.” Washington Post, January 28, 2002. 
 
Miles, Raymond E. and Charles C. Snow. “Organizational Strategy, Structure and 
Process.” The Academy of Management Review 3, no. 3 (1978): 546-562. 
 
Miller, Mark C. “Courts, Agencies, and Congressional Committees: A Neo-Institutional 
Perspective.” The Review of Politics 55, no. 3, special issue on public law 
(Summer 1993): 471-489. 
 
Milner, Helen. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Mitchell, Alison, “Cheney Rejects Broader Access to Terror Brief.” New York Times, 




Monetapento, Ronald, Ross Terril, Keith Eirinberg and Weiquo Zhang. The Future of 
US-China Relations. Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1992. 
 
Morganthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New 
York: Free Press, 1967. 
 
Morrison, Wayne M. China-U.S. Trade Issues, CRS Report, IB91121 (July 1, 2005). 
 
Mouawad, Jad. “Unocal’s Chinese Suitor Wants U.S. Review.” New York Times, June 
28, 2005.  
 
Mufson, Steve. “President Pledges Defense of Taiwan.” Washington Post, April 26, 
2001. 
 
Myers, Ramon H., Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds. Making China 
Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001. 
 
Myers, Ramon H. and David Shambaugh. “Introduction: The Legacy of U.S. China 
Policy, 1989-2000.” In Myers, Oskenberg, and Shambaugh, 1-17. 
 
Nakashima, Ellen and Dana Milbank. “Bush Cabinet Takes Back Seat in Driving Policy.” 
Washington Post, September 5, 2001. 
 
Nakayama, Toshihiro. Politics of U.S. Policy toward China: Analysis of Domestic 
Factors. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2006. 
 
National Bureau of Statistics. China Statistical Yearbook 2000. Beijing: Statistical 
Publishing House, 2000. 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. The 9/11 Report. New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., July 2004 
 
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press, 1990. 
 
Newmann, William W. “Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security.” 
Public Administration Review 62, no. 1 (September 2002): 126-137. 
 
Newsom, David. “Foreign Policy and Academia.” Foreign Policy 101 (1995-1996): 52-
68.  
 
Ning, Chang. “China’s Importation of Mineral Resources and Oceanic Sh pping.” 
Chinascope (June 2005): 24-29. 
293 
 
North, Douglass, C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performances. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Norton, Stephen J. “A Bid to ‘Buy American’ Under Security Spotligh .” CQ Weekly 
(July 18, 2005) 1952-1953. http://www.cq.com (accessed December 11, 2005). 
 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones. “International Security St dies: A Report of 
a Conference on the State of the Field.” International Security 12 (Spring 1988): 
5-27. 
 
Oksenberg, Michel. “A Decade of Sino-American Relations.” Foreign Affairs 61 (Fall 
1982): 175-195. 
 
Oleszek, Walter. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978. 
 
Organization for International Investment, Letter to the House Committee on Armed 
Services, July 13, 2005. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective 
Action.” Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. 
American Political Science Review 92 (March 1998): 1-22. 
 
Ostrom, ———. “Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward 
Complementarity.” American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 237-43. 
 
Ostrom, ———. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Paik, Keun-Wook. “China Moves on Gas for Supplies and Environment.” Petroleum 
Economist 66 (February 1999). 
 
Palmeri, Christopher. “On a Fast Boat to China?” Business Week, January 24, 2005). 
 
Peters, B. Guy. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’ . 
New York: Continuum Press, 2005. 
 
Peters, B. Guy and Jon Pierre. “Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and 
Explanation.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8, no. 4 
(1998): 565-583. 
 
Peterson, Paul E. “The President’s Dominance in Foreign Policy Making. Political 
Science Quarterly 109, no. 2 (1994): 215-234. 
294 
 
Petrova, Margarita H. “The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground between 
Rationalist and Ideational Approaches in International Relations?” European 
Journal of International Relations 9, no. 110 (March 2003): 115-163. 
 
Pettis, Michael. Far Eastern Economic Review 28 (July 2005):27-29. 
 
Pierson, Paul. “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Policy Change.” 
World Politics 45, no. 4 (2003): 595-628. 
 
Pierson, ———. “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change.” 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13 (October 
2000): 475-499. 
 
Pierson, ———. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study Of Politics.” 
American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 251-267. 
 
Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political 
Science.” In Katznelson and Milner. New York: Norton, 2002. 
 
Polsby, Nelson. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” 
American Political Science Review. 62 (1968): 144-68. 
 
Przeworski, Paul. “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts.” In Elster and 
Slagstad. 
 
Ragsdale, Lyn and John Theis. “The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 
1924-1992.” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 4 (1997): 1280-318. 
 
Rakove, Jack N. “American Federalism: Was there an Original Understanding.” In 
Killenbeck, 107-129. 
 
Rakove, ———. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 
 
Rapaport, A. “Explanatory Power and Explanatory Appeal of Theories.” Synthese 10 
(1972): 341-42. 
 
Reich, Robert. "The Dead Heat." The American Prospect 11.24 (2000): 56. http://0-
find.galegroup.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/gtx/start.do?prodId=AONE&user Group 
Name=udenver (accessed November 15, 2009). 
 
Rice, Condoleezza. “Promoting the National Interest.” Foreign Affairs 79:1 




Riker, William. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of 
Institutions.” American Political Science Review 75 (1980): 432-47. 
 
Robinson Glen O., Ernest Gellhorn, Harold H. Bruff. The Administrative Process. Saint 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1986. 
 
Robinson, James A. Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative 
Influence and Initiative. Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1962. 
 
Romer, Thomas and James M. Snyder, Jr. “An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics 
of PAC Contributions.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 745-69. 
 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. Excerpts from the Press Conference, July 23, 1937. Archived by 
John Woolley and Gerhard Peters. The American Presidency Project. http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences (accessed June 3, 2009). 
 
Rosenau, James N. and Klaus Knorr. eds Contending Approaches to International 
Politics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1969). 
 
Rosenbloom, David H. 2001. “Whose Bureaucracy is This, Anyway? Congress’ 1946 
Answer.” Political Science and Politics. 34, no. 4 (December 2001): 773-777. 
 
Rossiter, Clinton. The American Presidency. New York: Time Incorporated, 1960. 
 
Rothenberg, Lawrence S. and Mitchell S. Sanders. “Modeling Legislator Decision 
Making: A Historical Perspective.” American Politics Research 30, no. 3 (May 
2002): 235-264. 
 
Rozman, Gilbert and Noah Rozman. “The United States and Asia in 2002: Needing Help 
Against ‘Evil.’” Asian Survey 43, no. 1 (January-February 2003): 1-14. 
 
Rubin, Janice E. and Michael V. Seitzinger. “Unocal: Legal Implications of Acquisition 
Bids by Chevron Corporation and China National Offshore Oil Corporation.” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 13, 2005. 
 
Rumsfeld, Donald H. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001. 
 
Sanger, David E. “Bush Tells Beijing the U.S. is Ready to Defend Taiwan.” New York 




Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala. U.S. National Security: 
Policymakers, Processes, and Politics. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2008. 
 
Savage, Charlie. Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of 
American Democracy. New York: Little Brown, 2007. 
 
Scharpf, Fritz W. Games Real Actors Play. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997. 
 
Scharpf, ———. “Institutions in Comparative Policy Research.” Comparative Political 
Studies 33 (August/September 2000): 762-790. 
 
Schick, Allen. “The Problem of Presidential Budgeting.” In  Helco and Salmon. 
 
Schneider, William. “Zealots and Cranks, Be Gone. National Journal 31, no 19 (1999). 
Academic One File, penlib.du.edu., Gale doc. A54775127 (accessed November 
15, 2009). 
 
Scott, W.R. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers, 1995. 
 
Searing, Donald D. “Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism.” The 
American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991): 1239-1260. 
 
Seiberg, Jaret and Shanon D. Murray. “Antitrust Alert.” The Daily Deal (May 1, 2001). 
 
Seitzinger, Michael V. Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Statutory 
Restrictions. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 26, 
2009. 
 
Sewell, William H. Jr. “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation.” 
American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992): 1-29. 
 
Sewell, ———. Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology. In Terrance J. 
McDonnald, 245-80. 
 
Shackouls, Bobby S. “How to Achieve a Balanced Natural Gas Policy.” World Energy 7, 
no. 4 (2004): 32-40. 
 
Shambaugh, David. “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Rections to 
China’s Rise.” The Washington Quarterly 28, no.3 (2005): 7-25. 
 
Shearer, W. Robert. “The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible 




Shepsle, Kenneth A. “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice 
Approach.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47. 
 
Simon, Sheldon W. “Is There a U.S. Strategy for East Asia?” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 21 (December 1999) 325-
343. 
 
Sinclair, Barbara. “Context, Strategy, and Chance.” In Campbell and Rockman, 105-132. 
 
Singer, J. David. “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight without Evidence.” In Rosenau and 
Knorr. 
 
Sitathan, Tony. “Exploration and Development Encouraged. “ World Oil 223, no. 8 
(2002): 67-71. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research.” In Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol. 
 
Skocpol, ———.  Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social 
Policy in the United States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1992. 
 
Smith, Steven S. and Christopher J. Deering. Committees in Congress, 2nd ed. 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1990. 
 
State Economic and Trade Commission . China Energy Annual Review.  Beijing, China, 
1997, 198-201. 
 
Steinmo, S., Kathleen Thelen, and F. Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1992. 
 
Stevenson, Richard W., David E. Sanger, and Jeff Gerth, contributors. “In Unocal Bid, 
U.S. Struggles with China Policies.” New York Times, June 26, 2005. 
 
Stone, Gary. Elites for Peace: The Senate and the Vietnam War, 1964-1968. Knoxville, 
TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2007. 
 
Suettinger, Robert. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003 
 
Sundquist, James L. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, DC: 




Sutter, Robert G. Grading Bush’s China Policy: A-. PacNet 10 (March 8, 2002), 
Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ pubs/pac0210[1]. 
pdf (accessed Feb. 24, 2007). 
 
Sutter, ———. China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2005. 
 
Sutter, ———. “Congressional Pressures and U.S.-China Policy.” Foreign Service 
Journal 82, no.5 (May 2005): 24-29. 
 
Sutter, ———. “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (August 2003): 477-492. 
 
Sutter, ———. “The U.S Congress: Personal, Partisan, Political.” In Myers, Ok enberg 
and Shambaugh. 
 
Sutter, ———. U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Roles of Interest 
Groups. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. 
 
Tempas, Kathryn Dunn and Stephen Hess. “The Contemporary Presidency: The Bush 
White House: First Appraisals.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32 (September 
2002): 577-585. 
 
Teten, Ryan Lee. “The Evolution of the Rhetorical Presidency and Getting Past the 
Traditional/Modern Divide.” Political Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 2008). 
 
Thelen, Kathleen. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404. 
 
Timmons, Heather. “China Oil Giant Expected to Vote Today on Unocal Bid.” New York 
Times, June 22, 2005. 
 
United Nations, General Assembly Official Records of the 26th Session, 1971. 
 
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (New York: 
United Nations, 1993);  
 
U.S. Congress. Commission to Assess Ballistic Missile Threat, Report of the 
Commission. 104th Cong., 2d sess., July 15, 1998. 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. China Energy Profile, 




U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Country Profile: China, 
August 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov (accessed April 7, 2009). 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. China Country Analysis 
Brief, August 2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html (accessed 
March 3, 2009). 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis 
Briefs: China, (Updated August 2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ 
china/ pdf.pdf (accessed March 28, 2009). 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 
2008, Report # DOE/EIA-0484 (June 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of State. Interview with Time Magazine Editorial Board, 19 September 
2005.  http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/53630.htm (accessed June 16, 
2007). 
 
U.S. Department of State.  Briefing En Route to Anchorage, Alaska. July 13, 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49536.htm (accessed June 16, 2007).  
 
U.S. Department of State. Press Availability in Beijing. July 10, 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm 2005/49113.htm. (accessed June 16, 2007). 
 
U.S. Department of State.  Remarks to Press en Route to Alaska. July 8, 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49110.htm (accessed June 16, 2005). 
 
U.S. Department of State. Briefing on Trip to Sudan, Jordan, and Egypt. July 5, 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/48994.htm (accessed June 16, 
2007). 
 
U.S. Department of State. Press Gaggle by Scott McClelland and Steve Hadley, National 
Security Advisor. July 5, 2005. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/49003.htm 
(accessed June 16, 2007). 
 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Country Reports on 
Economic Policy and Trade Practices, 2001: China. (February 2002). 
 
U.S Government Accounting Office. Defense Trade: Enhancements to the 
Implementation of Exon-Florio Could Strengthen the Law’s Effectiveness. R port 
to Congressional Requesters (September 2005). 
 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules. L gislative Reorganization Act of 
1970. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. H. Rpt. 91-1215) 
300 
 
Vaida, Bara, “Chevron versus CNOOC on K Street,” National Journal 37, no. 27 (July 2, 
2005): 2139. 
 
Van Evera, S. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University, 1997. 
 
Walcott, Charles E. and Karen M. Hult. Governing the White House. Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press, 2007. 
 
Walsh, Kenneth T. “Looking Back on a Troubled Presidency: Bush is Hoping to Cast His 
Legacy in a Positive Light.” U.S. News & World Report 145, no. 13 (December 
15, 2008): 22. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in Interna ional 
Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 23-48. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A reply to my 
critics.” Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 9-61. 
 
Waltz, ———. “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security, 25 
(Summer 2000): 5-41. 
 
Waltz, ———. “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory.” Journal of International 
Affairs 44, no. 1 ( Spring/Summer1990): 21-38. 
 
Waltz, ———. “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Reply to My Critics.” 
In Keohane, 322-46. 
 
Waltz, ———. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University, 1979. 
 
Waltz, ———. Theory of International Politics. New York: Columbia University, 1959. 
 
Wayne, Leslie and David Barboza. “Unocal Deal: A Lot More than Money is at Issue.” 
New York Times, June 24, 2007. 
 
Weber, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Edited and translated by J. Winklemann. 
Tübingen: Mohr, 1976. 
 
Wen Jiabao, Report to the National People Congress, March 5, 2005, cited in Warwick J. 
McKibbin, “Environmental Consequences of Rising Energy Use In China,” paper 
prepared for the Asian Economic Policy Review conference held in Tokyo n 




Wildavsky, Aaron. “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural 
Theory of Preference Formation.” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 
3-22. 
 
Wildavsky, ———. “The Two Presidencies.” In The Presidency, edited by Aaron 
Wildavsky. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969. 
 
Weir, Margaret. Politics and Jobs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1992. 
 
Wolf, Martin. “The Sleeping Giant Awakes.” Financial Times, June 28, 1993. 
 
Woolley, John T. and Gerhard Peters. The American Presidency Project (online). Santa 
Barbara, CA: University of California (host). http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/?pid=15748 (accessed June 3, 2009). 
 
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, 2005. 
 
Wu Kang, Shair Ling Han. “Chinese Companies Pursue Overseas Oil and G s Assets.” 
Oil & Gas Journal 103, no.15 (April 18, 2005): 18-24. 
 
Xu Xiaojie, “Long-range Strategies for China’s Energy Security,” Pipeline & Gas 
Journal 226, no. 8 (1999), http://0=galenet.galegroup.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/ 
servlet/BCRC?vrsn=149&locID=ude (accessed December 8, 2005). 
 
Yergin, Daniel. “Ensuring Energy Security.” Foreign Affairs 85 (March/April 2006): 69-
82. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed, “Is Robert Gates a Genius?”  Newsweek (April 20, 2009): 29. 
 
Zhao Suisheng. “The Making of China’s Periphery Policy. In Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, edited by Suisheng Zhao, 256-275. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 
 
Zhu Ang. “China’s Investment Environment, Laws, and Regulations.” In Dorian and 
Fridley. 
 
Zoellick, Robert B. 2001. Statement before the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives (March 7, 2001), cited in Bruce Stokes, “Fr e
Trade-Offs,” Foreign Policy, (May-June):62-63. 
 





Zweig, David and Jianhai Bi. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 
5 (September/October 2005): 25-38, available at Academic Search Complete 




TABLE 4:  AGENCIES REPRESENTED ON THE COMMITTEE ON 





Lead Office Mission 





Office of International Investment: Coordinates policies toward 




1975 International Trade Administration: Coordinates Issues 
concerning trade promotion, international commercial policy, 




1975 Defense Technology Security Administration: Administers the 
development and implementation of Defense technology security 
policies on international transfers of defense-related goods, 
services, and technologies 
 
Department of State 1975 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs: Formulates and 
implements policy regarding foreign economic matters, including 
trade and international finance and development 
 
Office of U.S Trade 
Representative 
  
1980 Directs all trade negotiations of and formulates trade policy for 
the United States 
Council of Economic 
Advisors 
1980 Performs analyses and appraisals of the national economy for the 




1988 Criminal Division: Develops, enforces, and supervises the 
application of all federal criminal laws, except for those assigned 





1988 Evaluates, formulates, and coordinates management procedures 
and program objectives within and among federal departments 
and agencies, and controls administration of the fed ral budget 
 
Office of Science and 
Technology Policy  
1993 Provides scientific, engineering, technological analyses for the 




1993 Coordinates the economic policymaking process and provides 




1993 Advises and assists the President in integrating ll aspects of 




2003 Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection: Identifies 
and assesses current and future threats to the homeland, maps 
those threats against vulnerabilities, issues warnings, and takes 
preventative and protective action 
                                                
610 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters (GAO-
05-686), “Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio Could 
Strengthen the Law’s Effectiveness, (September 2005); 6. 
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TABLE 5:  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIOC  Azerbayan International Operation Company 
ANWR Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
APA  Administrative Procedure Act 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASML  ASM Lithography 
BBL/D Billion barrels per day 
BEA  Bureau of Economic Analysis  
BOB  Bureau of Budget 
BTU  British Thermal Units 
CATIC China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFIUS  Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CNOOC Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC  Chinese National Petroleum Corporation 
DOE/EIA Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration 
DOJ  Department of Justice 
DPA  Defense Production Act 
EOP  Executive Office of the President 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
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FDR  Franklin D. Roosevelt 
FTC  Foreign Trade Commission 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GOP  Republican (“Grand Old”) Party 
G-7  Group of Seven 
HSAC  Homeland Security Advisory Council 
IDA  International Development Association 
IEA  International Energy Administration 
IEEPA  International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
IIE  Institute for International Economics 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
LNG  Liquid Natural Gas 
LRA  Legislative Reorganization Act 
MFN  Most Favored Nation 
NEPDG National Energy Policy Development Group 
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
NSA  National Security Advisor 
NSC  National Security Council 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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OHS  Office of Homeland Security 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OSI  Office for Strategic Initiatives 
PNA  Premerger Notification Act 
SEZ  Special Economic Zone 
SETC  State Economic and Trade Commission 
SINOPEC China National Petrochemical Corporation 
SVG  Silicon Valley Group, Inc. 
UN  United Nations 
WB  World Bank 
WHO  White House Office 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
WWI  World War One 
WWII  World War Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
